It was not the Emperor’s rapid surrender that accounts for my dad’s and his 1500 other camp mates’ survival after Nagasaki. Their camp, Fukuoka #17, was just enough out of range (well, 50 miles out, enough to survive in the short term) to comment how that must’ve been “one hell of an ammo dump,” only to see several of their guards lose heart and dessert, presumably to check on their nearby families’ abodes.
After further sacrifice of several prisoners, the guards that remained in the camp were overpowered then torn limb-from-limb by 90-pound men that had endured—and seen their friends succumb to—years of the most horrific torments imaginable.
Prisoners took over the camp and organized, sending out scouting patrols that eventually met up with Americans on the ground near Nagasaki, through which the camp’s prisoners that could travel then evacuated by ship. Most spent Thanksgiving around Manilla, where many pledged their attendance at yearly reunions to be held in the States.
My father, weighing in at 22kg, was not recognized when he first appeared on his parents’ doorstep.
HF
Oops, that was 44kg, not 22kg.
HF
“... Prisoners took over the camp and organized, sending out scouting patrols that eventually met up with Americans on the ground near Nagasaki, through which the camp’s prisoners that could travel then evacuated by ship. ...”
Additionally, Imperial Japan maintained a large number of POW camps in Korea and mainland China. Word among US forces then preparing for invasion of the Home Islands, was that the Imperial government had already let the Allies know (by informal back-channel diplomatic contacts, one surmises) that the moment the first Allied soldier set one foot on the Home Islands, every last POW would be put to the sword.
The precipitous surrender evidently caught would-be POW executioners by surprise. But the Imperial Japanese were not above playing the victims even then: all camp guards and administrators outside the Home Islands instantly cut off what spare rations the POWs had been getting, stopped every bit of meager support and care they’d been providing. Allied authorities, properly alarmed, made vigorous protests but were told by Japanese counterparts, “Hey, we just surrendered to you. We’re the victims here! These people aren’t our problem. You figure it out.”
The Allies had not yet deployed any occupation forces to any spot that had been under Imperial Japanese control, and no matter how upset they might become, they were in no position to compel behavior by Japanese forces: “Feed those POWs or we’ll ... ???”
No Allied airlifter bases were sufficiently close to these camps to airlift supplies. Allied warships (submarines excepted) were many days’ steaming time from any coast in question, and in any case had no capability to airlift any supplies so far inland (carrier aircraft hadn’t the range nor load capabilities).
Every possibility loomed, that huge numbers of POWs might starve before rescuers could get there. What to do?
Then someone suggested it: use USAAF’s B-29s.
The largest bombers then in operation, they were the only aircraft with the range, payload, and numbers to get there, drop supplies, and come back.
And so the most powerful bomber force ever to drop munitions in anger loaded up and ventured forth on a mission of mercy to aid POWs, mere days after applying the last touches to the “rain of ruin from the air” President Truman had promised the Imperial Japanese.
“... Prisoners took over the camp and organized, sending out scouting patrols that eventually met up with Americans on the ground near Nagasaki, through which the camp’s prisoners that could travel then evacuated by ship. ...”
Additionally, Imperial Japan maintained a large number of POW camps in Korea and mainland China. Word among US forces then preparing for invasion of the Home Islands, was that the Imperial government had already let the Allies know (by informal back-channel diplomatic contacts, one surmises) that the moment the first Allied soldier set one foot on the Home Islands, every last POW would be put to the sword.
The precipitous surrender evidently caught would-be POW executioners by surprise. But the Imperial Japanese were not above playing the victims even then: all camp guards and administrators outside the Home Islands instantly cut off what spare rations the POWs had been getting, stopped every bit of meager support and care they’d been providing. Allied authorities, properly alarmed, made vigorous protests but were told by Japanese counterparts, “Hey, we just surrendered to you. We’re the victims here! These people aren’t our problem. You figure it out.”
The Allies had not yet deployed any occupation forces to any spot that had been under Imperial Japanese control, and no matter how upset they might become, they were in no position to compel behavior by Japanese forces: “Feed those POWs or we’ll ... ???”
No Allied airlifter bases were sufficiently close to these camps to airlift supplies. Allied warships (submarines excepted) were many days’ steaming time from any coast in question, and in any case had no capability to airlift any supplies so far inland (carrier aircraft hadn’t the range nor load capabilities).
Every possibility loomed, that huge numbers of POWs might starve before rescuers could get there. What to do?
Then someone suggested it: use USAAF’s B-29s.
The largest bombers then in operation, they were the only aircraft with the range, payload, and numbers to get there, drop supplies, and come back.
And so the most powerful bomber force ever to drop munitions in anger loaded up and ventured forth on a mission of mercy to aid POWs, mere days after applying the last touches to the “rain of ruin from the air” President Truman had promised the Imperial Japanese.