Iran Update, June 7, 2024
Some senior members of the Ebrahim Raisi administration are backing Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Esmaili in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. They have framed their support for Esmaili as meant to continue Raisi’s agenda. Fifteen senior officials signed a letter on June 7 urging the Guardian Council, which is responsible for vetting and approving electoral candidates, to allow Esmaili to compete in the election.[4] The officials praised Esmaili’s “intellectual, political, and managerial abilities and qualifications.”[5] The letter’s signatories include the following:
Vice President for Executive Affairs Mohsen Mansouri
Vice President for Women’s Affairs Ensieh Khazali
Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani
Energy Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian
Oil Minister Javad Owji
Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister Abbas Ali Abadi
Agricultural Jihad Minister Mohammad Ali Nikbakht
Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zareh Pour
Environmental Protection Organization Director Ali Salajegheh
Administration and Employment Organization Director Meysam Latifi
Esmaili leads a faction affiliated with Raisi’s son-in-law, Mekdad Nili.[6] Mekdad’s brother, Meyshem Nili, and Mohsen Mansouri accompanied Esmaili when he registered for the presidential election on June 2.[7] Esmaili’s faction also includes Planning and Budget Organization Director Davoud Manzour and Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi.[8] Esmaili’s faction is reportedly competing against another faction in the Raisi administration that is led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash.[9] Bazrpash has also registered as a candidate in the presidential election. Bazrpash’s faction includes Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and is affiliated with Presidential Office Cultural Deputy Mehdi Mojahed.[10] Bazrpash, along with Interim President Mohammad Mokhber, did not sign the letter to the Guardian Council endorsing Esmaili.[11] Mortazavi, who is part of Esmaili’s faction, also notably did not sign the letter.[12]
Some elements in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) appear to be supporting Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published an article on June 4 indirectly criticizing Ghalibaf’s competitor, Vahid Haghanian.[13] The article accused Haghanian of “unethically” using his relationship with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to advance his presidential campaign. The article was referencing that Haghanian has long worked in the Office of the Supreme Leader as a senior adviser to Khamenei. Haghanian responded to the article by vowing to end Iranian media’s “interference in internal politics” if he becomes president.[14] Reformist and opposition media attributed the attack on Haghanian to Tasnim News Agency supporting Ghalibaf in the upcoming election.[15] These reports are consistent with other reports that Tasnim News Agency has defended Ghalibaf against corruption allegations in recent months.[16]
Tasnim News Agency’s support for Ghalibaf could indicate that the top echelons of the IRGC also support him. Hamid Reza Moghadam Far, who is one of the outlet’s founders and current chairman of its board of directors, serves as a cultural and media adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami.[17] The close relationship between Moghadam Far and Salami suggests that there is a broader IRGC effort to help Ghalibaf win the presidency. Tasnim News Agency has notably left an article of Salami congratulating Ghalibaf on his reelection as parliament speaker on its politics home page since May 28.[18]
It would be unsurprising for significant elements in the IRGC to support Ghalibaf in the presidential race. Ghalibaf has decades-old ties to many senior IRGC officers dating back to their time fighting Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s. Ghalibaf is moreover part of a close circle of current and former IRGC officers who have repeatedly come together in times of domestic crisis to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-7-2024
Iran Update, June 8, 2024
nothing special
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-8-2024
Iran Update, June 9, 2024
The Houthis conducted a drone and missile attack targeting three commercial ships in the Arabian Sea on June 9. The attack caused two ships to catch fire. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on June 9 that the Houthis conducted a combined drone and missile attack targeting two vessels, the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Norderney and the Liberia-flagged MSC Tavivshi, in the Arabian sea.[36] The Houthis said that both ships violated the unofficial Houthi blockade on Israeli ports. British maritime company Ambrey stated that a missile struck the Norderney 83 nautical miles southeast of Aden, Yemen.[37] UKMTO reported that vessel’s mooring station caught fire.[38] UKMTO reported that a second vessel was struck by an unknown projective 70 nautical miles southwest of Aden, resulting in a fire.[39] The unnamed ship proceeded to its next port of call without casualties. UKMTO also reported that a missile struck a third vessel in the Arabian Sea, 89 nautical miles southwest of Aden.[40]
Sarea also claimed on June 9 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles targeting UK Royal Navy destroyer HMS Diamond in the Red Sea.[41] A spokesperson from the British Ministry of Defense stated that the Houthis’ claim is false.”[42]
Houthi media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes targeting al Jabaneh, west of Hudaydah, Yemen, on June 9.[43]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-9-2024