In the middle of July the German front ran true along a north-south line from the mouth of the Dniester, on the Black Sea, to Narva, on the Estonian frontier.
But in the centre the reversed S of two gigantic salients bulged ominously. The Panzer groups of Army Group Centre, advancing on Moscow to the north and south of the Minsk highway, had already passed the longitude of Smolensk. But to their right the Russian 5th Army still held its forward positions in the Pripet Marshes.
In this way there was an extra "front" of over 150 miles which lay against the exposed flanks of Army Group Centre, and of Rundstedt's left wing as it approached Kiev. The Russian salient, although giving the appearance of mass, was in reality a fragmented hodgepodge of defeated units, stragglers, men without equipment, tanks without fuel, guns without ammunition. But this was not apparent from the large-scale war map at Rastenburg, and the Germans simply did not dispose of the men to probe the area in sufficient strength to find out. And so the Russian presence, poised (as it seemed) over its supply routes, acted as a brake on the freedom of the army groups to either side.
Meanwhile, as the days passed with them undisturbed, the Russians were exploiting to the full that extraordinary gift of improvisation which was to succor them on so many occasions during the campaign.
Under Potapov they were busy restoring cohesion to their shattered brigades, laying the foundations of the Partisan movement, and operating vigorously with their cavalry—the only mobile arm left to them in any strength.
The 5th Army and the units gathered around it were the largest concentration operating in the German rear, but there were many others still in vigorous action, even though (unlike the 5th Army) they were completely cut off from the main front. The garrisons at Orsha and Mogilev, great numbers of wandering infantry—some as far west as Minsk and Vilna— the whole stretch of the Baltic coastline up to the west of Tallinn, the continued resistance of all these "pockets," lent force to the arguments of those who believed that the Wehrmacht was being dangerously overextended.
With the intention of restoring concentration and asserting at the same time a strict priority of objectives, OKW had issued, on 19th July, Directive No. 33. This opened with a reminder that although the Stalin Line had been pierced along its whole front, ". . . the liquidation of important enemy contingents caught between the mobile elements of the Centre will take a certain amount of time." The directive went on to complain that Army Group South had its northern wing immobilised by the continued resistance of the Soviet 5th Army and by the defence of Kiev. Therefore ". . . the object of the immediate operation is to prevent the enemy from withdrawing important forces beyond the Dnieper and to destroy them."
Barbarossa-Alan Clark
Photo dated mid-July. No description as to what type of unit this is-note armbands.
Soviet armor knocked out by at least two apparent hits.
Part of bag of over 200 Soviet troops who suddenly surrendered to passing German unit.
Pro-German Ukrainian partisan attempts to score with local peasant.
Although photo has no description, this appears to be the aftermath of a Soviet ambush on a German unit.
German panzer soldier says goodbye to members of his crew.
Wounded waiting for transportation to dressing station.
German signpost pointing eastward.
