The first essential point here is that Pufendorf wasn't English.
The second essential point here is he is citing natural law, not English common law. The usage of the word "citizen" effectively means a "natural law" foundation, not one from English common law.
You are also ignoring what was happening in the other states.
Connecticut
1795 Zephaniah Swift - “The children of aliens, born in this state, are considered as natural born subjects, and have the same rights with the rest of the citizens.”
"Considered as," means "*We will Pretend*." He effectively says they are not the same thing. You make my point for me.
Virginia 1779
Thomas Jefferson - “…that all white persons born within the territory of this commonwealth … shall be deemed citizens of this commonwealth”
"White Persons?" Sounds very Jus Sanguinus to me.
"Deemed" means "we will pretend". It does not mean "is."
To make that statement mean what you want, it would have to read:
" …that all white persons born within the territory of this commonwealth … *are* citizens of this commonwealth”.
And it would have to come from the Virginia Legislature. Not TJ.
It makes no sense that the Framers just figured everyone would figure out what they meant.
I'm pretty sure they considered the matter not terribly significant in the difference between a subject and a citizen, and for the vast majority of the cases, the legal basis of the one is completely compatible with the other.
But for the one purpose for which "natural born citizen" was specifically desired, (qualifications for the Presidency), The Vattel version fills the need while the English common law version does not.
For all the rest, the distinction doesn't matter, and most people of that era didn't see the issue as significant enough to worry about.
Thankfully we have the Supreme court of Pennsylvania to clarify which one the founders had in mind when they were talking about "citizen."
The record in this case is wholly lacking in any showing of intent, actual or presumptive, on the part of appellee at any time to abandon American citizenship and, lacking such showing, what was said by Attorney General Pierrepont in Steinkauler's Case, 15 Op. Attys. Gen. 15, is true here, that:"There is no law of the United States under which his father or any other person can deprive him of his birthright. He can return to America at the age of twenty-one, and in due time, if the people elect, he can become President of the United States * * *."
Like opinions were expressed by Secretary Olney on May 29, 1896, in a letter to Mr. Materne, by Secretary Frelinghuysen in 1882, and by Mr. Blaine in 1892. These and many other instances of the application of the rule to a state of facts like those in the present case are to be found in Moore's Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, p. 532, et seq. And the rule is summarized in the statement of Mr. Uhl, acting Secretary of State, in a letter to Mr. Rudolph of May 22, 1895, as follows:
"* * * no principle is better settled than that birth in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the parents, confers American citizenship. The right of election of nationality, which it is generally conceded a person born under such circumstances has, cannot be exercised until he attains his majority. The father cannot by any act of his alter the status conferred upon the son by his birth in this country."
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939)
First. On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 329*329 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, § 1; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that case — that a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United States — the Court adverted to the "inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, p. 668.As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law, on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents, does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law.