Yep. Considering how such a large quantity of Japanese raw materials passed through the South China Sea, retaking the Philippines would provide a base of operations from which the vital Japanese supply route could be strangled thereby greatly facilitating an eventual invasion of Japan.
Which was the greatest benefit of the dual axis strategy. The Southern route gave us the Philippines, which cut off Japan from her resource base. The Central Pacific route gave us bases in the Marianas for B-29s to commence bombing the homeland.
The foundation for this strategy is being set now, with Operation Cartwheel. The Japanese are being ground down in a war of attrition, particularly in the air, while the United States Navy gathers its strength. Despite the heavy losses of the Guadalcanal campaign, the IJN emerged tactically stronger than the USN. At one point, we were down to two damaged carriers, the Enterprise and Saratoga. The Japanese had two complete carrier divisions with fleet carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku, Junyo and Hiyo, and light carriers Ryuho and Zuiho. We also lost a lot of valuable cruisers and destroyers in the night actions. If the IJN had pushed a “decisive battle” a few months ago, I don’t know if we could have sortied in response to the challenge. However, Yamamoto threw away all his carrier pilots during Operation I-Go. So the sought after “decisive battle” was instead “No-Go.”
I made a funny.