Iran Update, August 19, 2025
Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website said in an August 18 article that recent remarks by reformists were similar to a “quiet multimedia influence campaign” conducted by the United States and Israel, and alleged that the reformists seek to promote division within Iran over issues such as nuclear policy and uranium enrichment specifically.[23] The article indicates that the Supreme Leader continues to reject any zero uranium enrichment demands.[24] This statement from the Supreme Leader’s office comes after reformists have called for political reform and foreign policy shifts. The Reformist Front published a statement on August 18 outlining eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.[25] Former President Hassan Rouhani advocated on August 13 for reducing tensions with the West and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries.[26] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 19 that reformists are conceding to Western pressure, and Tasnim warned that “trusting the enemy“ could threaten regime stability.[27] Another IRGC-affiliated outlet dismissed the Reformist Front’s statement as a “blueprint” for selling Iran’s independence and accused reformists of spreading American and Israeli propaganda.[28] Assembly of Experts Secretary Abbas Kaabi similarly said that the statement repeated “the enemy’s narrative” and focused too narrowly on internal problems rather than external threats.[29]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Armenian officials in Yerevan, Armenia, on August 19 to discuss concerns about the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus.[42] Pezeshkian emphasized Iran’s concerns about ”the presence of third-party forces” near the Iran-Armenia border during his meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[43] Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 for a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Senior Iranian officials have strongly criticized the proposal due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors could use the transit corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. The Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee visited Iran’s northwestern border on August 19 to ”ensure decisions reflect national security interests.”[44]
Iranian officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral relations with Armenia during the visit, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to try to hedge against future US influence in the region.[45] Iranian ministers signed ten memorandums of understanding (MOU) focused on bilateral trade and transportation relations.[46] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 19 that Iran and Armenia agreed to finalize a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement soon.[47] Iranian Minister of Transport and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh discussed the reopening of the Jolfa–Yerevan–Georgia rail link with the Armenian territorial administration minister and mentioned the role the link could play in boosting regional transit.[48]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2025
Iran Update, August 20, 2025
The New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting.[14] The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow in June 2025, targeting ventilation shafts at the site that led to a centrifuge cascade hall located at least 250 feet underground.[15] An unspecified US Department of Defense official said that the United States aimed to destroy the centrifuges with shock waves and other effects of the blasts because the bombs would probably not make direct contact with the centrifuge chamber itself.[16] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi previously stated that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that even small vibrations can destroy them.[17] The US bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.[18] Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran cannot access the nuclear sites struck by US and Israeli airstrikes yet, which also prevents conclusive battle damage assessments.[19]
Several factors may have impacted the effectiveness of the US strikes on Fordow. A US defense official familiar with US decision-making said that the main targeted ventilation shafts had bends near the shaft entrances, which means the path to the underground facility through the shaft was not straight.[20] Several geologists also stated that the geology of Fordow almost certainly had an impact on the extent of damage. One expert said that Iran likely built Fordow using volcanic tuff, which may have helped cushion the site from the bombs due to its porosity.
Iran secured loans against tankers transporting Iranian and Iranian allies’ oil exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to circumvent Western sanctions between 2019 and 2023, according to the Financial Times on August 20.[21] A US-sanctioned Iranian broker set up one billion dollars’ worth of mortgages in Switzerland against at least 34 oil tankers, according to Panama Maritime Authority documents.[22] The United States has sanctioned 20 of these 34 tankers.[23] The Iranian broker used these mortgages as collateral, which allowed the broker to take ownership of the tanker if the buyer did not complete the payment once the oil arrived at its destination.[24] Buyers traditionally require official bank documents to prove their credit to traders.[25] These mortgages allow buyers to circumvent bank involvement in the process. Many banks have increasingly refused to work on transactions related to Iran’s illicit oil trade since the United States began to impose strict sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports in 2019.[26] Iran’s illicit oil export network has moved at least 130 million oil barrels worth $9.6 billion using mortgages to circumvent detection between 2019 and 2023. This network transferred sanctioned Iranian oil as well as sanctioned Russian and Venezuelan oil. The network exported the vast majority of this oil to the PRC, according to a research group focused on illicit networks.[27]
Iran’s use of mortgages on tankers to evade US sanctions is only one of the many strategies that Iran employs to obfuscate illicit Iranian and Russian oil trade to the PRC. Many companies affiliated with Iranian oil tankers use fake addresses and conduct ship-to-ship transfers.[28] The multi-national network controlled by Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani’s son, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, frequently changes vessel operators and managers to obscure ownership, falsifies cargo information, and turns off automatic identification systems (AIS) during loading. The United States sanctioned Shamkhani on July 30.[29]
Iran is deepening its economic and military cooperation with Belarus. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20 in Minsk, Belarus, to discuss opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[30] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus share common interests and want to combat US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the region.[31] Pezeshkian emphasized that both countries can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[32] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[33] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[34] Iran and Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation over the past few years.[35] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May 2025.[36] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[37]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-20-2025