Can you give us the jist in the short form instead of legal ease and preferably, English?
Sounds to me that the Court is dissembling. If what they state is in fact true, and Obama was not even a NATURALIZED citizen, or, for that matter, UNDER the age of 35, as required by the Constitution, his lack of qualifications for office would be irrelevant.
No controversy Ping
apparently it is no one’s Constitutional right to have a Constitutionally qualified President. Since generally the denial of one’s Constitutional rights is considered an injury.
But what do I know
“Standing” was created very soon after America was formed and it was basically a way for a court to throw something out that they know they have no power to enforce.
Yet another bought-off/threatened/treasonous/cowardly/Democrat judge proves the American court system is hopelessly corrupt, and an orderly, peaceful means of change within the current system is no longer an option.
I imagine the decision of the appeals court in Orly’s Keyes v Obama case will read pretty much the same.
The list, ping
This whole ‘standing’ notion is really beginning to chafe a whole lot of folks. It does nothing to clarify the issue at hand, and has been spread broadly and thinly enough to cover, probably, ANY person bringing a suit challenging the anointed one’s eligibility.
It seems to me, common folk that I am, that:
1. ANY registered voter should have standing to challenge the eligibility of any elected official with direct representation; President, VP, Senator (of the state of residence), Representative (of the District of residence), any State elected official (under the same terms). The notion of particularized injury is bunk, IMO, when dealing with direct Constitutional challenges.
2. ALL State and Local Boards of Elections should be required to vet the eligibility of all candidates seeking to add their names to a ballot.
So, what’s the best way to go in the Federal courts? Quo Warranto in DC? Where is Donofrio?
Let the revolution, or the insurrection begin!
"The essence of Berg's complaint is that the defendents, the states, presidential candidates other than Obama, political parties, a majority of American voters, and Congress - a list that includes some who could have challenged, or could still challenge, Obama's eligibility through various means - have not been persuaded by his claim. That grievance, too, is not one "appropriately resolved through the judicial process."
Is this the case that has Berg’s evidence under wraps because of a court order?
Ping to a ruling on Berg v. Obama.
ANYONE HAS STANDING or as they put it back then, subject matter jurisdiction.
4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ action. Pp. 395 U. S. 512-516.
(a) The case is one “arising under” the Constitution within the meaning of Art. III, since petitioners’ claims “will be sustained if the Constitution . . . [is] given one construction and will be defeated if it [is] given another.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678. Pp. 395 U. S. 513-514.
(b) The district courts are given a broad grant of jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), over “all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution . . . ,” and, while that grant is not entirely coextensive with Art. III, there is no indication that § 1331(a) was intended to foreclose federal courts from entertaining suits involving the seating of Congressmen. Pp. 395 U. S. 514-516.
5. This litigation is justiciable because the claim presented and the relief sought can be judicially resolved. Pp. 395 U. S. 516-518.
(a) Petitioners’ claim does not lack justiciability on the ground that the House’s duty cannot be judicially determined, since, if petitioners are correct, the House had a duty to seat Powell once it determined that he met the standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution. P. 395 U. S. 517.
(b) The relief sought is susceptible of judicial resolution, since, regardless of the appropriateness of a coercive remedy against House personnel (an issue not here decided), declaratory relief is independently available. Pp. 395 U. S. 517-518.
6. The case does not involve a “political question,” which, under the separation of powers doctrine, would not be justiciable. Pp. 395 U. S. 518-549.
(a) The Court’s examination of relevant historical materials shows at most that Congress’ power under Art. I, § 5, to judge the “Qualifications of its Members” is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to [that] co-ordinate political department of government” (Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 217) to judge only standing qualifications which are expressly set forth in the Constitution; hence, the House has no power to exclude a member-elect who meets the Constitution’s membership requirements. Pp. 395 U. S. 518-548.
(b) The case does not present a political question in the sense, also urged by respondents, that it would entail a “potentially embarrassing confrontation between coordinate branches” of the Government, since our system of government requires federal courts on occasion to interpret the Constitution differently from other branches. Pp. 395 U. S. 548-549.
7. In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution. P. 395 U. S. 550.
http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/486/index.html
obumpa