General George S. Patton was the only WW 2 Commander who knew it was going to happen.
“General George S. Patton was the only WW 2 Commander who knew it was going to happen.”
[Excerpt]
After capturing Metz, General Patton ordered a powerful drive into the Siegfried Line, which he called, “A monument to the stupidity of mankind.” Using this attack, he planned on fighting its way into the coal mining region of Germany. The Third Army was forced to give up this attack because of a problem that developed in the First Army’s area to the north.
German General Von Rundstedt started an attack against the First Army’s VII and VIII Corps on the 16th of December. Von Rundstedt’s forces hit quickly and gained the element of surprise. Because of this, his soldiers were making excellent progress.
Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF began to worry that they had underestimated the ability of the Germans. They feared that the Germans might be able to use this massive offensive to go to the north and west to capture the cities of Liege and Antwerp.
Liege was extremely important because the Allies had large supply dumps there. If the Germans managed to seize those supplies, they could possibly push the Allies back to the coastline, causing them to lose all the ground they had gained.
Antwerp was important because it was a port city. If captured, the Germans could use it to bring in badly needed supplies.
At a special meeting of all the highest ranking generals in the American, British, and Canadian armies, it was decided that the toughest job would go to General Patton and his Third Army. They would have to relieve the soldiers who had been surrounded by the Germans at the Belgian city of Bastogne.
After the meeting, Eisenhower, who had just been promoted to the five-star rank of General of the Army, was talking with General Patton. He remarked, “George, every time I get promoted I get attacked.” Patton shot back with the comment, “And every time you get attacked, I pull you out!”
The 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, was holding out and fighting off the fierce attempts by the Germans to overrun Bastogne.
The Third Army had to stop a full scale attack they had started to the east, pull back the entire army, swing around ninety degrees to the north, and then begin another full scale attack on the southern flank of the German forces. Nothing like that had ever been done in the history of warfare. Everyone thought it was impossible except General Patton. He knew his men could do the impossible.
It only took three days for the Third army to perform that massive maneuver. Today, military historians readily admit that only Patton’s Third Army could have accomplished a maneuver like that and make it look easy. Patton always demanded more from his soldiers than other commanders did and they never let him down.
One of the reasons the Third Army performed so well is because they expected the German attack. While Eisenhower and his friends were playing cards in London and the First Army turned part of their area into a R & R (Rest and Recuperation) area, Patton’s intelligence officers were hard at work.
The events leading up to the Battle of the Bulge have, like the Falaise Gap and Operation Market-Garden, become controversial issues. Many people believe that Eisenhower’s staff at SHAEF made poor decisions when they ignored Third Army reports about a possible German offensive in the Ardennes.
Colonel Oscar Koch, head of Third Army’s G-2 Intelligence department, had sent intelligence reports warning SHAEF that the Germans were probably planning a major attack against the First Army’s R&R area. His report was ignored. They refused to believe the Germans could collect the mass of weapons, men, and material to launch a large attack. It was a classic case of under-estimating the enemy. At Colonel Koch’s suggestion, General Patton gave the order for his staff to design two separate plans in the event of a German attack. General Patton believed Colonel Koch and considered him to be the best G-2 in the European Theater of Operations.
When Patton attended the meeting with the other Allied commanders he told them he could attack in two days with at least two divisions. Everyone thought he was crazy, but he told them that he had already set plans in motion before he left his headquarters. All he had to was place a phone call. When it was finally decided that he should attack as soon as possible, he phoned his headquarters and said, “Nickel.” The attack was on.
The General never returned to his headquarters. Instead, he and his driver, Sergeant Mims, began traveling along the roads where he knew he would meet his soldiers heading north. He gave orders on the spot and told everyone he met to head north and kill Germans. Sergeant Mims once said to Patton, “General, the army is wasting a lot of money on your staff officers. You and I can run the whole war from your jeep.”
While watching his men heading toward the Germans surrounding Bastogne, he said, “No other army in the world could do this. No other soldiers could do what these men are doing. By God, I’m proud of them.”
On the 26th of December a 4th Armored Division Task Force, commanded by Major General H.J. Gaffey, made contact with the soldiers at Bastogne.
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