Yes, and after all that, they still didn’t change their tactics.
Brezhnev’s general staff figured that they could use a massive chemical weapons barrage to initiate their invasion of western Europe, followed by an extended North-South linear front, all buttoned up in butyl rubber chemical suits.
Just like Napoleon’s advance on the Danube river, prior to the encirclement of Ulm. They intended to bypass the major cities, as they represented strong points.
But because of the butyl rubber suits, they had only two weeks to make it all the way to the coast. Every day later than two weeks would cost them 10% of their force lost to heat exhaustion.
This timetable was a deadly weakness, because all NATO had to do was delay their advance by any possible means. It figured on small units being everywhere: in front of the advance, within it, and behind it, disrupting everything.
A meat grinder. And while this was going on, the REFORGER reinforcements would be enroute, blasting their way through the North Sea fleet in a vicious naval battle.
We had significant forward located equipment, so that for several armored divisions, only the soldiers needed to be moved forward. That would have reduced the effect of any delay in ship convoys.
Glanz has written some recent books that take advantage of archival WWII materials on the Soviet side. That look indicates that Soviets did substantial learning from the meet grinder of the first few years. German memoirs mostly come from generals who served in the early years.
Oh, and during the winter, chemical weapons are less effective, so solving the heat exhaustion problem that way shouldn’t work either