For those curious about the lookouts, it was at night and what they actually see is lights. Not hulls, just lights. The way it's supposed to work is that CIC keeps the big picture and feeds the bridge crew a distilled version that the bridge matches up with what it sees visually. The lookouts are part of that, and they need to be fed a little help of what it is they're looking at. It's supposed to be a team effort - it has to be a team effort in congested waters and this sounds more like a gaggle of unrelated individuals wandering around with not a clue about the outside world and not talking to one another to make it any better. The lookouts can't help you when you're in extremis.
Apparently they froze when it became apparent what was about to happen - the collision alarm was never activated and nobody had even the seconds that would have offered to brace themselves or get out of the spaces. Seven sailors died for it.
The idea that the TAO was on watch to back up a weak bridge crew is scary enough by itself - this is not, or wasn't, usual procedure. Any bridge crew that suspect should have had the Captain or XO on the bridge to back it up, especially in those waters, not somebody in Combat who was essentially blind, and worse, did nothing about it.
What the hell has happened to my Navy?
I am wondering exactly the same thing.
"Ceterum censeo Islam esse delendam."
Garde la Foi, mes amis! Nous nous sommes les sauveurs de la République! Maintenant et Toujours!
(Keep the Faith, my friends! We are the saviors of the Republic! Now and Forever!)
LonePalm, le Républicain du verre cassé (The Broken Glass Republican)
Keep in mind it was two women who were at loggerheads. Most guys can work with other guys they don’t like. You do your job, they do theirs, and you both hope that one or the other of you gets transferred. Two women tend to personalize it. No real surprise that there were women at both ends of the non-communication.
Great post. I am glad that a former instructor read the articles. Here are other articles I have accumulated on the various 7th Fleet accidents.
Singapore Safety Report on USS John S. McCain Aug. 21, 2017 Collision
https://news.usni.org/2018/03/08/singapore-safety-report-uss-john-s-mccain-aug-21-2017-collision?utm_source=USNI+News&utm_campaign=3d90b38add-USNI_NEWS_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-3d90b38add-230377553&mc_cid=3d90b38add&mc_eid=d1b7ba249a
Response from a shipmate who now a Merchant Marine instructor:
In teaching the COLREGS to young Mariners and upgrading the older ones......I have had so many questions to what had happened involving the collision of the McCain. This report provides a very good look into the bridge management and events aboard each vessel.
The way the Report is organized and wordsmyth I may use it as required reading by my NavRules of the Road students. The Report covers at least 13 out of 38 rules they study, with specifics being:
14. Rule 2 - Responsibilities: Special Circumstances - when more than 2 vessels meeting, crossing or overtaking;
15. Rule 5 - Proper look-out; although, additional lookouts may NOT have prevented the collision, each vessel operated BELOW manning requirements which contributed to extra duties for existing bridge personnel, and inadequately trained personnel.
16. Rule 6 - Safe Speed;
17. Rule 7 - Risk of Collision;
18. Rule 8 - Action to Avoid Collision;
19. Rule 9 - Narrow Channels;
20. Rule 10 - Traffic Separation Schemes;
21. Rule 13 - Overtaking;
22. Rule 16 - Give-way Vessel;
23. Rule 17 - Stand-on Vessel;
24. Rule 27 - Vessels Not Under Command
25. Rule 34 - Maneuvering and Warning Signals;
26. Rule 36 - Signals to Attract Attention
The U.S. Navy’s Fundamental Problem
https://www.marinelink.com/amp/news/fundamental-problem-navys433437
More Punishments Issued for Fatal Western Pacific Destroyer Collisions; Dates Set for Initial D.C. Criminal Hearings
https://news.usni.org/2018/02/01/punishments-issued-fatal-western-pacific-destroyer-collisions-dates-set-initial-d-c-criminal-hearings?utm_source=USNI+News&utm_campaign=9e872bec98-USNI_NEWS_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-9e872bec98-230377553&mc_cid=9e872bec98&mc_eid=d1b7ba249a
Former USS John S. McCain XO Found Guilty of Dereliction of Duty
https://news.usni.org/2018/02/14/former-uss-john-s-mccain-xo-found-guilty-dereliction-duty-hearing?utm_source=USNI+News&utm_campaign=d90e8dd4fd-USNI_NEWS_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-d90e8dd4fd-230377553&mc_cid=d90e8dd4fd&mc_eid=d1b7ba249a
Document: Report on the Collision Between USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and Fishing Vessel Nam Yang 502
https://news.usni.org/2017/11/30/document-report-collision-uss-lake-champlain-cg-57-fishing-vessel-nam-yang-502?utm_source=USNI+News&utm_campaign=47900e5f15-USNI_NEWS_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-47900e5f15-230377553&mc_cid=47900e5f15&mc_eid=d1b7ba249a
Collision Reports: Next Steps to Ensuring Surface Warfare Readiness
https://blog.usni.org/posts/2017/12/12/collision-reports-next-steps-to-ensuring-surface-warfare-readiness
USS Fitzgerald, USS John S. McCain Collision Report
https://news.usni.org/2017/11/01/uss-fitzgerald-uss-john-s-mccain-collision-report
Document: Investigation into the Deaths of 7 Sailors Aboard USS Fitzgerald
https://news.usni.org/2017/08/17/document-investigation-deaths-7-sailors-aboard-uss-fitzgerald