No.
I think that having a fly-by-wire system like MCAS can make the 737MAX a safe aircraft to fly, as long as it is appropriately configured.
I am no expert, but it seems like the correction should require, at minimum:
1) Multiple AOA sensors. In a situation where the AOA sensors are not in agreement, with one reading a stall situation and the other not, this information to be reported to the pilot, who can resolve the discrepancy, compare the readings to the actual performance of the aircraft, and trigger the MCAS, if necessary.
2) Simple controls to disable MCAS system. In the event MCAS is triggered in a situation where no hazard exists, the pilot should be able to disable it by hitting a button. Preferably a Big Red Button.
3. Limit range of trim in MCAS. It should not be possible for the MCAS to have more authority than a pilot has through his stick. Full MCAS deflection combined with full up command from the pilot should result in a nose-up attitude.
4. Transition training for all pilots to familiarize them with the MCAS system, the potential problems, and how to deal with them.
The MCAS obviously has an important function. Simply eliminating it while placing a restriction on operating conditions for the aircraft seems to be a poor response, because the aircraft will be flown from High/Hot airports, no matter what the restrictions are from Boeing. You have to assume that airlines are going to push the aircraft to the limits and beyond, particularly if other, less advanced, versions of the 737 can fly out of these High/Hot airports.
The proper aircraft design was to not put those oversized engines on a 737 and creating an unstable design.
The 737 should have been redesigned as a new airplane. Boeing wanted to beat Airbus to market and total screwed the pooch. Their blunder is now costing far more than they made.