Hamas leaders may expect the conflict that they have ignited to expand to include other Palestinian militias as well as Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance.
Hamas may have based its current operation on Iranian leaders’ thinking about defeating Israel. Major General Hossein Salami—the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—presented in August 2022 the most explicit articulation from an Iranian official yet on how to destroy Israel.[9] Salami downplayed the role of drones and missiles and instead argued for Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias to conduct more ground operations and urban combat inside Israel. Salami asserted that such activities would generate internal displacement and sow chaos, which would ultimately destabilize Israel and lead to its decline. Hamas’ decision to conduct a ground attack into Israel and how it went about doing so are noteworthy in this context. The group indiscriminately killed, abused, and abducted civilians in the towns its fighters reached and posted images and videos of the acts online, likely in part to instill terror among Israelis.[10]
Hamas may have sought to disrupt the US-led negotiations to normalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The United States and its allies must remain vigilant against the danger that Iran and its partners may seek to expand the crisis caused by the Hamas attacks on Israel and must avoid the tendency to become narrowly focused on Gaza and the immediate Israeli response to this attack. Iran has been pursuing an offensive strategy in the Middle East aimed at expelling the United States, among many other things, for years, as CTP has previously assessed.[12] The October 7 Hamas attack could be a part of that larger effort.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-october-7-2023
https://twitter.com/AmbJohnBolton/status/1710748273273618734
Moh Heidari: The timing of increased attacks against Israel and other states directly correlates with high-level meetings between Islamic Republic regime and groups like Hamas and PIJ. This suggests that IR’s foreign policy is keenly aimed at regional destabilization through its proxies.
According to the article published by @criticalthreats based on reports by the Islamic Regime's new agency ISNA and Tasnim back in June 2023, “Islamic Regime's leaders met with senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas officials in Tehran. PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah met several Islamic Republic regime's officials, including President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, on June 17-20. A Hamas delegation led by Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh similarly visited Tehran and met with Raisi and Ahmadian on June 19-20. These meetings follow increasingly frequent Islamic Regime calls for armed resistance against Israel in the West Bank and a concurrent increase in kinetic activity in the West Bank, as CTP previously reported. Tasnim News Agency published a report on June 20 criticizing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ground forces capabilities, suggesting Islamic Regime intention to exploit this perceived weakness. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami previously described in August 2022 plans to stoke civil unrest in the West Bank and conduct ground operations against Israeli security forces. In addition to using Palestinian militias to impose military pressure on Israel, CTP previously assessed that Islamic Regime used its influence over these militias to distract Israel from IRGC military transports in eastern Syria.”
As we just observed, High-level meetings between Islamic Republic regime officials and groups like Hamas is followed by escalations in terrorist attacks on Israel, pointing to a level of coordination and strategic planning. Islamic Regime leverages its influence over groups like Hamas to push its own geopolitical agenda, aiming to create disruptions or provocations that serve its strategic interests.
Islamic Regime's foreign policy, particularly its support for terrorist organizations like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), has far-reaching implications beyond the Middle East. Recent attacks on Israel outlines the global risks posed by Islamic Regime's activities.
The Islamic Regime's sponsored network has global reach, with potential impacts stretching from Europe to South America.
Considering the predictability in Islamic Republic regime's actions, there is a timely opportunity for proactive countermeasures including strengthening intelligence-sharing mechanisms, initiating preemptive attack to destroy the security and militia apparatus of the regime to help Iranian people to take over the streets and change their regime with a secular democratic government that will be in peace with Israel, its Arab neighbors and the whole world. Cutting off the snake head in Tehran is the only way to eliminate the escalating threats.
Palestinian militias in Gaza responded to calls from Hamas to join in fighting against Israeli security forces on October 8. Hamas and its militant wing, Al Qassem Brigade, called on fellow Palestinian militias and members of the Axis of Resistance to join in its fight against Israel on October 7 following its ground incursion into Israel from Gaza.[1] Palestinian militias quickly pledged their support in fighting against Israeli security forces and clashed with Israeli security forces at border points and within Israeli territory.[2] Most clashes between Palestinian militias and Israeli security forces have been concentrated in southern Israel with Hamas reporting that it rotated new forces into Israeli territory to continue the fight against Israeli security forces on October 8.[3]
The Al Qassem Brigade clashed with Israeli security forces in Sufa Kibbuts, Holeit Kibbuts, Ofakim, Sderot, Yad Mordechai, Kfar Azza, Kissufim, Be’eri military post, and Ezre in southern Israel on October 7 and 8.[4] The brigade also conducted two separate rocket attacks on Sderot and Ashkelon of 100 rockets each, according to the group's Telegram channel.[5] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also fought against Israeli security forces with the Al Qassem Brigade in several towns in southern Israel.[6]
PIJ backfilled Hamas’s Al Qassem Brigade in Israel's South District on October 8, which allowed the Al Qassem Brigade fighters to rest and refit. Hamas Spokesperson Abu Ubaida reported that Hamas rotated new forces into Israeli territory to continue the fight against Israeli security forces in a statement on October 8.[7] The Al Qassem Brigade appears to be the most active Palestinian militia operating in the vicinity of Gaza.
Non-Iranian affiliated Palestinian militias also supported the offensive. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade conducted rocket strikes into Israeli territory on October 8.[8] The brigade previously coordinated attacks with Hamas and PIJ in 2008.[9] The Popular Resistance Committee's military wing claimed it used one-way attack drones to attack Israeli targets.[10] ISW cannot independently verify either group's claim.
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and Palestinian militias also conducted attacks on Israeli positions from south Lebanon and the West Bank, respectively, which could expand the war to a second front.
details: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-8-2023
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-8-2023