[HamiltonJay]

Not at all. The FAA would never certify for airworthiness a system with a known single point of failure, period.

Engineers inside Boeing would never not point out the software system had a single point of failure to their superiors.

The low end variant of this plane override pilot commands based on a single sensors input.

Meaning if that single sensor failed it would override the pilot, which is exactly what appears to have happened in both these crashes.

Which means Boeing either lied, explicitely or by omission to the FAA about how this software and variant operated, or they bribed someone or someone’s in the FAA to get the certification.

There is zero doubt that BOEING engaged in criminal activity to get this plane certified.

[A strike]

Not (even hardly) proven.

[A strike]

“The FAA would never certify for airworthiness a system with a known single point of failure, period.”

I guess single engine aircraft are all hallucinations, right?

[WhoisAlanGreenspan?]

There's speculation, pretty believable I'd say, that the MCAS system was an available off the shelf solution to the Boeing 737 MAX that came from the KC-46. Lost in the transition between the two aircraft was the fact that multiple sensor redundancies and training are included with the KC-46, but not the 737 MAX.

From the cited article, I think this part is crucial:
What Does the Simulator Say?

Starting from the point where the Ethiopian pilots hit the cut-off switches and stopped MCAS from operating, the U.S. MAX crew tried in the simulator to recover.

Even though the U.S. crew performed the simulator experiment at a normal speed of 250 knots instead of the more than 350 knots of the Ethiopian jet, the forces on the jet’s tail still prevented them from moving the manual wheel in the cockpit that would have corrected the nose-down attitude.

To get out of it, the pilots used an old aviator technique called the “roller coaster” method — letting the yoke go to relieve the forces on the tail, then cranking the wheel, and repeating this many times.

This technique has not been in U.S. pilot manuals for decades, and pilots today are not typically trained on it. Using it in the simulator, the U.S. MAX crew managed to save the aircraft but lost 8,000 feet of altitude in the process. The Ethiopian MAX never rose higher than 8,000 feet, indicating that from that point in the flight, the crew couldn’t have saved it.

[logi_cal869]

You’re being awfully-dismissive of culpability by FAA in this fiasco: The FAA granted Boeing the ability to certify the aircraft itself.

“The problems were apparently compounded by FAA rules allowing manufacturers to essentially self-certify aircraft. Boeing reportedly tried to speed up the process in order to catch to rival Airbus’ A320neo, and pushed the FAA to give it more responsibility. “There wasn’t a complete and proper review of the documents,” a former Boeing engineer said. “[The] review was rushed to reach certain certification dates.” “

You can read more here.

https://www.engadget.com/2019/03/18/boeing-737-max-faa-certification-flaws/

[CodeToad]

“Engineers inside Boeing would never not point out the software system had a single point of failure to their superiors.”

Wanna bet? Especially since those that wrote the software we’re most likely offshore.