Give me a source where NATO or the US says that Ukraine will never be allowed to join NATO.
A JUNIOR membership? There is no such thing. There are various conditional partnership programs but they do not contain anything even remotely close to an Article 5 obligation as is present in NATO membership. The former Soviet republic of Georgia became a such a conditional partner in 2014. Why didn’t Russia invade Georgia then? Or anytime since then? Finland is such a conditional partner, as well (and might even become a NATO member); yet, Russia has not invaded Finland (and Finland has an 800 mile border with Russia). So, Russia getting the fantods over a conditional partnership doesn’t pass the smell test.
"As a NATO partner, Ukraine has provided troops to Allied operations, including in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as to the NATO Response Force and NATO exercises. Allies highly value these significant contributions, which demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic security."
"As an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, Ukraine will benefit from tailor-made opportunities to help sustain such contributions. This includes enhanced access to interoperability programmes and exercises, and more sharing of information, including lessons learned."
Resisting Russian’s natural tendency towards aggression and domination of others is very much in our national interests. Don’t you think it would be better to stop such aggression early, and not let it metastasize into more and greater aggression?
Why didn't we intervene during the Hungarian Uprising, the Prague Spring, the construction of the Berlin Wall, etc.? Because we had responsible leadership that realized the limits of our power and the risks involved.
You use the EXACT argument that the pacifists in the 1930s used vis-a-vis Nazi Germany: “Oh, let Hitler reoccupy and remilitarize the Rhineland; because, after all, it used to be part of Germany. Oh, let him incorporate Austria into Germany because, after all, the Austrians speak German, too. Oh, let him invade and annex the Sudetenland, because, after all, there are ethnic Germans living there. Oh, let him have all of Czechoslovakia, because, after all, he pretty much has it anyway; and, besides, he has said he has no more territorial ambitions.”
The reality was that Europe was not ready for a war with Germany. The Brits declared war against Germany when it invaded Poland in 1939. They were otherwise ill-prepared to do anything about it. Germany declared war against the US on December 11, 1941. There was strong sentiment in the US not to get involved again in Europe after our experience in WWI, the war to end all wars.
It was former victims of Soviet (Russian) aggression rushing to join NATO because they did not want to have to live through another Russian aggression and domination. Don’t blame NATO for that: That was ALL Russia’s doing.
I lived two years in Warsaw (1981-83) during the days of martial law and Solidarnosc'. The poles hatred for the Russians was palpable. Of course they wanted into NATO so the US could be the guarantor of Polish sovereignty. As I mentioned before, we provided the insurance and paid the premiums. A no-brainer for the former Warsaw Pact countries.
For your reading pleasure: NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard--Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major, and Woerner
Slavic Studies Panel Addresses “Who Promised What to Whom on NATO Expansion?” The 30 documents provided are clear evidence of such assurances.
Washington D.C., December 12, 2017 – U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu).
The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.
Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)
Afterwards, Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day, with much of the very same language. Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8)
“Give me a source where NATO or the US says that Ukraine will never be allowed to join NATO.”
There is no such thing as “never” in geopolitics. There is a huge difference between “never” and “not holding out a possibility.” But you wouldn’t understand that.
“As a NATO partner, Ukraine has provided troops to Allied operations, including in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as to the NATO Response Force and NATO exercises. Allies highly value these significant contributions, which demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic security.”
It was under no obligation to do so. It chose to do so. And, yes, it makes sense that Ukraine would demonstrate a commitment to Euro-Atlantic security, because Ukraine is in Europe, and thus would be affected.
“Why didn’t we intervene during the Hungarian Uprising, the Prague Spring, the construction of the Berlin Wall, etc.? Because we had responsible leadership that realized the limits of our power and the risks involved.”
I’m going to give you a very basic primer in Cold War geo-politics: The cases you cited were ALL in the Warsaw Pact, and thus those were internal matters within the Warsaw Pact. Ukraine is in no pact with Russia. The two cases are as different as night and day.
“The reality was that Europe was not ready for a war with Germany. The Brits declared war against Germany when it invaded Poland in 1939. They were otherwise ill-prepared to do anything about it. Germany declared war against the US on December 11, 1941. There was strong sentiment in the US not to get involved again in Europe after our experience in WWI, the war to end all wars.”
I don’t think you know history at all. Britain declared war on Germany after Germany invaded Poland because Britain was obligated to do so under the Anglo-Polish Pact.
As for the “not one inch further” comment attributed to James Baker, Baker could only commit the Bush I administration; he could not commit any future administrations, and certainly could not commit Congress or even NATO: He had no authority to do so. So any “commitment” or “guarantee” ended in January, 1993 when Clinton took office.