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Many, like Lincoln himself, who looked at the neo-colonial relationship between Southern cotton planters and British manufacturers regarded that system in the same way as you regard protectionism. Once land was settled there was little industry and hence, little opportunity for the industrious poor to improve their condition. Protectionism was intended to stimulate industry that would give opportunity to the ambitious workingman. For those plugged into the colonial economy, protection was an unnecessary burden, but for more impoverished Southerners it's possible and likely that the benefits of protection could have outweighed the costs.

Established economic powers and underdeveloped countries viewed competitive advantage in different ways. In the British scheme, Spain and Portugal would always be providers of wine to the English, and the Caribbean Islands would always provide sugar for the home country. 19th century Americans wanted to avoid such a subservient fate. And it wasn't only Northerners. Virginians, like Madison and Monroe promoted protective tariffs in the early 19th century. Virginia manufacturers and ironfounders, Kentucky hemp growers, and Louisiana sugar kings all favored higher tariffs.

We've moved beyond protectionism, but a major reason for that is that we are now in the position that Britain had in the early 19th century. We benefit from and rely on foreign trade for our prosperity. A protective tariff would be a great folly for us. In the 19th century, Americans still had to work things out on their own and figure out ways to develop home industries or reconcile themselves to being appendages to other economies.

Given Confederate support for protective sugar tariffs, and Virginia manufacturers' enthusiasm for using revenue tariffs against their Northern competitors, it's pretty clear that things weren't so black and white between North and South.

Protectionism was intended to stimulate industry that would give opportunity to the ambitious workingman.

That is admittedly the economic benefit of protectionism to the protected industry. Regardless, the cost in opportunity on the nation as a whole caused by a protectionist tariff and lack of free trade far outweighs any isolated gains in the protected industry. This is a matter of economic fact and a central part of international trade. The problems on the whole caused by protection may be graphically demonstrated without fail, just as may be done with the isolated gains of a protected industry.

but for more impoverished Southerners it's possible and likely that the benefits of protection could have outweighed the costs.

Most likely not, as they would tend to be hit the most economically from the higher post-tariff prices. Though the prices would increase for all, the burden is less upon those with large ammounts of expendible cash after production than those producing on the margin, or the small farms. Perhaps a small few could get into a protected industry and gain from the artificial economic boost created for that industry by the tariff, but the larger whole would continue to suffer the prices. That is because a large and continuous protectionist tariff is nothing more than a perk to a select few drawn from the greater many.

In the British scheme, Spain and Portugal would always be providers of wine to the English, and the Caribbean Islands would always provide sugar for the home country. 19th century Americans wanted to avoid such a subservient fate.

The best way to do exactly that is to promote free trade and produce where the market strength is. This in turn places trade dynamics within the framework of price and production advantages rather than historical preset expectations.

Virginia manufacturers and ironfounders, Kentucky hemp growers, and Louisiana sugar kings all favored higher tariffs.

Is there any reason to expect that they shouldn't have? Political interests have written personal perks into law wherever the opportunity has presented itself since the dawn of history.

Not in the least. That a small minority of any given population acts in a politically inconsistent manner from that population's greater majority in no way means that dissent to be widespread or significant beyond itself. Historical evidence in 1860 makes it clear that the majority representations of both regions advocated opposite policies. The best example of this is the Morrill Act vote in the House of Representatives, which, if I may remind, occurred before secession and therefore enjoyed the full presence of all the state delegations during the vote. The vote broke on strictly sectional lines - arguably the most sectional of any vote taken before the war. Here is how it split:

Total: 105 yes, 64 no.

Yes votes from Confederate state representatives: 1.
Yes votes from the border states of Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri: 6.

No votes from Union state representatives: 15.

Southern congressman voting in favor (including border states): 12.5%
Northern congressman voting in favor: 87%