I often wonder about the "what if's" of major turning-point battles. Assume, for instance, that Nagumo's air strikes against Midway had succeeded to the point where no 're-strike' was required. Then his carriers would have been free to re-arm for anti-shipping strikes earlier. Would that have made a difference?
I think not. Here's my reasoning.
1. The invasion force would soon be ready to land and would presumably require close air support in the landing phase.
2. Nagumo still had no clue that there were American carriers lurking in the area. The Op Plan called for seizing Midway first then waiting to ambush the US counterstroke. I don't think that capturing Midway would have been easy. In light of what happened at Wake Island it is entirely possible that the initial assault would have been repulsed -- and that would have forced Nagumo into further strikes against landbased targets. We're right back to Nagumo's initial dilema -- what should I arm for, land-attack or anti-shipping?
3. Perhaps most important was the Japanese neglect of shipboard damage control. This meant that their aircraft carriers, on average, were extremely fragile compared to US carriers. Even if the Japanese carriers weren't caught with decks full of munitions - making them a one-hit kill target - they still would have been suseptible to a single-hit "mission kill" -- and they were a long way from any support base.
“Perhaps most important was the Japanese neglect of shipboard damage control.”
THIS is the single most important point about the Japanese Navy that people, and most historians, I’m afraid, neglect.
To prepare and train for damage control was to admit you could be defeated, and that wasn’t Bushido. It was to cost the Japanese dearly throughout the war.
On the other hand, it was the Yamato’s experience with damages earlier in the war that made it’s officer’s train INCESSENTLY for damage control, making it so hard to kill when it’s time came.
Agreed. Until Nagumo had definite information about an American carrier in the area it would have made no sense for him to arm any of his planes for anti shipping operations while Midway was still in American hands.