[alexander_busek]

Yes, it was a very impressive operation on the tactical level. But what did it achieve at the operational and strategic levels? Not much. Yes, it’s an embarrassment for [...] Yes, they lost a dozen bombers (but still have hundreds left). Yes, it may temporarily hamper some operations in the [...] theater, but that’s it. It was basically a PR stunt. Sure it generated lots of splashy headlines and did good service to the Western “narrative” but what difference does it really make on the battleground?

Are you talking about the Doolittle Raid?

Regards,

[tumblindice]

With the significant difference between that raid and this one, we weren’t looking to make peace.

[CatHerd]

Yeah, it might give Ukrainians a temporary boost in morale, but again, no real advantage on the battlefield. And again, at what cost?

Doolittle: We were already officially at war with Japan. Cost was next to nothing. Therefore, the risk/benefit ratio was in our favor.

The Kursk incursion was touted as a morale booster for the Ukrainians, but look at the cost/benefit ratio. It was basically a case of The Flies Have Captured the Flypaper. The Russians picked them off like fish in a barrel. Yet the Ukrainians kept feeding their best troops and their best shiny Western war toys into Kursk, only to lose them. Meanwhile, the Russians kept methodically grinding down the Ukrainians all across the front lines in Ukraine. The cost/benefit was certainly not in Ukraine’s favor. It was a big ouchie.