[henkster]

Kursk was not irrelevant; for the Germans, it wasn’t about “winning” but rather getting an operational stalemate in the East. A draw if you will.

The main problem for the Germans wasn’t Kiev or Smolensk. The die had already been cast by then. The real problem was in the brain of Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder, who cast the die. He sold Hitler and his generals on the idea of defeating the USSR in one campaign season. A look at the map should have told them it was logistically impossible to project their power that distance in such a short time. Instead, they should have planned for at least a two-year war.

[colorado tanker]

Kursk was like a slow-moving train wreck. It was a big, juicy salient, ripe for plucking in early 1943. But in the winter and early spring, the German army was too exhausted to mount the offensive. When it was approved for Spring, there were already misgivings, especially knowing the allied invasion in the West was coming closer. Manstein, however, talked Hitler into it. The offensive was repeatedly delayed to allow better preparation, including delivery of new, more powerful tanks. Hitler stayed with the plan despite his own misgivings and the fact that by the time of the attack, most senior officers would have called it off.

Meanwhile, the Red Army had months to prepare defenses in depth against the anticipated attack.