“What, as a deterrent?
Germany develops the bomb. They either keep it secret or announce it to the world.
The US would do as they did - publish shots at trinity demonstrating the yield and the capabilities.”
An over-cute modernism called upon in bad faith, to cast doubt on decisions taken in earlier times. I don’t know if “ahistoricism” is the proper term for this sort of ploy, or “presentism,” or some other word. It should be obvious that lots of modern academics indulge in it, deeming themselves “historians” (which is not a profession), and thus above moral reproach. Whatever the case, JCBreckenridge loves to chase after them, panting and salivating in agreement, as this example suggests.
“Deterrence” was in the dictionary in 1945, but its meaning contained nothing like what it does today. And it did not do so for some years after USAAF dropped those two bombs.
That little intellectual development had to wait for a coterie of intellectuals to dig up the word, dust it off, spin new meanings out of the thinnest air, and ram them down the throats of the military and the public. In this latter day, it now reeks of paradox, because an explicit - a keystone - assumption is that it deals chiefly with weapons we dare not use.
If any American citizen of 1945 voiced the opinion that any weapon existed - could exist - which ought not be used because of moral scruples, he/she would have encountered immediate resistance, and become (instantly) the subject of great suspicion: that (1) the citizen was a lunatic, or (2) an agent for the Axis. Possibly both.
A co-development was the reaction of the nation’s “moral leaders” (mostly, the clergy, the academics, and the upper echelons of the scientific community ... “public intellectuals” and their activist/groupie hangers-on as we now know them scarcely existed in 1945). In December 1945, Harper’s Magazine published the results of a poll, which asked questions of citizens concerning the wartime use of atomic weapons: Did we use the right number? Too many? Not enough? Something above three quarters of respondents expressed the opinion that the nation had employed either a sufficient number of bombs, or too few.
Our self-appointed “moral leaders” were shocked. Plainly, this was not acceptable, and immediate steps were taken to re-educate the great unwashed masses, and the evil military-industrial complexers who had hoodwinked them. Various Manhattan Project physicists formed pressure groups (ironically, Dr Leo Szilard, who’d led the way in getting the project approved, had grown to doubt the whole affair so seriously that he led the way in arguing - to authorities, behind closed doors - against using the bombs in battle).
Many of these groups are not only still around, but enjoy uninterrupted and ever-mounting moral gravitas (go look up The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists). 68 years later, our self-appointed moral betters have just about triumphed.
Not only do all Progressives support their goals, most scientists do, and almost all academics. More ironically, much of the military now dismisses such weapons as counterproductive, if not downright immoral. Our arsenals shrink year by year. Public figures boost their popularity with the unwashed masses by calling for “the end” of nuclear weapons. Some once wore uniforms.
The conceit that noncombatants can hope for safety in wartime became a non-issue no later than the 17th century. Many moralizers wish it otherwise - sometimes quite intensely - but their objections amount to nothing greater than addled sentiment.
The fact that the Allies complained about various enemy “violations” of international law in both World Wars, and whipped their own citizenry into a frenzy with propaganda about Nazi and Japanese “war crimes”, does not transform these into worthy moral concepts; all it really does is reinforce the validity of the truism notably codified by Winston Spencer Churchill, about truth becoming the first casualty.
Those who accuse the United States of hypocrisy are singularly obtuse: evidently, they labor under the misconception that we will become more effective if we comply with their notions of morality, which are irreducibly subjective. No conceit is more wrongheaded, nor more dangerous. Especially in the realm of armed conflict.
There is another possibility: they seek our destruction.
If I am not mistaken, I believe Szilard's view was colored by the prospect of using the bomb against Japan. He had not voiced an objection to using it against Germany. Only after Germany surrendered did he become anti-nuclear.
“An over-cute modernism”
I can cite contemporary opinion, (including that of American nationals), who believed the same, and expressed that the necessity of the bomb development for American deterrence. Even before 1945 and the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
I can cite contemporary opinion regarding negotiation wrt to Japan an opinion that I do not share as yet another alternative to the blockade.
Arguing that citation of contemporary opinions as ‘bad faith’ does a disservice to these men and women, many of whom were instrumental in the development of the Atomic bomb. Many of whom would later go on to the development of the postwar theories of Detente.
“or some other word.”
Citation of contemporary opinions is the precise opposite of your accusations of ‘recentism’. These are not recent theories. In fact, they aren’t talked about much because they are contrary to more recentism and revisionism that seeks to state, “there were no viable alternatives to the bomb” This is false. There were many other options taken into consideration even if they were not used back in 1944 and 1945, and even earlier in some cases.
“deeming themselves “historians” (which is not a profession)
In what way is ‘historian’ not a profession?
“thus above moral reproach.”
I don’t believe I’ve made any claims to being a historian here, nor have I stated that anyone who is one is above moral reproach. That is all you. I’ve simply attacked historical speculation lacking sufficient proof.
“panting and salivating”
No bias here!
“Deterrence was in the dictionary in 1945, but its meaning contained nothing like what it does today.”
It tended to be called Proliferation in the early 50s and deterrence today. The label is used for convenience. The concept that American possession of the atomic bomb would deter nuclear attack from Germany or others is precisely what FDR wrote about in 1939, well before the initiation of the Manhattan project.
“Dr Leo Szilard, who’d led the way in getting the project approved, had grown to doubt the whole affair so seriously that he led the way in arguing - to authorities, behind closed doors - against using the bombs in battle).”
So you’re arguing that it was in fact contemporary opinion, which corroborates with what I am saying here. Thank you.
Again, I suggest you spend some time reading my posts first - I don’t believe that it was wrong to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. I also don’t believe that the atomic bomb was the only viable option.
Before labelling me a progressive lickspittle it would be helpful for you to do due diligence in the future.