Years ago, probably during a radio interview or discussion, I heard the claim that there had been a translation error. I’ve now googled this and immediately found confirmation: “the Japanese responded [to the Potsdam Declaration] with the word ‘’mokusatsu,’’ which was intended to mean in context that they were reserving comment. The Allied Powers were mistakenly informed by inaccurate translators that ‘’mokusatsu’’ meant that the Japanese were ignoring it”. The result was the two atomic bombs. It has been described as “The worst translation mistake in history”. But I also found a claim that this mistranslation claim has been disputed.
Herbert P. Bix in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan says, “”Next, on July 28, at the urging of Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chief of the Naval General StaffToyoda Soemu, and others, Prime Minister Suzuki made Japan’s rejection explicit by formally declaring at an afternoon news conference, that the Potsdam Declarationwas no more than a ‘rehash’ (yakinaoshi) of the Cairo Declaration, and that he intended to ‘ignore it’ (mokusatsu).
Edward Behr in Hirohito Behind the Myth says, “For Premier Suzuki, in a rare press conference on July 28, summed up the government’s majority view as a mandate to mokusatsu the declaration, that is, to ‘kill it with silence.’ The word could also be translated as ‘treating it with silent contempt’”
David Bergamini in Japan’s Imperial Japanese Conspiracy says, “Two days after the Potsdam Declaration had been issued (July 6), Prime Minister Suzuki declared that it offered no change in the Roosevelt policy of unconditional surrender laid down in the Cairo Conference in December 1943 and that ‘to us its meaning does not seem of great worth, just something to be ignored’”
These three authors would have had a chance to read the entire news conference and place the word in context as the Americans had at the time, so it does seem they received the correct understanding even though there might have been a possible alternative translation of that word.
Referring to my essay, I said the pattern of Japanese contacts demonstrated an unwillingness to accept any responsibility for understanding Western expectations for negotiation strategies. The fact America had destroyed its navy, massacred its island garrisons, and bombed its cities into cinders should have prompted Japanese proposals embracing a Western style of clarity.