Be they "new converts" or not, their will obviously represented the majority since their proposal to ban the slave trade was passed and the attempt to prevent states that did not allow slavery from joining the Confederacy was defeated.
George Rable writes in "The Confederate Republic": On March 8, Tom Cobb moved to prohibit the admission of nonslaveholding states to the Southern republic. But Cobb's own Georgia delegation was divided, with Stephens and Robert Toombs leading the opposition. After three days of debate the motion failed. The delegates eventually agreed to a compromise allowing for the admission of free states but requiring a two-thirds vote of approval from both House and Senate. This result gave new life to reports of sentiments for compromise in the convention and greatly alarmed the fire-eaters. Both sides probably attached too much importance to this matter because it was unlikely that any free states would want to join the Confederacy, and in any case, the new nation's commitment to slavery was embedded in the Constitution.
It showed that far from being "all about" slavery, the CSA was perfectly willing to admit states that had banned it and that they were more concerned with having a more decentralized form of government and fully respecting the sovereignty of the states. The Confederate Constitution no more had slavery embedded in it than the US Constitution did. The situation wrt slaves, the states' laws and the rights of slaveholders were not different than had been the case in the US.
The convention was in a compromising mood and the measure wasn't as significant as some late 20th century historians might have believed. 2/3rds of each half of the Confederate Congress would have to approve and the Senate would vote as states.
The CSA was in general much more willing to respect the sovereignty of the states and had a much more decentralized government. That was true of everything - not just the admission of new confederate states.
This meant that the Deep South States would be able to block any admission of free states on the first go around. The 2/3rds requirement and the Confederacy's explicit and pronounced committment to slavery meant that few free states would realistically be tempted to join.
I don't agree with that assessment at all. If a state that had already banned slavery wanted to join and the states in the Confederacy deemed them a trustworthy partner as well as a beneficial new member to have, they would have almost certainly been admitted.
Why would free states that had objected to slave catchers coming north to take back runaways ever vote to join a country that was even more dedicated to catching and returning runaways?
Some states saw considerable opposition to slave catchers capturing fugitive slaves. Others not nearly so much. I doubt the ones that had strong movements against it would have ever considered joining the CSA anyway so its a moot point.
Why would Deep South militants who were worried about the flagging committment to slavery in the Border States and even in the Upper South agree to admitting free states into their Confederacy?
I haven't seen evidence of some deep worry on the part of Southerners from the Deep South that the states of the Upper South had "a flagging commitment to slavery". Southerners viewed it as a matter for the people of each state to decide.
That would be inviting the abolitionist foxes into the slaveowner's henhouse.
Just because the people of one state had chosen to get rid of slavery it does not necessarily follow that they would then try to force their choice on others. Most Southerners saw it as a matter for each sovereign state to decide.
So yes, the door was theoretically open to admitting free states, but it was based on some imaginary future. It was also a good public relations measure, if anyone had noticed it at the time.
Nobody could know what the future would hold. The future is always imaginary.
Emory Thomas suggests in "The Confederate Nation" that some moderates believed that free states in the Mississipi Valley might at some point be tempted to join, and that those states' admission would strengthen the Confederacy to get territories for slave owners elsewhere -- in the West, in Mexico or (I'll add) the Caribbean. In any event, none of this affected the Confederacy's committment to slavery, whatever late 20th century historians might imagine.
Slavery was primarily used in the production of cotton and tobacco - and to a much lesser extent, rice and sugar. The West is simply not suitable for these crops. Witness the tiny number of slaves actually domiciled in the Arizona Territory which included present day New Mexico as well. What the Confederacy was really committed to was respecting the sovereignty of each state.
Politicians make compromises and concessions. They kick the can down the road. Often they make sure that their concessions aren't likely to have serious real world consequences. The Confederate convention didn't bar the admission of free states. They didn't make it easy either. If it happened at some point down the road, the CSA would deal with that later. It didn't affect the Confederacy's commitment to slavery.
The Confederacy was no more committed to slavery than the US was.
There's a parallel to the Corwin Amendment. Congress and Lincoln threw it out there as a last ditch attempt to save the union. It worked for a minute. The Upper South rejected secession before war began. Then it didn't work.
The states of the Upper South chose to stay in initially not because of the Corwin Amendment which wasn't drafted until after the 7 states of the Deep South had already seceded. The states of the Upper South only chose secession when they were forced to choose between that or attacking other sovereign states to impose a government on them that they did not consent to. The fact that the North was perfectly willing to explicitly protect slavery effectively forever demonstrates once again that slavery was not really threatened in the US.
It was never really going to bring back the Deep South States that had seceded. Secession gave them all the security for slaveholding they wanted. They had crossed the Rubicon and they weren't coming back.
The hope was precisely that it would bring back the states of the Deep South. Since slavery wasn't really their primary concern - and wasn't threatened in the US anyway - it did not address their big concerns which were economic and philosophical against the ever growing usurpation of more and more power by the federal government at the expense of the states. Refusing the Corwin amendment which they had to know would bring war was the one thing that did risk the continuing existence of slavery. They chose that course because slavery was not their main concern.
It isn't true that Lincoln was lobbying the states to ratify the amendment after war began. The amendment had already failed in its purpose, and there was no reason to carry on with it. Even before the war, Lincoln's support for the amendment was lukewarm and distanced. He said he had no objection to it and notified state governors that the amendment was submitted for ratification without explicitly endorsing it.
He didn't put nearly the effort into getting states to ratify it after he started the war that he had before that. Still, he did continue to exert influence to get it passed. While he claimed he merely "had no objection" to it and even that he had not seen it in his inaugural address, that was a lie. He had orchestrated its passage and had worked closely with Corwin and Seward to draft it, get it passed with a supermajority in both houses of Congress and then lobby state governments to pass it. Politicians lied then just as they do today.
The Confederacy was no more committed to slavery than the US was.
The US Constitution refused to mention slavery. The Confederate Constitution did refer to slaves. Thus it was more committed to slavery. Few honest, unbiased and thoughtful people would have denied that in 1861.
Just because the people of one state had chosen to get rid of slavery it does not necessarily follow that they would then try to force their choice on others. Most Southerners saw it as a matter for each sovereign state to decide.
"The people of one state" is a variegated group. "The people" of a Northern state would include abolitionists. Southerners had done all they could to drive abolitionists out. Clearly, admitting free states would mean admitting abolitionists. They would be fewer in some states than others, but most Southern politicians wouldn't really want any.
Barring free states from joining the Confederacy would have been bad public relations. It would have alienated foreigners and others who might sympathize with the CSA, but that didn't mean that the CSA could realistically expect to admit Northern states or that it would want them.
What the Confederacy was really committed to was respecting the sovereignty of each state.
Yet slaveowners didn't want more free states to be admitted to the union, and Missourians were filling up Kansas to make it a slave state. Why would they change now?
Slave states weren't happy about free states blocking the return of runaways. When they had the upper hand they weren't opposed to federal overreach, as in Taney's Dred Scott opinion. But you repeat it as a dogma that they were all about state sovereignty.
Lincoln worked closely with Corwin and Seward to draft it, get it passed with a supermajority in both houses of Congress and then lobby state governments to pass it.
That just isn't true. Buchanan had called for such an amendment. The House went through 57 drafts of the amendment. Early on, John Crittenden played a major role in drafting proposals that were unacceptable to Republicans, so Seward and Corwin jumped in to come up with an alternative. Lincoln submitted possible versions of an amendment. So did a lot of other people. It had to be hammered out in the House and the Senate. Corwin and Seward were there on the scene. Lincoln didn't arrive in Washington until about 10 days before his inauguration.
Seward was more experienced than Lincoln. He thought he was the better man and that in the new administration he would play the role of prime minister and head of government to Lincoln's more passive role as head of state. He wasn't going to take direction from Lincoln. Corwin was giving advice to Lincoln, rather than getting direction from him. Corwin was active in hammering out the compromise. He was an experienced parliamentarian capable of handling all of the maneuvering himself.
Lincoln played a peripheral role in getting the amendment passed. He could sweeten the pot by offering appointments to the supporters of politicians that Seward needed to vote for the amendment or abstain from voting. That apparently happened in one case. Lincoln was far from any kind of mastermind, though. Seward and Corwin were in charge. After the amendment was passed Lincoln sent letters to governors informing them that the amendment had passed Congress, but he wasn't energetically lobbying them. If you have any evidence of that, please provide it now or stop repeating that claim.
Politicians lied then just as they do today.
Yes, politicians lie. People lie. After the Civil War some of them helped give the lie that it was all about tariffs a start. Lincoln had more of a role in the origin of the Corwin Amendment than he claimed, but less of a role in its origin and promotion than modern day conspiracy theorists claim.
“I haven’t seen evidence of some deep worry on the part of Southerners from the Deep South that the states of the Upper South had “a flagging commitment to slavery”. Southerners viewed it as a matter for the people of each state to decide.”
That is the dogma. But it’s clear that militants further South viewed the weakening of slavery in the Border States as a threat and feared that it would spread.
In “The Disruption of American Democracy,” Roy Nichols describes Southern fears in the Summer and Fall of 1860.
This fear was not the fear of property loss, of slave uprising, or of the destruction of white supremacy; these might be felt by the voters, but among the leaders there was the fear of loss of power. They would lose their preferred position in Washington; that was bad enough, but it was not their greatest dread. Their very real and often overlooked fear was loss of power at home. The victory of Abraham Lincoln, one time Kentucky poor white, might have consequences little related to the much talked-of abolition. It might stir up the submerged whites to whom Helper had appealed.
If elected, Lincoln would have the federal patronage at his command. He would be appointing a postmaster in every community. Where would he find the men. Not among the aristocracy, not among the fire eaters, not among the Democrats. Might they not be men of his own humble origin? Already that idea was stirring in the minds of some of the ambitious. One Indiana Republican alone, by election day, had received six hundred applications for office from men in the South.
Worse still, Lincoln might appoint free Negroes Undoubtedly, the Republicans would endeavor to use the federal patronage to build up their party. The new postmasters would not censor the mails, would not burn abolition papers. They would preach to the poor against the rule of the rich and would stir up a class struggle to create a new order in the name of democracy. They might even be abolitionists.
This fear already had been voiced in the Senate during the last two sessions. When a North Carolina member heard of the breakup at Baltimore and reflected upon the character of the times, and “the dirty influences which in this day prompt action,” he confessed that he was not surprised. “The democratic proclivities of the age pervade our whole country — nothing can arrest our downward tendency to absolute Government — the idea of a Republic is cherished by but few. What a season for Demagogues and Charlatans!”
The fear of a shift of power to the poorer farmers and artisans was contributing to local political contests in a fashion big with danger. In several of the southern states the Democratic machines had to deal with this election under local conditions which had nothing directly to do with it. The crisis of 1860 illustrates very well a fundamental characteristic of American politics; namely, that federal issues are frequently used in state politics in an artificial and opportunistic fashion. This local use of federal issues is not always apparent and is difficult to understand if too constant focus is kept on the federal angle. Such local use was particularly marked in South Carolina during this fateful summer.
The Helper referred to is Hinton Rowan Helper, whose “appeal to the non-slaveholding whites of the South” entitled “The Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It” advocated that sort of class conflict. The book set off a panic among slaveowners.
I think Nichols sees things too much through the prism of class. A large number of Southerners, elite or not, feared that Republicans would build up a party in the Border States and the South that would support an eventual end to slavery and possibly to White Supremacy.
The Corwin Amendment appeased many in the Upper South, but it wasn’t enough to calm those fears in the Deep South states that had already succeeded. It was never going to bring them back into the union.