Posted on 06/02/2025 3:52:23 PM PDT by marcusmaximus
Majority Leader John Thune, R-S.D., said Monday the Senate could begin work this month on a bill imposing stiff sanctions on Russia – and secondary sanctions on countries that trade with Russia – over its war in Ukraine.
Thune said President Donald Trump's administration still hopes for an agreement to end the three-year-old conflict, but the Senate is prepared to help put pressure on Moscow.
"We also stand ready to provide President Trump with any tools he needs to get Russia to finally come to the table in a real way," Thune said in a speech opening the day's business in the upper chamber.
Thune told reporters afterward he has been discussing the sanctions legislation with the White House.
The measure would impose 500% tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil, gas, uranium and other exports. China and India account for about 70% of Russia's international energy business, which helps fund its war effort.
The bill, whose lead sponsors are Sens. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., and Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., has at least 82 co-sponsors in the 100-member Senate.
Graham said in Kyiv last week he thought the Senate could take up the bill as soon as this week, but Thune did not set that timeframe.
"I think right now they're still hopeful they'll be able to strike some sort of a deal," Thune said. "But as you might expect, there's a high level of interest here in the Senate, on both sides of the aisle, and moving on it, and it very well could be something that we would take up in this work period."
He was referring to the weeks before lawmakers leave Washington, D.C., ahead of the Fourth of July recess.
(Excerpt) Read more at newsmax.com ...
Allowing that to happen would be result in Mike Johnson looking for another job.
Instead of the BBB we have the Big F'n Joke.
Well I never would have guessed. The jokes write themselves.
“It’s not a sellout to impose real sanctions on Putin.”
No, but it is a sellout to impose 500% sanctions on US buyers of imported items, which will be the effect, and once Trump signs the bill, he’s POWERLESS to stop them.
Gaetz is gone.
“As soon as Trump says no, they lose 40 sponsors.”
Agree, the sponsor count means NOTHING until Trump supports it. During his first term, AT LEAST 82 Senators (meaning most of the Republicans too) would have voted to throw Trump out of the White House, but it was a public vote, so they knew better.
It can be a way of buying votes for the budget, but agree that it cannot be part of the budget.
Yes they will. None of those varmints care about what we voted for. They don’t care that they are causing the destruction of our own country either.
So you have just admitted that you want the democrats to win and to hurt Trump.
Zeepers are neocons and democrats.
“Yes they will. None of those varmints care about what we voted for.”
They could, but if it means a lot to Trump, then they won’t. It really depends on whether Trump makes getting along with Russia a priority, or instead reverts to the Biden / DNC / Globalist / Neocon view of Russia (as we often see here, by the way).
As soon as Trump says no, they lose 40 sponsors.
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Looked it up. Only 7% of the 1500+ vetoes ever cast get overridden with 2/3 vote both houses.
Beyond all that and probably more important, the recent OPEC+ increase in output allocates 16% of that to Russia. China and India are explosively growing their consumption, and everyone else already has customers for their output.
In a few weeks the new update to the Bible of oil comes out. As of now China’s consumption is 16.6 million bpd. Growth about 5%/yr. India is at 5.44 mbpd. Growth 11%/yr.
China does produce about 4.5 mbpd. India less than 1 mbpd.
Eyes glaze over unless they are used to storing these numbers. Bottom line: they have nowhere else to get the oil and oil is life. If an iPhone prices up 500% then iPhones won’t be bought. But oil has to be bought because it carries food to grocery stores.
It means Speaker Johnson will do a deal with Thune and Graham to pass President Trump’s budget. The Demonrats are incidental to the goal of passing President Trump’s budget.
AI says this, so it must be true: The phrase “countries don’t have friends, only interests” suggests that international relations are driven by strategic interests rather than personal or emotional bonds. This perspective emphasizes that nations prioritize their own goals and security over loyalty to allies or enmity towards rivals.
Why do you have such a boner for the Ukraine? Dual-citizen?
Sorry to repeat myself, but:
Are we going to sanction ourselves? Despite the 2024 ban on our importing LEU from Russia, waivers have been issued to allow some imports. How about Europe? They still import Russian oil. China and India stop importing Russian oil? Uh, no. Are we gonna sanction Israel? Hmm.
Rand Paul wrote an excellent piece on why and how this stupid bill would result in nasty blowback:
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/congress-sanctions-russia/
I’m an advocate of Zeepers going to the front and getting in a trench. Russia doesn’t give a crap about sanctions. They can trade with China or any of the Brics; we don’t have anything that they need or want.
Grok AI also says this:
Ranking Vladimir Putin’s top five mistakes in the invasion of Ukraine, launched in February 2022, requires assessing their strategic impact on Russia’s failure to achieve its objectives. Based on available analyses, here are the mistakes in descending order of importance:
1. **Underestimating Ukrainian Resistance and National Unity**: Putin assumed Ukraine would collapse quickly due to perceived weak leadership and societal divisions. Instead, Ukraine’s unified resistance, fueled by national identity and led effectively by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, galvanized both military and civilian efforts. This miscalculation turned a planned swift victory into a protracted war, fundamentally undermining Russia’s strategy. The failure to anticipate Ukraine’s resolve has been the most consequential error, as it set the stage for all subsequent setbacks.
2. **Misjudging Russian Military Capabilities**: Putin overestimated Russia’s military strength, expecting a rapid, decisive campaign. Poor planning, inadequate logistics, and reliance on poorly trained conscripts led to early failures, such as the botched Kyiv offensive. Corruption had hollowed out military readiness, with outdated equipment and low morale further crippling operations. This misjudgment squandered Russia’s initial advantage, forcing it into a costly war of attrition.
3. **Ignoring Western Resolve and Support**: Putin underestimated the scale and unity of Western backing for Ukraine. NATO, the U.S., and allies provided over $100 billion in aid, including advanced weaponry like HIMARS, Javelins, and drones, as well as real-time intelligence. Sanctions also crippled Russia’s economy, limiting its war-sustaining resources. This error amplified Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and Russia’s isolation, significantly prolonging the conflict.
4. **Poor Strategic and Tactical Execution**: Russia’s initial multi-front invasion was overly ambitious, spreading forces thin across a vast country. Inflexible Soviet-style tactics, coupled with inadequate supply lines and communication failures, allowed Ukraine to exploit weaknesses through mobile defenses and guerrilla tactics. This operational incompetence prevented Russia from consolidating early gains and turned the war into a grinding stalemate.
5. **Failure to Secure Domestic and International Support**: Putin miscalculated the domestic cost of the war, avoiding full mobilization to maintain political stability, which limited troop numbers. Internationally, he failed to counter Western narratives or secure meaningful allies beyond limited support from countries like China and Iran. This left Russia diplomatically isolated and reliant on mercenaries and depleting resources, constraining its long-term war effort.
These mistakes, rooted in hubris and flawed intelligence, have compounded over three years, preventing Russia from achieving its goal of conquering Ukraine while entrenching it in a costly, ongoing conflict.
Putin’s inability to conquer Ukraine since the invasion began in February 2022 stems from a combination of strategic, military, and geopolitical factors:
1. **Ukrainian Resilience and National Unity**: Ukraine’s military and civilian population have shown fierce resistance, bolstered by a strong sense of national identity. Volunteer fighters, territorial defense units, and widespread public support have made occupation costly and difficult. Ukraine’s ability to mobilize and sustain its forces, even under pressure, has been a significant obstacle.
2. **Russian Military Miscalculations**: Russia underestimated Ukraine’s capabilities and overestimated its own. Poor planning, inadequate logistics, and low morale among conscript-heavy Russian forces led to early failures, like the stalled Kyiv offensive. Corruption and outdated equipment further hampered Russia’s effectiveness.
3. **Western Support for Ukraine**: Massive aid from NATO countries, the U.S., and allies—over $100 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian support—has been critical. Advanced weapons like HIMARS, Javelin missiles, and drones, combined with intelligence sharing, have enabled Ukraine to counter Russian advances effectively.
4. **Geographic and Tactical Challenges**: Ukraine’s vast terrain, including urban centers and difficult rural landscapes, favors defensive warfare. Ukrainian forces have used guerrilla tactics, ambushes, and fortified positions to bog down Russian troops, turning the conflict into a protracted war of attrition.
5. **Economic and Political Constraints**: Western sanctions have strained Russia’s economy, limiting resources for a prolonged war. Domestic political pressures, including dissent and the need to maintain regime stability, have forced Putin to avoid full mobilization, relying instead on mercenaries and poorly trained recruits.
6. **Adaptability of Ukrainian Forces**: Ukraine has effectively adapted to modern warfare, leveraging drones, cyber operations, and real-time intelligence. Russia, by contrast, has struggled to innovate, relying on outdated Soviet-style tactics.
7. **International Isolation**: Russia’s invasion has unified much of the global community against it, isolating Putin diplomatically and economically. This has limited Russia’s ability to replenish resources or gain allies to counterbalance Western support for Ukraine.
Despite territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, Russia controls only about 18-20% of Ukrainian territory as of mid-2025, far short of Putin’s apparent goals of full control or regime change. The war’s stalemate reflects these intertwined challenges, with no quick resolution in sight.
I’m not reading all of that.
More from Grok:
Vladimir Putin’s top five mistakes in the Ukraine invasion—underestimating Ukrainian resistance, misjudging Russian military capabilities, ignoring Western resolve, poor strategic execution, and failing to secure support—stem from a mix of cognitive biases, systemic issues, and personal miscalculations. Here’s why these errors likely occurred, tied to each mistake:
1. **Underestimating Ukrainian Resistance and National Unity**: Putin’s belief that Ukraine would collapse quickly reflects a combination of historical bias and flawed intelligence. He viewed Ukraine as an artificial state, inherently tied to Russia, based on a skewed interpretation of shared history and Soviet-era ties. His inner circle, insulated from dissent, likely reinforced this by feeding him overly optimistic reports, shaped by fear of contradicting his narrative. Limited exposure to accurate ground-level intelligence about Ukraine’s growing national identity and military reforms since 2014 led to a gross misreading of its resolve.
2. **Misjudging Russian Military Capabilities**: Putin’s overconfidence in Russia’s military was rooted in decades of propaganda exaggerating its strength and his own detachment from operational realities. Corruption within the military, which siphoned off funds for modernization, went unaddressed, as did logistical weaknesses. Putin’s reliance on a small cadre of loyalists, rather than competent military advisors, meant he was unaware of issues like low morale, outdated equipment, and inadequate training. His assumption of a quick victory blinded him to the need for rigorous preparation.
3. **Ignoring Western Resolve and Support**: Putin underestimated Western unity due to prior successes in exploiting divisions, like during the 2014 Crimea annexation when sanctions were milder. He likely believed NATO was fractured and that Europe’s energy dependence on Russia would deter strong action. His misreading of U.S. commitment, especially post-Afghanistan withdrawal, and failure to anticipate the scale of financial and military aid—over $100 billion—reflect a strategic blind spot about the West’s willingness to counter Russian aggression.
4. **Poor Strategic and Tactical Execution**: Putin’s decision to launch a multi-front invasion was driven by hubris and a desire for a swift, symbolic victory. His centralized control stifled military flexibility, forcing commanders to adhere to rigid plans unsuited to Ukraine’s terrain and defensive tactics. The lack of input from experienced field officers, combined with an overreliance on Soviet-style strategies, led to logistical failures and tactical blunders. Putin’s distrust of subordinates likely prevented course corrections early in the campaign.
5. **Failure to Secure Domestic and International Support**: Putin’s authoritarian system, which suppresses dissent and rewards loyalty over competence, limited his ability to gauge domestic discontent or build a robust war economy. His expectation of rallying global south or non-Western allies misfired, as countries like China offered only limited support, wary of Western backlash. Putin’s isolation from diverse perspectives and overreliance on a narrow, sycophantic circle meant he misjudged the diplomatic and domestic costs of a prolonged war.
These mistakes trace back to Putin’s centralized decision-making, surrounded by yes-men, and a worldview shaped by outdated assumptions about Russia’s power and Ukraine’s fragility. His isolation, amplified by years of unchallenged rule, fostered overconfidence and a disconnect from reality, leading to catastrophic miscalculations that have prolonged and complicated the war.
Other than trying to give us reasons for not wanting to move to Russia, it’s hard to see why he just spammed his own thread.
I can only surmise he’s getting paid by the word for these walls of pilpul.
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