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More important than the bombing was the US Government's swift and vigorous response to it and earlier anarchist bombings.

The bombing was attributed to Italian anarchists, likely followers of Luigi Galleani, though it remains officially unsolved to this day. This attack came amid a wave of radical violence in the United States, including earlier bombings in 1919 that had already heightened national fears of communism and anarchism. (unlike today where there seem to be no such fears!)

A. Mitchell Palmer served as U.S. Attorney General under President Woodrow Wilson, a position he had held since 1919. Palmer, a former Quaker and ambitious politician eyeing the 1920 Democratic presidential nomination, had already positioned himself as a staunch opponent of radicals following personal attacks on his life. In June 1919, a bomb intended for his Washington, D.C., home detonated prematurely, killing the anarchist bomber Carlo Valdinoci and severely damaging the residence—shaking even the nearby home of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt. This incident, part of a coordinated series of bombings targeting public officials, prompted Palmer to establish the Radical Division within the Department of Justice to monitor and suppress perceived threats to social stability, particularly from anarchists and leftists. (Calling Pam Bondi!!)

Palmer's response to the Wall Street bombing was swift and he framed it as validation of his long-standing warnings about radical subversion. Upon arriving at the scene shortly after the explosion, he addressed reporters directly, declaring that the attack was precisely the kind of "terrorist" outrage he had been alerting the American public to for months. He emphasized that it demonstrated the urgent need for aggressive federal action against anarchists and Bolshevik-inspired radicals, whom he portrayed as enemies intent on overthrowing the U.S. government and capitalist system. In public statements, Palmer linked the bombing to broader conspiracies, accusing immigrants and labor agitators of importing revolutionary violence from Europe. This rhetoric was not new; it built on his earlier essay "The Case Against the 'Reds'" (published in February 1920 in *The Forum*), where he argued that communism was "eating its way into the homes of the American workman" and justified mass deportations as essential to national security.

The bombing occurred just months after the height of the so-called Palmer Raids, a series of nationwide operations in November 1919 and January 1920 that Palmer orchestrated with the help of young J. Edgar Hoover, then head of the Radical Division (later the FBI). These raids targeted suspected radicals, leading to the warrantless arrests of thousands—estimates range from 3,000 to 10,000 individuals across 33 cities—many of whom were immigrants of Italian, Eastern European Jewish, or other leftist backgrounds. Over 800 were detained in the Boston area alone, and hundreds, including prominent anarchist Emma Goldman, were deported on ships like the USS *Buford* (dubbed the "Soviet Ark"). Palmer justified these measures under wartime-era laws like the Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918, claiming they were necessary to prevent a Bolshevik-style revolution. The Wall Street attack, he argued, proved that his preemptive crackdowns had been insufficient and that further vigilance was required.

Palmer's reaction was deeply intertwined with the so-called "Red Scare" of 1919–1920, a period of intense anti-radical hysteria fueled by labor strikes, race riots, and the recent Russian Revolution. The 1919 bombings, including the one at his home, had already spurred him to action, but the Wall Street incident amplified his campaign (Paging Pam Bondi -- your history lesson is available). He used the tragedy to renew calls for expanded surveillance, deportations, and restrictions on free speech, warning of imminent threats like a radical uprising on May Day 1920—which ultimately failed to materialize and began to erode public support for his tactics. Critics, including civil liberties advocates, accused him of exaggeration and abuse of power; for instance, Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Freeland Post blocked many deportations by insisting on due process (the more things change, huh?), leading to congressional attempts to impeach him.

Politically, Palmer saw the bombing as an opportunity to bolster his image as the "Fighting Quaker"—a law-and-order figure who could protect America from internal enemies. His presidential bid capitalized on this, with supporters praising the raids as heroic. However, the Wall Street response also highlighted the limits of his approach: despite the raids, the bombing succeeded, and investigations yielded few concrete leads, partly due to the Justice Department's focus on broad sweeps rather than targeted intelligence.

While Palmer's immediate response garnered initial praise from a fearful public and press (imagine that! the press supported him!), it ultimately contributed to the backlash against the Red Scare. The disregard for civil liberties during the raids—illegal searches, prolonged detentions without charges, and ethnic profiling—drew widespread condemnation from legal scholars, labor unions, and emerging groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), founded in 1920 partly in reaction to these events. Palmer's credibility suffered further when his dire predictions of violence repeatedly proved unfounded, leading President Wilson to privately admonish him in April 1920: "You should not let this country see red." By mid-1920, the raids had largely ceased, and Palmer's presidential ambitions fizzled; he lost the Democratic nomination to James M. Cox.

In retrospect, Palmer's response to the Wall Street bombing exemplified the era's tension between security and rights, setting a precedent for future anti-subversive campaigns, including the McCarthy era. Though the bombing underscored real dangers from anarchist groups like the Galleanists, Palmer's heavy-handed tactics alienated many and highlighted the risks of fear-driven governance. The event remains a stark reminder of how terrorism can fuel both protective measures and overreach.

The article says "Palmer's credibility suffered further when his dire predictions of violence repeatedly proved unfounded." -- Gee, maybe it was because Palmer's tough approach worked?