“A Zuni missile from a F-4 was launched and struck McCain’s A-4. …” [centurion316, post 13]
“The Zuni missile did not strike McCains aircraft …” [silverleaf, post 266]
The 127 Mk32 “Zuni” was at the time an unguided rocket, not a missile. A couple posters have noted that. Its motor has a relatively low-voltage ignition pulse of 28 volts. Not the best for rocket motor initiators; the electrical primers for the 20x134mm aircraft gun rounds need higher voltages.
Best safety practice was to keep ignition-lockout circuit interruptor pins installed in rocket firing jacks for these munitions until the aircraft was spotted for launch upon a catapult. Surviving aviation ordnance specialists on the USS Forrestal later said they’d been ordered to remove the safety lockout pins before final spotting, because doing it according to the book slowed the launch rate. The configuration of the Mk 32 launcher lockout pin was quite similar to another commonly used lockout pin, and they were known to become swapped. Using the wrong pin may have looked OK externally; but it did not interrupt the electrical continuity sufficiently. It was never determined which pin had been installed on the Mk 32 launchers on the F-4 from whence the launched rocket came. Pins had also been observed to be blown loose by jet blast and starter-cart exhaust or pressurized air.
The 1000-pound bombs stored in quantity on the Forrestal’s deck were 1953 vintage, not WW2. The lot in question had been onloaded earlier from a resupply vessel; enlisted techs and a junior officer noted leakage of phlegmatizing agent from the bomb cases, which had been poorly stored (determined later). Leakages was reported up the Forrestal’s chain of command and a loadout of better-condition munitions was requested, but they were told none were available and the command hierarchy overruled the junior troops - in the interest of an extra push toward mission accomplishment. It was later determined that the HE bursting charge of the munitions in question was less than stable under prolonged storage in extreme conditions; it was then more likely to cause to low-order detonation when heated. Afterwards, most air-launched munitions of this type were filled with a different burster charge (H6) - far more stable.
Then-LCDR McCain testified that his own aircraft was hit, but it’s probable he recalled the details wrong in the uproar and immediacy of the event. He also recalled the tail number of his A-4 in error. Such mistakes are a common occurrence in aviation mishaps; even trained observers can get stuff wrong.
The commanding officer of the Forrestal was not officially faulted for the mishap, but when his tour was over, he was assigned to a staff billet and never commanded at sea the rest of his career.
The fuel fire and subsequent munition detonations killed a great many of the shipboard firefighting personnel; untrained crewmembers stepped in as they could, but were of necessity lower in abilities, contributing to the problems. In the aftermath, the US Navy altered firefighting training to require a much higher percentage of carrier crews to become qualified. This may have proven fortuitous; another fire occurred in 1969, on USS Enterprise, when a starter cart’s exhaust caused a Mk32 rocket motor to catch fire and burst. The mishap report credited a measurably quicker and more effective response to the greater training on firefighting and damage control resulting in lower loss of life (28, compared to 134 dead on the Forrestal) and less damage.
Carrier air operations are at best risky, demanding the utmost concentration and the highest proficiency among personnel.
That was an outstandingly informative post .. thank you.