Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces are continuing to reinforce their positions in Deir ez Zor Province in response to rumors of an imminent International Coalition attack to liberate cities.
The Shia Coordination Framework – a loosely aligned coalition of pro-Iranian political parties – blamed US sanctions on Iranian accounts in Iraq for failures in energy supply to Iraq from Iran, likely to place additional political pressure on the Iraqi government to remove the US from Iraq.
Social media accounts affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) circulated a call on July 11 for supporters to storm the US Embassy in Baghdad.
Iran is attempting to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt to portray itself as a member of the global community. Normalizing ties with Egypt would likely improve Iran's economy.
Iranian security personnel violently suppressed injured Iraq-Iran war veterans protesting livelihood conditions in front of the Martyr Affairs Foundation Headquarters in Tehran on July 8. [33] Social media users circulated footage of tear-gassed pepper-sprayed veterans and claimed that security personnel had also arrested and beaten an unspecified number of protesters. Iran-Iraq war veterans have previously protested poor economic conditions, but the regime did not meet these protests with force.[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-11-2023
Iranian-backed militias are continuing to reinforce their positions in Deir ez Zor Province, possibly to bolster defensive positions against a rumored International Coalition attack.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced the Iraqi government will evade US sanctions on Iran by trading Iraqi crude oil for Iranian gas during a televised statement on July 11.
Social media accounts affiliated with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces called for supporters to siege the US Embassy in Baghdad, which could elevate the risk of an attack on US personnel in Iraq.
Iranian officials and media responded negatively to the July 10 Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint statement, highlighting preexisting tensions in the Russo-Iranian relationship. The Russia-GCC joint statement expressed support for the Emirati claim to three Iranian-controlled Islands in the Persian Gulf.[13] Iran seized the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa islands in 1971 shortly after the British withdrawal from the Gulf. Iran's Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned Russian Ambassador Alexey Dedov on July 12 to object to the statement.[14] Iran similarly summoned Chinese Ambassador Li Tieh-tseng in December 2022 over Chinese support for a negotiated settlement of the disputed islands.[15] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian emphasized the importance of preserving Iran‘s territorial integrity on July 12 and Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani stated on July 11 that the Russia-GCC statement upset Iran's improving relations with its neighbors while reaffirming Iran's ownership over the islands.[16] Other officials similarly criticized Russia for acting against Iran's national interests and attempting to create tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab states.[17] Reformist-affiliated media also published critical articles narrating what they perceived to be a history of repeated ”anti-Iranian” Russian actions in the recent and distant past.[18]
Chinese and Russian support for the Emirati claim to the three islands is part of their strategy to simultaneously balance their relationships with Iran and the Gulf Arab states.[19] The Sino-Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has admitted four of the six GCC member states into the organization as dialogue partners. Both China and Russia have separately initiated strategic dialogue forums with the entire GCC.[20] The July 10 Russia-GCC joint statement was published at the conclusion of the most recent Russia-GCC strategic dialogue summit in Moscow, which started in 2016.[21] Chinese President Xi Jingping traveled to Riyadh in December 2022 to participate in the China-GCC summit.[22] Both Russia and China have simultaneously advanced their relationship with Iran, the most recent example of which was admitting Iran into the SCO as a full member on July 4.[23]
The Raisi administration is attempting to override parliamentary adjustments to its mandatory veiling bill. Regime enforcement of mandatory veiling—in any capacity—will likely exacerbate intra-regime tensions. It will also likely reignite anti-regime sentiments.