But when you strip it all down, the bottom line is all of that technology is ultimately designed to give the advantage to the ground troops.
You bomb areas to pacify areas for ground troops to move in.
“...the bottom line is all of that technology is ultimately designed to give the advantage to the ground troops...” [dfwgator, post 5]
“...Foot troops are obsolete.” [Cymbeline, post 4]
As conservatives, do we merely reject concepts on a visceral level, just because they aren’t sufficiently traditional?
I’d submit that cymbeline’s formulation might be somewhat abrupt: say not that footsoldiers are obsolete. Rather, acknowledge that infantry suffer from a very poor ratio of effectiveness to vulnerability: this has been the case for over 100 years, and all trends are down, not up. Boots-on-the-ground isn’t a final argument - it’s closer to begging for trouble, or flirting with disaster if things drag on (especially when American infantry - scions of voting citizens - become part of the equation).
“giving the advantage to ground troops” sound nice and collegial. And it appeals to the military establishment’s own sense of solidarity and teamwork. But actually making the idea work is something else. Requiring all other elements of the armed forces to focus on (and kneel to) the plight of the lone GI sounds laudable - in theory. However, when push come to shove in action, rescuing the foot patrol or the lost battalion becomes urgent, imperative, so much so that everybody on scene loses track of the original mission.
Also lost in the uproar is this central fact: each armed service owns its own doctrine, which informs servicemembers on the best way to fight, currently understood. Unlike religious doctrine, it is dynamic (or it had better be), continually evolving. And it drives everything the service in question does, from battle formations to systems acquisition & development.
Each separate service brings unique capabilities to the fray, and suffers from unique limitations. Many of the constraints can be remedied by the other service, but not all of them.
Congress has decreed that no armed service may fight alone. One presumes this directive is the will of the people; but in real life it has resulted in a slow-motion muddle in a particular theater or armed encounter, in which the original point vanishes from view. Constraints on one service become binding limitations on all. The unique contributions of a particular branch are prevented.
Note that none of this accounts for the impact of bureaucratic rivalries, nor the obtrusion of politics: neither is salutary, nor can they be avoided within the system. And over stretches of time, technologies change, adversaries disappear or crop up, alliances rearrange. Original formulations can be discovered to be erroneous (correcting those mistakes is something else).
The purpose of the military establishment is to prepare to apply force in the national interest, then carry out those orders if ever they come. To this end, efficiency and effectiveness must be the goals. Enshrining tradition, or compelling the armed forces to abide by specific preconceptions about societal mores, have no place.