“Given the choice between the F-16 and the A-10, I;ll take the A-10 ANY DAY !
It IS the MOST EFFECTIVE of the two!”
Sorry, but the A-10 is ineffective as an air superiority fighter and in a number of other roles handled by the F-16 and other aircraft.
The only choices currently available to the U.S. Air Force are to retire one-third of its F-16 aircraft and squadrons or the five squadrons of A-10 aircraft.
Wikipedia:
Proposed retirement
In 2007, the A-10 was expected to be in USAF service until 2028 and possibly later,[99] when it may be replaced by the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.[28] Critics have said that replacing the A-10 with the F-35 would be a “giant leap backwards” given the A-10’s performance and the F-35’s rising costs.[100] In 2012, the Air Force considered the F-35B STOVL variant as a replacement CAS aircraft, but concluded that the aircraft could not generate sufficient sorties.[101] In 2012, the USAF proposed disbanding five A-10 squadrons in its budget request to cut its fleet of 348 A-10s by 102 to lessen cuts to multi-mission aircraft.[102] In August 2013, Congress and the Air Force examined various proposals, including the F-35 and the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle filling the A-10’s role. Proponents state that the A-10’s armor and cannon are superior to aircraft such as the F-35, that guided munitions could be jammed; and that ground commanders frequently request A-10 support.[88]
In the Air Force’s FY 2015 budget, the service considered retiring the A-10 and other single-mission aircraft, prioritizing multi-mission aircraft; cutting a whole fleet and its infrastructure is seen as the only method for major savings. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve members argued that allocating all A-10s to their control would achieve savings; half of the fleet is operated by the Air National Guard. The U.S. Army had expressed interest in obtaining some A-10s,[103][104] but Army Secretary John M. McHugh later stated there was “no chance” of that happening due to Army aviation fleet reconfiguration and that the aircraft’s mission was for the Air Force to perform.[105] The U.S. Air Force stated that retirement would save $3.7 billion from 2015 to 2019. Guided munitions allow more aircraft to perform the CAS mission, reducing the requirement for a specialized aircraft; since 2001, multirole aircraft and bombers performed 80 percent of CAS missions. The A-10 is also more vulnerable to advanced anti-aircraft defenses. The Army stated that the A-10 is invaluable for its versatile weapons loads, psychological impact, and reduced logistics needs on ground support systems.[106]
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 prohibited the Air Force from spending money during FY 2014 on retiring the A-10; it did not change scheduled reductions of two aircraft per month, reducing the operational total to 283.[107] On 27 January 2014, General Mike Hostage, head of Air Combat Command, stated that while other aircraft in the A-10’s role may not be as good, they were more viable in environments where the A-10 was potentially useless and that retaining the A-10 would mean cuts being imposed on other areas.[108] Equivalent cost saving measures include cutting the entire B-1 Lancer bomber fleet or 350 F-16s; the F-16 fleet would either be reduced by a third or perform most CAS missions until the F-35 becomes fully operational.[109] On 24 February 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel presented a budget plan that would retire the A-10 over five years to fund the F-35A.[110][111]
There were accusations that the A-10’s retirement is due to less importance placed on ground support and that it would risk lives. Army Chief of Staff Ray Odierno told Congress that while the Army did not recommend retiring the A-10, he understood the Air Force’s budget decision, and that both services would work together to develop better CAS tactics for the F-16; the Senate viewed that as a new solution to one already in place.[112] On 23 April 2014, Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh defended the plan to divest the A-10 as “logical” and that analysis showed that the choice was the least operationally harmful, as well increased cost savings to $4.2 billion. He also revealed alternative cost-saving measures the Air Force rejected such as: F-35A deferments; further F-15 Eagle cuts; ISR and air mobility fleet reductions; extensive tanker fleet reductions; command and control cuts; and grounding some long-range strike platforms.[113][114][115]
The House Armed Services Committee passed an amendment to their FY 2015 markup blocking A-10 retirement, stipulating that the fleet cannot be retired or stored until the U.S. Comptroller General completes certifications and studies on the abilities of other platforms used to perform CAS.[116] The Senate Armed Services Committee markup directed $320 million saved from personnel cuts to retain the A-10. Both Armed Services Committees of Congress draft plans kept the A-10 in service for at least another year.[117] The House Appropriations Committee voted in favor of retiring the A-10 fleet,[118] but the House FY 2015 spending bill blocked the retirement during 2015.[119]
The F-35A’s operational readiness may be pushed back due in part to the blocked A-10 retirement, as the Air Force claims it is keeping maintainers needed to work on the F-35.[120] Lawmakers are backing bills to prevent A-10 retirement in FY 2015; up to 36 planes could be allowed to be moved to back-up status to free up maintainers for F-35 work,[121] and 18 will be moved to back-up status in 2015.[122] In January 2015, Air Force officials told lawmakers that it would take 15 years to fully develop a new attack aircraft to replace the A-10;[123] service leaders admit a follow-on weapon system for the A-10 is “on the table.”[124] The Air Force plan is for F-16s and F-15Es to initially take up CAS sorties, which will then be taken over by the F-35A once sufficient numbers reach full operating potential over the next decade. After that, the service is considering purchasing a relatively inexpensive replacement to perform CAS against enemies that lack sophisticated air defenses.[125]