Replies

>>If by “one-gun solution” Bryanw92 means a rifle/cartridge combination the average individual can master, with effective range no greater than that at which the average can score an acceptable percentage of hits, then I agree: an AR-15-style rifle isn’t a bad compromise.

I don’t know why you are trying to turn this into an argument that I’m saying that the AR-15 is a good rifle from CQB to 1000 yds.

But if you are trying to educate me, then you totally miss my thesis: the AR-15 IS a good compromise, as you admit. That’s all I’m saying. It is good compromise that is very reliable for a citizen, effective at reasonable distances, and can put out a volume of fire that meets the needs of a citizen trying to, as an example, take down a solo shooter from across a parking lot.

>>The bolt action rifles issued by the Euro powers, US, and Imperial Japan will outshoot the AR-15. Each and every one will: every time.

If the bolt-action is so superior and the Army knows that, then explain the Garand.

One is tempted to be coy, and ask Bryanw92 if the names S.L.A. Marshall, I.B. Holley Jr, Julian Hatcher, Rene Studler, William Crozier, Stephen Benet, and James Ripley mean anything. But that would be a disservice to other forum members.

“...you totally miss my thesis: the AR-15 IS a good compromise, as you admit. That’s all I’m saying. ...”

A good start. But Bryanw92 hasn’t thought any farther into the meaning of “compromise.”

In the military context, “compromise” means that a system put into the hands of troops will perform less than optimally in some situations. Suboptimal systems fail. In action, this means some people will perish. At the very least. If the situation unravels too far, units get overcome or wiped out, victory turns to defeat; the sky is never the limit.

“Compromise” is a dirty word to many citizens and nearly all Freepers. But - moral opprobrium notwithstanding - it cannot be escaped.

As an officer responsible for operational test & evaluation of a number of aircraft subsystems, across every US military branch, including some systems of Allied nations, I was privileged to work with every technical specialty. Couldn’t help but develop a certain fondness for the people involved, and for the troops who had to take what the military establishment handed them, then go in harm’s way. Improving their chances - of prevailing and returning home safe - became an obsession, an ongoing intellectual preoccupation despite the fact they required me to leave active duty 18 years ago.

So I judge it worth at least a little extra thought into what compromises have had to be made, in system design and performance, in procurement and supply for the armed forces, from before the Founding right down to today. Not all compromises are obvious; more annoyingly, not all have relevance to system design or supportability, or other attributes.

“...If the bolt-action is so superior and the Army knows that, then explain the Garand.”

Easiest one of the bunch.

From its inception up until the formal adoption of US Rifle Cal 30 M1 in 1936, it was recognized - by some - that the self-loader could bring advantage in action. But it was resisted; expense, difficulty of resupply, inclination of troops to fire off all their ammunition prematurely, were all raised as objections (nearly all were also raised as objections to the adoption of breechloaders, metallic cartridges, repeaters, and other stuff).

The question for system designers was not, will it work? It was closer to, will it work well enough and accurately enough and long enough, and be light and simple enough, to justify the expense of changing, and can we reorganize field support to enable it to keep functioning?

The historical reality that Byranw92 has completely missed, is that military doctrine is not static (so much for timeless verities and fundamental truths that never change). Before WWII, what counted for the US Army infantry establishment was scoring hits.

It was found that the average recruit firing the M1 Garand could score more hits in a given time period than could an expert marksman firing the M1903. The recruit did miss more, but the overall result was judged to be worth the risk. And the Army Ordnance field support people proved equal to the task of keeping it all going.

After the Second World War, doctrine changed.

Data collected by S.L.A Marshall suggested plain volume of fire was as good at causing enemy casualties as aimed fire. Various influential leaders and organizations within the Army establishment agreed, and - backed by analyses from the Operations Research Office - convinced the keepers of official doctrine to make the change.

Not everyone agreed. Pushed by various factions in and out of the Ordnance Corps, the Army officially adopted US Rifle, 7.62mm, M14 as a replacement for the M1 (also the M2 Carbine, all submachine guns, and the BAR M1918A2). Not the best of compromises; various specialized offices in the defense establishment were reluctant to give up their specialized small arms (most of which were lighter and less powerful than the M14, or the M1).

Evidence grew, that various offices inside the Army establishment had doctored operational testing for the M14 or otherwise shaded the results. Unforeseen production problems arose, delaying M14 production and subsequent replacement of the M1. Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara was not satisfied with explanations offered by the Ordnance Corps; he terminated M14 production and declared that the military would be re-equipped with the M16. Springfield Armory was closed down as a result.

Since then, the Army firepower doctrine has been called into question, somewhat ... significant doubts have been raised about the ability of historian S.L.A. Marshall to collect the data he says he did. But he remains at the official pinnacle of orthodoxy when it comes to doctrine.

The US Marines believe a different doctrine: firepower equals hits per minute. They have long maintained a studied indifference to doctrinal disagreements inside and between the other service departments, and for quite a long time they made it a point of pride to accept whatever the War Dept, and later the Army Dept, sent to them in terms of systems.