My remark about the Germans "losing the war" with the 9mm was meant to be silly - I was just fencing with a set of colonels who were determined to change our primary caliber to 9mm para come hell or high water and it was my chance to tweak their noses in public. .40 S&W would have been a better choice if they really had to replace the .45 but they had their own agenda.
Oh, well if you walked around and counted grave stones, that clearly proves everything.
Here is another claim.
“”According to calculations by the US Army the results of the battles in World War II were only possible, when the soldiers of the Wehrmacht - man for man and unit for unit - were 20 to 30 percent more effective then was the British and American forces they faced.
Extrapolating the individual soldiers against each other - and although the Wehrmacht was far lower in numbers - so the German troops that faced British and American troops under all combat conditions (for assaults with the usual factor of 1.0 - in the defense in carefully selected positions with view by a factor of 1.3 - in prepared defense positions 1.5 - in fortified defense positions by a factor of 1.6) cause approximately 50 percent higher losses than they suffer.
This was accessible whether the Germans were in attack or defense, if they were locally in place with higher numbers or - what was the rule - in lower numbers, if they had air cover or not, whether they had won the battle or lost at the end.
Even in the bitter years of defeats on the Russian front, the German combat effectiveness superiority over the Russians was even more pronounced. In the early days of the campaign in the east, one German division could take up with three Russian divisions of comparable strength and power. And, theoretically, under favorable defense conditions one German division could stand against no less than seven comparable Russian divisions.
In 1944 this superiority was still about 2:1, and one German soldier at the front caused an average loss of 7.78 Russians for one German. These figures need to adapted to the fact that the Wehrmacht in 1944 was almost always in the defense, had a relatively higher mobility and at this time the German weapons were better than the weapons of the Russians. But even if you take into account these considerations, the ratio for the infliction of losses was more than 4:1 and the German fighting power in battle was - man by man - about more than 50% better.””