Politics has nothing to do with it. MacArthur’s conduct of the 1941-1942 Philippines campaign was abysmal.
Even though he knew war was coming, he did not take enough steps to prepare his command. Specifically, the failure on his part to move supplies to Bataan at he start of the war, or even before the war when tensions increased. He did not start moving supplies until well after the war started, a critical failure on his part that led to the early defeat of the USAFFE forces on Bataan.
Logistics is the key to winning a war, and MacArthur’s utter disdain for it cost his troops dearly.
In addition, he:
...instead of following prewar plans, he tried a “fight them on the beaches strategy” that his troops were simply not capable of implementing.
... did not place his forces on a full alert after receiving the war warning in late November of 1941. Instead he continued to operate on mostly a peacetime basis. B-17s that were due to move to Del Monte field on Mindanao stayed on Luzon so that a party could be thrown for them. Not acceptable with war imminent. The aircraft at Clark should have been dispersed, the auxiliary fields should have been completed faster. But MacArthur had convinced himself that war was not coming until spring, despite all evidence to the contrary.
...accepted secret cash payments from the Philippine government (for services before the war) that was inappropriate for him to accept while his troops were fighting, starving and dying on Bataan and while a large chuck of the Philippines was already under enemy occupation.
... he painted himself as a hero of Bataan when he made exactly one visit to the peninsula during the siege. And generally used US Army resources to promote himself instead of the troops under him.
MacArthur failed to prepare his command for war and failed to use his forces properly after war started.
Had another competent commander been in charge, the Philippines would have held out longer (possibly 9 months to a year) and would have drawn in significantly more troops derailing Japanese plans elsewhere.
Give me an example of a commander in that period whose performance was stellar. They fought with what they had which was next to nothing. If you want a scapegoat, look to FDR.
Even though he knew war was coming, he did not take enough steps to prepare his command. Specifically, the failure on his part to move supplies to Bataan at he start of the war, or even before the war when tensions increased. He did not start moving supplies until well after the war started, a critical failure on his part that led to the early defeat of the USAFFE forces on Bataan.
Unless you can cite criticism from the 1940's into the early 1950's by officers who were in theater, you make your claims only due to the clarity of vision offered by hindsight.
Logistics is the key to winning a war, and MacArthur’s utter disdain for it cost his troops dearly.
In an alternate universe, what would the difference have been? The troops could not have been resupplied until 1943 at the earliest.
... did not place his forces on a full alert after receiving the war warning in late November of 1941.
Instead he continued to operate on mostly a peacetime basis. B-17s that were due to move to Del Monte field on Mindanao stayed on Luzon so that a party could be thrown for them.
From where do you get your information about such a party?
The aircraft at Clark should have been dispersed,
Clark was unfortunate in that the anticipated early morning attack did not materialize. This appears to have been due to Formosa being socked in by heavy fog. American fighters were never-the-less ordered up on patrol. At noon, the fighters had just returned from patrol and were on the ground being refueled when the Japanese attack came. Simultaneously, the B-17's were having their bomb loads changed in preparation for an attack of Formosa. The problem for Clark was not one of dispersal but rather fog over Formosa prevented Japanese planes from taking off earlier (It also prevented an earlier American B-17 attack). The Japanese attack on Clark did not come until noon and with no early warning. The sirens at Clark didn't start wailing until bombs were already falling from the sky.
Had another competent commander been in charge, the Philippines would have held out longer (possibly 9 months to a year) and would have drawn in significantly more troops derailing Japanese plans elsewhere.
What difference would it have made? They were not going to be resupplied in 1942.