Bayerlein had understood Guderian very well. During the day the first directives had come down from Army Group Centre revealing the new plan: parts of Second Panzer Group were to drive south into the Ukraine. Immediately after Guderian's telephone call Colonel Freiherr von Liebenstein, chief of staff of Second Panzer Group, summoned the staff officers. He knew Guderian. When he came back from Rastenburg he would expect the new plan to be ready in outline.
There was no one at headquarters who was not deeply depressed by Hitler's decision to turn against the Ukraine instead of against Moscow. Nobody understood it. Every one regarded it as a mistake. The staff officers' trained minds rebelled against the fundamental violation of one of the basic strategic rules in the spirit of Clausewitz—not to be seduced away from one's main objective, always to stick to the basic framework of one's operational plan, and to concentrate all one's forces against the enemy's strong point.
This turning away from Moscow at the very moment when it seemed within reach, barely two hundred miles away and, as far as anyone could predict, almost certain to fall to Guderian's and Hoth's now refreshed armored forces, was very soon to be seen as a serious error of judgment.
The directives for the new operation were clear. As far as Guderian's two Panzer Corps were concerned, they read:
Drive to the south into the rear of the Soviet Fifth Army, the core of Marshal Budennyy's Army Group South-west Sector, defending the Ukraine beyond the Dnieper to both sides of Kiev
Guderian's first target was the big railway junction of Konotop on the Kiev-Moscow line. The next step would depend on the situation, according to the progress made by Army Group South.
When, on 24th August, Guderian arrived at Shumyachiy, a small village on the Moscow highway where Liebenstein had set up the headquarters of the Panzer Group, he was again full of zest. He greeted Liebenstein, Bayerlein, and Major von Heuduck, his Intelligence officer, who were all patently disappointed, and went with them straight to his headquarters bus.
" I know what you're thinking," he said calmly.
" Why didn't he succeed-why did he give in?"
He did not wait for an answer.
" There was nothing I could do, gentlemen," he continued. "I had to give in. I was out there alone. Neither Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief, nor the Chief of the General Staff had accompanied me to the Fuehrer. I was faced by a solid front of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. All those present nodded at every sentence the Fuehrer said, and I had no support for my views. Clearly the Fuehrer had expounded his arguments for his strange decision to them before. I spoke with a silver tongue -but it was in vain. Now we can't go into mourning over our plans. We must tackle our new task with all possible vigour. Our hard-won jumping-off positions for Moscow-at Roslavl, Krichev, and Gomel-will serve us now as a springboard into the Ukraine ."
Guderian was right. The operations conducted by his Army Group around Roslavl and Krichev at the beginning of August, resulting in about 54,000 Russian prisoners, now proved a valuable prerequisite also for the new operation. Let us look back at the three weeks which have passed.
On 1st August Guderian had started operations against Roslavl. His plan was a typical battle of encirclement. He operated with two Infantry Corps and one Panzer Corps. The bulk of the infantry divisions attacked the enemy frontally in order to tie him down. The 292nd Infantry Division, acting as IX Corps' striking division, strongly supported by artillery and rocket mortars, pushed to the south in the Russian rear. From the south-western wing 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions performed a rapid outflanking movement, first to the east, then north across the Roslavl-Moscow road, and closed the ring with 292nd Infantry Division on the Moscow highway. The plan worked. Roslavl became a genuine, if minor, battle of encirclement.
The war diary of Captain Küppers, artillery liaison-officer of 197th Infantry Division, the combat report of VII Army Corps, and the day-to-day reports of engagements of an infantry battalion—all of them extant—provide an impressive picture of the fighting.
H-hour was 0430. Along the entire line of VII Corps the attack was launched without artillery preparation. The spearheads of the infantry regiments worked their way forward— past the communications group of the artillery commander, who had been lying in the front line with Lieutenant-Colonel Marcard since 0300 hours, watching the Russian positions. Everything was quiet on the Russian side. Suddenly the quiet of the morning was broken by the first rifle-shots from the infantrymen who had just moved forward. Triggers were pulled too soon by nervous fingers. They roused the Russian night sentries. At once Soviet machine-guns opened up. Mortars plopped. Major-General Meyer-Rabingen, the commander of 197th Infantry Division, drove in his jeep to the foremost line. Farther down, in the village of Shashki, Major Weichhardt's 3rd Battalion, 332nd Infantry Regiment, had already broken into the Russian positions. It was a case of bayonets, spades, and pistols.
Thirty minutes later the white Very lights went up: " We are here!"
" Artillery forward," the advanced observer radioed back.
A moment later Captain Bried was on the move. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 229th Artillery Regiment. His car got as far as the edge of the village. Then there was a flash and a crash—a minefield.
The nearside front wheel of Bried's car sailed through the air. The observer's car, which followed behind, suffered the same fate as it tried to swing off the road. In response to the signal " Sappers forward!" Engineers Battalion 229 cleared the mines.
Meanwhile the guns of the 2nd Battalion had moved into position and were supporting the infantry with their fire. The first few prisoners were brought in for interrogation. A short Ukrainian was found to speak German. He looked trustworthy. An interpreter unit supplied him with a denim uniform and a white armlet lettered " German Wehrmacht
On 2nd August at 0400 hours the infantry went into action again.
Their objective was the main road from Smolensk to Roslavl. It was a particularly hard day for 347th Infantry Regiment. Its battalions were stuck in difficult terrain in front of a thick and swampy patch of woodland and were only able to advance inch by inch and at the cost of heavy losses. The Russians again proved their mastery in forest fighting. With sure instinct they moved among the impenetrable undergrowth.
Their positions, not on the forest's edge but deep inside, were superbly camouflaged. Their dugouts and foxholes were established with diabolical cunning, providing for a field of fire only to the rear. From in front and from above they were invisible. The German infantrymen passed them unsuspecting, and were picked off from behind. The Russians were also very good at infiltrating into enemy positions. Moving singly, they communicated with each other in the dense forest by imitating the cries of animals, and after trickling through the German positions they rallied again and re-formed as assault units. The headquarters staff of 347th Infantry Regiment fell victim to these Russian tactics.
In the night, at 0200, the shout went up, " Action stations!" There was small-arms fire. The Russians were outside the regimental headquarters. They had surrounded it. With fixed bayonets they broke into the officers' quarters. The regimental adjutant, the orderly officer, and the regimental medical officer were cut down in the doorway of their forest ranger's hut. NCOs and headquarters personnel were killed before they could reach for their pistols or carbines. Lieutenant-Colonel Brehrner, the regimental commander, succeeded in barricading himself behind a woodpile and defending himself throughout two hours with his sub-machine-gun.
An artillery unit eventually rescued him.
Meanwhile, 332nd Infantry Regiment had reached the main road from Roslavl to Smolensk. First Lieutenant Wehde blocked the road with his 10th Company and stormed the village of Glinki. The Soviets in Roslavl realized they were in danger of being encircled. They left the town in lorries and tried to run down the positions of 10th Company. They scattered hand-grenades among them by the armful and fired wildly from machine-guns and sub-machine-guns. But 10th Company held out, but only until midday. After that they were unable to stand up to the Soviet attacks.
The Russians retook the village.
Now for an immediate counter-attack. Lieutenant Wehde scraped up anyone he could lay his hands on—supply personnel, cobblers, bakers—and dislodged the Russians, But in the afternoon they were back in Glinki. Another immediate counterattack. House after house was recaptured with flamethrowers and hand-grenades. The place was to change hands many more times. On Sunday, 3rd August, 197th Infantry Division found itself in difficulties because 347th Infantry Regiment was hanging back a long way. The Soviets tried to break through at the contact point between 347th and 321st Infantry Regiments. The gunners fired from every barrel they had. To make matters worse it started to pour with rain. Roads became quagmires. At 1600 hours Lieutenant Wehde was killed outside Glinki. The 321st Infantry Regiment was fighting desperately. Several groups were encircled and had to defend themselves on all sides.
Things went better on the right wing of VII Corps. Towards 1100 hours 78th Infantry Division had reached the Krichev-Roslavl road with the bulk of its units. Fascinated, the infantrymen watched 4th Panzer Division moving off for its outflanking attack on Roslavl. On the extreme left wing, meanwhile, in the area of 292nd Infantry Division, the 509th and 507th Regiments were struggling towards the south along soft, muddy roads. In the leading company of 507th Infantry Regiment, the regiment forming the left wing, a man with crimson stripes down the seams of his trousers was marching by the side of the captain—Colonel-General Guderian.
Reports of the difficulties which 292nd Infantry Division had with its advance—difficulties that might affect the overall plan —had induced him to find out for himself by taking the part of an ordinary infantryman. As though this were the most natural thing in the world, Guderian later told his headquarters staff, " In this way I kept them on the move without having to waste words ."
" Fast Heinz as an infantryman!" the troops were shouting to each other. They pulled themselves together. When the leading self-propelled gun stopped a few miles from the Moscow highway, the target for the day, Guderian was up on the vehicle in a flash. " What's the trouble?"
" There are tanks along the highway, Herr Generaloberst," the gun-layer reported.
Guderian looked through his binoculars.
" Fire white Very lights!"
The white flare streaked from the pistol. And from the highway in the distance came the reply: also white Very lights.
That meant that the 35th Panzer Regiment, of 4th Panzer Division, was already on the Moscow highway.
At 1045 hours 23rd Infantry Division penetrated into the northern part of Roslavl. On 4th August Glinki was lost once more. Stukas attacked the Soviet strongpoint. Russian tank attacks against the left and right flanks of 197th Infantry Division collapsed in the concentrated fire from all available guns. Glinki was taken again. The Russians wavered and withdrew. Hastily they reformed for desperate break-through attempts along the Moscow highway.
On 5th August it was discovered that a strong Soviet armored unit had fought its way out of the pocket at Kazaki, in the area of 292nd Infantry Division. The division's regiments were so extended, and, moreover, so involved in heavy defensive fighting, that they were unable to close the gap. The Russians were pouring through—supplies, infantry, artillery units. Guderian at once drove to the gap. Personally he moved a tank company against the Russians streaming through the gap; he organized a combat group from armored units, self-propelled guns, and artillery; and this group, under General Martinek, the artillery commander of VII Corps, at last closed the gap.
The Russians still coming through met their doom.
On 8th August it was all over. Some 38,000 prisoners were counted. Booty included two hundred tanks, numerous guns and vehicles. The Soviet Twenty-eighth Army under Lieutenant-General Kachalov had been smashed. But that was not the main thing.
For 25 miles in the direction of Bryansk and towards the south there was no enemy left. A huge gate had been opened towards Moscow.
But Guderian wanted to play safe. In order to have truly free flanks for a drive against Stalin's capital he must first eliminate the threat from the deep right flank at Krichev.
General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, the shrewd and resolute commander of XXIV Panzer Corps, whose divisions had only just closed the trap at Roslavl, ordered his armor to turn about in a bold operation and attack Timoshenko's divisions in the Krichev area by an encircling move. On 14th August this operation too was successfully concluded. Three more Russian divisions were smashed, 16,000 prisoners were taken, and large quantities of guns and equipment of all kinds captured. As with a heavy hammer, Guderian had smashed Timoshenko's bolt on the gate to Moscow.
Hitler Moves East by Paul Carell
(to be continued………….)
Soviet POWs await their fate near the lower Luga River sector. With a smaller panzer group, Army Group North failed to achieve the massive encirclements that characterized the battles in the Army Group Center and Army Group South sectors.
German replacements pay a visit to the regimental surgeon in Army Group Center at the end of July.
German recce unit exploring the roads in the Smolensk area-late July.
In the suburbs of Smolensk.
