Start at page 14, and see
R. C. Sherman
August, 1986
- Amelia's sighting of the bright lights on NAU was heard by Chief of Police
on his short wave radio. His request for frequencies and time had been answered
by Harry at LAE. We are thus certain of the LAE -NUK -NAU route. The time was not
accurately recorded by the Chief. but recalled later as between 10:30 and 11:30
Z. Of 11:00 Z is used, the G.S. would be 114K/131MPH, just a bit slower than
they had planned, indicating an average headwind component of about 10-15K.
Normal so far, over 1/2 way and exactly on (her revised) course, 1250 NM and 11
hours behind them, 989 NBM and 81/2 hours to go, with a new ETA for HOW of 1930 Z.
She should have passed the Gilberts from about 1400 to 1430 Z, 2-2:30 a.m.
local.
The Itasca heard some faint signals several hours later. At 1816 Z they heard,
"100 miles out", and by 1912 Z her, "…on top of you, but can't see you", was 5
x 5, as was 1915 Z, "…circling. It would appear that she was between her
ETEA and ETA-15 min. 2239 NM (revised route) in 19:15 is a G.S. of 116K/134MPH.
An indication that the headwind component was light but there was probably a
crosswind component because they missed HOW. An observation on the Itasca at
this time noted that it was clear to the South toward Baker and the Itasca had a
trail of smoke that could be seen from quite a distance/ To the North, however,
were fairly solid black clouds, probably rain. Amelia had reported cloudy
weather and rain. At 1928 Z she said, "give signal on 7500 Kc for bearing."
(There 7500 Kc is again). The Itasca responded to every call, but never got an
acknowledgement. Something must have been wrong with her 3105 receiver. Most
unfortunately she never tried another frequency until her 19282 request for 7500
Kc. At 1933Z the Itasca heard, "received your signal but couldn't get a
minimum." So! She must have heard 7500 and may had had D. F. capability on that
frequency. Meanwhile, Black and Lt. Cooper had set up their H.F. D. F. on the
island. For power they had rigged up the Itasca's gun control batteries.
During her calls on 3105 - a half dozen or more in the last 12 hours, none were
long enough for them to get a bearing. There is a suspicion that the batteries
had run down from earlier tests and the last several hours of use. Even had
they obtained several bearings, how could they have advised her since she heard
only one call of the hundreds made to her? At 2014 Z her signal was a bit
weaker, she said, "flying North and South on sunline 157° - 337 °." It was her
last message.
Tarawa was 622 NM from Howland; about 41/2 hours, although other islands in the
group should be seen earlier. They probably had about 5 hours of fuel, at the
most left. She likely set course for TAR, using HOW as the starting point.
Since she was probably 90 to 130 NM North, Northwest, of HOW, advancing the
heading to that area, and applying the crosswind that got her that far North in
the first place would put her within sight of Mill Atoll - about 630 NM from the
position we assumed, N.N.W. of HOW, as the gas needle hit zero.
Several natives saw the plane belly land in shallow water above the reef just off
the shore of Barre Island, on the North side of Mill Atoll. They were astounded
to see a "package" change into a boat, and two "men" climb in and paddle to
shore. The tallest man, Fred, was hurt and the shorter, thinner "man", Amelia,
helped him. Some Japanese soldiers had also seen the plane. When it landed,
they commandeered a fishing boat and paddled across the lagoon in the
cal Atoll; an intermittent ring of coral based islands, with a lagoon in the
middle. It is located on the Southern edge of the Marshall Island Group. The
hidden natives watched the strangers and the Japanese who came from behind
across the lagoon. Soon the confrontation occurred, with much arm waving and
sign language. Our flyers were eventually transported to the village on Mili
Island, the largest of the tiny Atoll ring.
On July 9th, three of the four ships in the 12th Squadron, ostensibly searching
for the downed plane, (reported to the U.S. as an all out effort) were ordered
back to their home base, Ise Bay Japan. No need to really search since they had
been found. The fourth ship, the 2000 ton research ship, Koshu, was ordered to
Jaliut, headquarters for the Marshalls. The Koshu was the only one of the four
ships with a plane hoist on the fantail. It had a canvas sling which was put
under seaplanes to hoist them aboard, before hoist rings were built into the
planes.
Incredibly, the Japanese in 1949 during the occupation, succeeded in convincing
an Army G-2 investigation into the Earhart disappearance, that rumors not
withstanding, their Navy had made a sustained, heroic effort to locate the
downed plane, it was never found. thus the flyers could not have been held on
Saipan or anywhere else. Pacific islanders had long ago learned that it wasn't
smart to talk to any outsiders, Japanese, Americans or whomever; they were mum
for years.
On July 17th, the Koshu took on coal in Jaluit. It then steamed to Barre Island
where they winched up the damaged Electra and picked up the prisioners. The
plane was seen on the fantail by a medical corpsman and his native helper when
the Koshu put into Jaluit on the 19th to get help for Fred Noonan from the local
medical detachment. The Koshu then steamed to Kwajalein, then on to the large
naval base at Truk. Amelia and Fred were transported to a sea plane and flown
to Garipan on Saipan in the Mariana's. All of the foregoing from witnesses,
crew members, and the Koshu's log.
Because of the Japanese paranoias about getting caught red handed with their string
of island fortifications and naval bases, theymwere suspicious about Amelia's
round the world trip. Fearing that her disappearance was an excuse for a
massive "search" by the U.S., the Japanese High Command was literally on pins
and needles. When she was found in the Marshalls, over 800 N.M. from Howland,
and with a camera (albeit an ordinary 35 mm type), the questioning was exten-
sive. By the time the High Command began to believe the truth, there was no way
to take back their lies to the world, nor erase the incriminating sights the two
had seen. They could never be released. Fred grew increasingly irritable with
his captors and his meager ration of watery soup and rice. In a fit of rage, he
threw a bowl of food at his jailer. He was summarily taken out and executed.
Amelia languished in her cell for another year (no more exact time could be
determined) finally succumbing to dysentery.
Goerner was convinced that Amelia and Fred had died in captivity in Garipan
Prison on Saipan, because of several witnesses, including one who was in an
adjacent cell. He was unable to prove how they came to be on Saipan, so he
spent a good deal of time trying to find their graves to have bones iden-
tified as a Caucasian male and female of Amelia's and Fred's approximate height
and age. He discovered that the cometry he poked around in was not the origi=
nal site, and when he thought he found the one in use in 12938 and '59, other
witnesses told him that it had been disturbed many times. He put much store in
the rumor of an American team, during the investigation of Saipan, going directly to
the old cemetery, exhuming several graves, and taking the remains back to a
warship. Klaas as convinced that Amelia was alive in the U.S., thus he
discounted witnesses referred to above, andspent no time looking foe ceme-
teries. Loomis, having put together a credible scenario that fit both previous
facts and the missing links that he found (e.g., the Koshu's log and several of
its crew members), did not believe that remainswere necessary to prove his the-
sis.
Despite their shortcomings, Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan had the courage and
self-confidence of all pioneers. He'd they been able to get a 'celestial fix
before dawn, or a radio bearing later (either with their equipment or by the
Itasca) to intersect their un line, history would have been differnt>
19
Also, I found this interesting chart.
Here is aircraft data onSpecifications for Earhart’s Lockheed Electra 10E.
