Iran Update, August 11, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks.[1] Velayati’s statements demonstrate significant continuity between Iran’s pre- and post-war approach to the region and its use of the Axis of Resistance. Velayati reiterated Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance but notably highlighted the Houthis as a “gem” within the Iranian proxy and partner network.[2] Velayati said that Iran will oppose US-supported efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Lebanese government, which the United States has pressured to disarm Hezbollah, agreed on August 7 to disarm Hezbollah.[3] The United States has similarly pressured the Iraqi government to pass legislation that would disarm or reform the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which has been opposed by Iran’s Iraqi allies.[4] Velayati held a phone call with the Iraqi State of Law coalition head and Iranian ally in Iraq, Nouri al Maliki, on August 8, in which Maliki emphasized that Iraq will not allow the United States to disarm the PMF, which suggests the pair discussed recent US efforts to undermine the PMF.[5] Velayati also suggested that resistance groups will form in Syria to resist Israel.[6] Khamenei and other Iranian officials have previously framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization, which is consistent with Iranian hopes before the Israel-Iran War.[7]
It remains unclear how Iran will attempt to oppose any of these US-supported efforts, but Velayati’s interview highlights the increased importance of the Houthi Movement within Iran’s Axis of Resistance. The Houthis remain the most unified and capable member of the Axis of Resistance after two years of war, having suffered relatively little damage compared to Hezbollah or Hamas.
Iran has taken steps to protect its nuclear scientists following the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Israel killed at least 14 nuclear scientists during the war.[20] The Telegraph reported on August 11 that Iran has sent its remaining nuclear scientists to safe houses in northern Iran, citing a senior Iranian official.[21] The official said Iran has replaced all the nuclear scientists teaching at universities with individuals who have no connection to Iran’s nuclear program. Iran reportedly assigned each key nuclear scientist at least one deputy in order to try to ensure knowledge continuity.[22] Israeli sources are concerned that some of these deputies have replaced the scientists whom Israel killed during the war. Some of the replacement scientists reportedly have expertise in explosives and warhead design. An Israeli intelligence and defense analyst stated that Iran still has scientists who have previously worked on nuclear weapons delivery systems, including efforts to adapt Shahab-3 missiles to hold nuclear warheads.[23] The senior Iranian official also said Iran has assigned multiple agencies to protect nuclear scientists as opposed to the single Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unit that handled the scientists’ protection previously.[24]
Iran likely assigned multiple agencies to protect its nuclear scientists to address counterintelligence concerns following the war.[25] The existence of multiple agencies providing security for the scientists enables each agency to ensure the compliance of the other agencies, but it will contribute to siloed organizations that hinder information sharing. Iranian authorities executed an Iranian nuclear scientist on August 6 for reportedly providing Israel with information about another nuclear scientist whom Israel killed during the war.[26]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2025
Iranian officials have strongly criticized the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors seek to use the corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 on a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27 mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[17] The agreed upon corridor is fundamentally the actualization of the Zangezur Corridor—a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence.[18] A senior adviser to the Supreme Leader emphasized Iran's strong opposition to the proposed transit corridor on August 9 and referred to it as a “political conspiracy” against Iran.[19] An Iranian analyst close to the regime similarly characterized the proposed transit corridor as an Iranian “containment belt” meant to isolate Iran and threaten Iran's security.[20] The corridor runs along Iran's only shared border with Armenia and would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could exclude Iran from a new international transit route and hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. The corridor would enable Azerbaijan to circumvent Iran to access the Nakhchivan Autonomy Republic, which will likely deprive Iran of political leverage and any associated revenue along the transit corridor. Azerbaijan currently accesses its exclave and Turkey through Iran.
This proposed agreement would be an additional victory for Iranian adversaries at a time when Iran's relative ability to project power in its near abroad has diminished.[21] Iranian officials have expressed concern about Turkey's expanding influence as a rival in the Middle East and around Iran's borders, especially after Turkey replaced Iran as the primary backer of the new Syrian government following Assad's fall in December 2024. Turkey currently uses routes through Iran to trade with Central Asia, but a new route directly from Turkey to Azerbaijan through Armenia means that Turkey may be able to use the corridor to reach the Caspian Sea while circumventing Iran completely. Iran has similarly found itself at odds with Azerbaijan, which has taken steps to strengthen ties with Israel in recent months. Iran has historically accused Israel of using Azerbaijani territory to conduct operations in Iran, including during the Israel-Iran War.[22] Israeli government officials have recently called for including Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords.[23]
Iran has taken some steps to deter the corridor from being established. Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian warned Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during a phone call on August 11 to be wary of foreign attempts to use the agreement as a way to achieve “hegemonic goals,” likely referring to the United States.[24] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately held a phone call with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on August 12 to discuss the US-brokered peace deal and the proposed transit corridor.[25] Pezeshkian is scheduled to visit Armenia on August 18.[26] The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Commission held a meeting with defense, military, and foreign policy officials on August 11 to discuss Iranian diplomatic and military efforts to block the passage of the transit corridor.[27] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media stated on August 12 that Iran will be forced to adopt a “multi-layered and measured response” to the corridor.[28] Iran has previously threatened to take military action to prevent the development of the Zangezur Corridor.[29] Iran has also previously conducted numerous provocative military exercises along the border designed to discourage the development of the corridor.[30]
Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris and encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance US and partner influence in Syria, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria.[31] Unspecified Turkish sources told Syria in Transition that Turkey pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from scheduled Paris negotiations with the United States, France, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), due to fears that the transitional government would be forced to concede to Kurdish autonomy demands because of its poor handling of security in Suwayda.[32] This demonstrates that Turkey's primary concern about the Syrian government's behavior in Suwayda is whether the Syrian government's behavior will strengthen the SDF, not the behavior itself or the crimes committed by government forces. However, the SDF’s decision to invite prominent Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri to a political conference in Hasakah City on August 8 likely made it easier for Turkey to successfully pressure Syria to abandon the talks in Paris and demand that the SDF negotiate in Damascus.[33] Hijri’s political movement declared an autonomous Suwaydawi government, and fighters close to Hijri have broken multiple ceasefires by attacking government forces and other Druze factions.[34] Turkey is simultaneously attempting to help Russia retain influence in Syria by encouraging the Syrian transitional government to strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia. Turkish sources said that the Turkish government had advised President Ahmed Shara to strengthen relations with Russia so that Russia, Turkey, and Syria can counterbalance US, European, Israeli, and Saudi interests in the country.[35]
These Turkish efforts undermine key US policy objectives, including maintaining Syrian stability and preventing Russia from re-establishing itself in Syria. The US effort to integrate the SDF into Syria would prevent future rounds of conflict between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkish-backed factions, which could seriously imperil Syrian stability and provide openings for ISIS to resurge. Increased Russian military influence in Syria would be similarly deleterious to Syrian stability. Russian state media reported on August 11 that the Syrian transitional government sought renewed Russian military police patrols in southern Syria to curb Israeli activity, citing a Russian source at an August 1 meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani and the Syrian diaspora in Moscow.[36] The Russian military conducted a patrol in SDF-controlled Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on August 4 shortly after Syrian diplomats returned from Moscow to negotiate Russian basing in Syria.[37] Russian military operations in Syria, particularly in southern Syria, did not contribute to lasting stability during the civil war and, in some cases, supported Iranian operations in Syria.[38]
The SDF and the transitional government have nonetheless continued to make progress in negotiations over the integration agreement despite Turkish interference. Al Jazeera reported on August 11 that an SDF delegation arrived in Damascus to renew integration talks with the transitional government, but no updates have followed.[39] The SDF and the Syrian transitional government likely desire to avoid any major fighting between the government and SDF, given that major military operations would risk significant destabilization of Syria that could imperil the political positions of both sides.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo visited Iranian officials on August 12 to discuss Iran's cooperation with the IAEA.[51] This visit marks the first IAEA visit to Iran since the Israel-Iran War and since all IAEA inspectors left Iran due to safety concerns.[52] Iran approved on June 26 a bill that suspended cooperation with the IAEA. Iranian officials repeatedly stated ahead of Aparo’s visit that the IAEA delegation would not inspect Iranian nuclear facilities during the visit.[53] The IAEA’s visit comes ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) end-of-August deadline for Iran to make progress towards a nuclear deal before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism.[54] The E3 reportedly aims to engage Iran and secure verifiable steps, such as restoring Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and the removal of Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile, before the snapback deadline takes effect.[55]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025