Ukraine ping
This SAM installations may be for internal security more than a defense against external attack. It’s not clear that this is necessarily because he’s more vulnerable than usual, in political terms. The issue is that with soldiers and military equipment moving around on a large scale, it’s easier to camouflage any incipient coup attempt.
In fact, that was how the October Revolution came about - not out of a formless desire for change, but actual soldiers who mutinied. Kamil Galeev alludes to the manner in which WWI-related troop movements in Russia’s then capital - St. Petersburg - provided cover for the troop mutiny that ended the rule of the Romanovs.
1) tons of new, unmotivated recruits
2) aware they’ll be sent to Ukraine, where they likely die or get maimed
3) stuck in Moscow, in proximity to the seat of power
That’s revolutionary situation Image
That is btw exactly the scenario of 1917 revolution in Russia. In November 1916 Nicholas started suspecting his ministry for internal affairs Protopopov of disloyalty and started vetting other candidatures. He offered Protopopov’s position to Krzhyzhanovsky
Krzhyzhanovsky said yeah, I could be a minister, but I have a condition. There are 460 000 reserve troops quartered in the imperial capital of St Petersburg. These are mobilised peasants, very unmotivated. They know, they’ll soon be sent to the WWI trenches, where they die
I want you to:
1. Transfer some of them to the city police with an exemption from the military service
2. Relocate the rest the F*** OUTTA THE CAPITAL
That’s my condition if you want to see me as a minister. Nicholas ignored it. 3 months later the Russian empire fell
It were not the “workers” or “peasants” who did the February and then the October revolution. It were first and foremost the 460 000 conscripts of the St Petersburg garrison. Who were stuck in the capital cuz logistics and found themselves close to the seat of power. The end]
Leadership struggles are fairly common everywhere. It’s why in the UK, for instance, we have seen 3 Prime Ministers in the span of a year. In a dictatorship like Russia’s, however, leadership turnover occurs only when a challenger gets enough guns on his side. That’s what the SAM batteries are there for - to ensure an air force unit doesn’t successfuly assist in shortening Putin’s tenure, as it did Salvador Allende’s in Chile.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Chilean_coup_d‘%C3%A9tat#Military_action
Military Coup 101🧵
1/
https://twitter.com/WarInUkraineYet/status/1616103162041241600
The following data is from a couple of presenters from the US Naval War College who did a role playing military-political seminar of a North Korean invasion of ROK in an Early 1990’s Origins wargaming convention in Ft. Worth that I attended the out brief of.
2/
It surprised them in that it was the 1st time this scenario went nuclear.😱
In any case, most successful military coups to that date (Early 1990’s) started in the Air Force for military professionalism reasons.
Doing the logistics for maintaining flying aircraft generally...
3/
...left Air Force officers better able to plan & execute a coup.
And by logistics I mean Air Force officers are much more aware of the signals, both ground wire & radio, plus all the things required to not make smoking holes in the ground of their expensive jets.
4/
Army units in the capitol can look good in parades, be deeply penetrated with informers & completely incompetent in everything other than pointing artillery & tanks at a large fixed target.
Light infantry type regime security forces watch those Capitol based army units & can
5/
...arrest both senior officer coup plotters and their families.
It’s also why you often see Army headquarters in Capitol’s in bunkers, while Air Forces have big above ground high rises as their HQ.
It is the big fixed target Capitol based Army units with heavy weapons can
6/
...engage inside visual range with little training.
Funny that.
Anyway, the Naval War College guys briefed how authoritarian/totalitarian regimes dealt with this Air Force Coup problem, using Saddam Hussein’s regime as an example.
7/
It boils down to the best squadrons of air superiority fighters being based in the capitol, with zero air to ground capability.
The pilots of said planes being chosen for loyalty and their families treated to the best air force quarters available...
...guarded by regime
8/
... security forces.
The Air Force ground attack squadrons were kept in the rural areas supporting Army/regime security forces against rebels far away from the capitol.
This model usually, but doesn’t always, work at preventing military coups.
9/
The failed coup attempt against Turkish strongman Erdogan is an example of this.
According to the Naval War College briefers, this is the reason authoritarian/totalitarian regimes always go all in for militarily competent surface to air missile forces.
The SAM boffins
10/
...simply are not equipped to do a coup, but are really good at stopping one by an Air Force.
Plus, you can put some of those regime security force light infantry inside the ground control cabins to make sure missiles are fired.
11/
So when I see pictures like the one below. 👇
I don’t think of the threat of Ukraine’s DIY strike drones.
I think of that 1990’s Origins briefing. IMO, what you seeing here is visual evidence that Putin is afraid of a Military Coup.
12/12 End.]
What you are seeing may have nothing to do directly with Ukraine and everything with Putin ‘coup proofing’ his regime.
Thank you for sharing such excellent thought provoking commentary.