The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force unveiled the “Jihad” ballistic missile during an annual military parade in Tehran on September 21.[77] Iranian media claimed that the “Jihad” ballistic missile is an upgraded version of Iran's Qiam-1 missile and has a range of 1,000 kilometers.[78] The IRGC Aerospace Force displayed a total of 23 ballistic missiles during the military parade.[79] The IRGC Aerospace Force also displayed a Shahed-136B drone, which reportedly has a range of over 4,000 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 200 kilograms.[80]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, canceled his seminary course on September 22.[81] Mojtaba is considered one of the top contenders to succeed his father as supreme leader. Mojtaba claimed that the decision to cancel his course had “nothing to do with political matters,” although some individuals have speculated that Mojtaba canceled the course in order to assume new political responsibilities.[82] IRGC-affiliated media notably referred to Mojtaba as an “Ayatollah” in its report about the cancellation of Mojtaba’s seminary course.[83] Holding the rank of Ayatollah is a prerequisite to becoming supreme leader in Iran.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-23-2024
Iran Update, September 24, 2024
ran declined a request by Lebanese Hezbollah in recent days to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, according to two unspecified Israeli officials and an unspecified Western diplomat speaking to Axios on September 24.[21] The Israeli officials stated that Iran told Hezbollah that the “timing isn’t right” for Iran to attack Israel given that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is currently in New York City attending the United Nations General Assembly.[22] A separate Israeli official told Axios that the Israeli security cabinet issued a directive to the IDF to “avoid steps that would give Iran a reason or a pretext to join the fighting.”[23] It is unclear what Israeli action(s) in Lebanon would drive Iran to enter the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah directly. Iran has previously directly intervened in regional conflicts when its principal allies—such as the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria—were at risk of collapsing.[24] Iran could decide to intervene in support of Hezbollah against Israel if Iran assesses that Israel is inflicting severe damage on Hezbollah. Iran’s reluctance to directly intervene to support Hezbollah could generate tension between Hezbollah and Iran as Hezbollah seeks full Iranian support against Israel and Iran attempts to avoid a large-scale war with Israel since the beginning of the October 7 War.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-24-2024