[nw_arizona_granny]

The below should go with this one. Your connection to islam, is in the fact that the muslim "brigades" do many things the same as the commies do, they use the same words and actions. I found this one with a simple google search. Soviet spy crippled U.S. Intelligence, ahead of Korean War To nw_arizona_granny | 09/13/2004 2:12:14 PM PDT sent G o o g l e's cache of http://listarchives.his.com/intelforum/intelforum.0006/msg00779.html as retrieved on Aug 19, 2004 19:32:32 GMT. G o o g l e's cache is the snapshot that we took of the page as we crawled the web. The page may have changed since that time. Click here for the current page without highlighting. This cached page may reference images which are no longer available. Click here for the cached text only. To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:PckwnkM9vrEJ:listarchives.his.com/intelforum/intelforum.0006/msg00779.html+declassified+fbi+memo&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&client=googlet Google is not affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content. These search terms have been highlighted: declassified fbi memo [Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: Soviet spy crippled U.S. intelligence ahead of Korean War, report says To: Subject: Re: Soviet spy crippled U.S. intelligence ahead of Korean War, report says From: "Matthew M. Aid" Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2000 07:42:41 -0400 Reply-to: intelforum@xxxxxxx Sender: owner-intelforum I am afraid that Robin Bhatty is correct about the fear of senior U.S. intelligence officials about the damage that would have resulted if the U.S. Department of Justice had prosecuted Weisband for espionage. During my research into the Weisband matter, I spent two days going through Weisband's FBI case file, which is on file at the FBI FOIA reading room in Washington, D.C. In it, I found a number of memoranda concerning whether to prosecute Weisband. It is clear from these documents that the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), predecessor to today's NSA, was terrified about what they would have had to reveal about their codebreaking activities if they were to prosecute Weisband for espionage. One memo in the Weisband file is particularly relevant. In mid-April 1950, the FBI liaison official to the AFSA, Special Agent S. Wesley Reynolds, informed AFSA Director Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone of the FBI's desire to "give immediate consideration to the likelihood of prosecution in this investigation." According to the declassified FBI memo: "Admiral Stone stated that the operations of AFSA are very highly classified and the success of their operations depends on these activities being cloaked by a veil of secrecy. He stated that any prosecution of Weisband which might reveal what Weisband has been doing at Arlington Hall or which might in any way publicize the activities of the Armed Forces Security Agency would jeapordize the success of AFSA's operations. Reynolds advised Admiral Stone that the Bureau could not promise in any prosecution of Weisband that no information would be divulged at a trial concerning Weisband's activity at Arlington Hall nor the operations of AFSA. Admiral Stone, therefore, stated that since this is the fact then he definately was of the opinion that no prosecutive action concerning Weisband should be contemplated. He stated that if a prosecution of Weisband could be undertaken at any time without the dangerous publicity, then he would be agreeable to reconsider this matter." Barred by AFSA from further action, the best that the Justice Department could do was convict Weisband of contempt of court when he failed to appear before a federal grand jury in Los Angeles. He spent time in a maximum security prison in Washington state. After his release the FBI watched Weisband closely, occasionally approaching him with offers to cooperate with the FBI. Weisband never did. Matthew M. Aid Follow-Ups: If It's Not Soviet it Must Not be Dangerous.... From: Robert David Steele, OSS CEO Prev by Date: Re: Soviet spy crippled U.S. intelligence ahead of Korean War, report says Next by Date: If It's Not Soviet it Must Not be Dangerous.... Previous by thread: Re: Soviet spy crippled U.S. intelligence Next by thread: If It's Not Soviet it Must Not be Dangerous.... Index(es): Date Thread

[nw_arizona_granny]

Now this is a history lesson.....LOL

See Venona and other reports at:

http://www.nsa.gov/history/histo00007.cfm


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>>Historical Publications

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Below is the list of NSA/CSS historical publications. All publications are
available in hard-copy through the Public and Media Affairs Office. PDF
and text versions are available for two-page monographs and
brochures. All booklets must be requested through the Public and
Media Affairs Office at (301) 688-6524.

Pre WWII Era (Prior 1914)

Subject
Title
Author
Date
Format
Cryptology
Masked
Dispatches
Cryptograms
and Cryptology
in American
History
1775-1900
Ralph E.
Weber
1993
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524, or
e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov
Friedman
The Friedman
Legacy: A
Tribute to
William and
Elizebeth
Friedman
Center for
Cryptologic
History
1992
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524, or
e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov
Rum
Runners
A New Kind of
Detective Work
Patrick
Weadon
2001
Monograph - PDF
or Text version
Rum
Runners
Listening to the
Rumrunners
David P.
Mowry
2001
Brochure - Text
version
Signals
Intelligence
Radio
Intelligence on
the Mexican
Border, World
War I: A
Personal View
Richard Egolf
Monograph - Text
version
Slave Quilt
Follow the
Drinking Gourd
Patrick
Weadon
2001
Monograph - Text
version


WWII Era (1941-1945)

Subject
Title
Author
Date
Format
African-Americans
The Invisible
Cryptologists
Jeannette
Williams
with
Yolande
Dickerson
2001
Brochure - Text
version
Bombes
The Secret of
Adam and Eve
Jennifer
Wilcox
2003
Monograph -
Text version
Cipher Machines
German Cipher
Machines of
World War II
David
Mowry
2003
Brochure - PDF
or Text version
Code Talkers
Origins of the
Navajo Code
Talkers
Patrick
Weadon
2002
Monograph -
PDF or Text
version
COMINT
A History of US
Communications
Intelligence
during WWII
Policy and
Administration
Robert
Louis
Benson
1997
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524,
or e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov
COMINT
A Priceless
Advantage: U.S.
Navy
Communications
Intelligence and
the Battles of
Coral Sea,
Midway and the
Aleutians
Frederick
D. Parker
1993
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524,
or e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov
Enigma
Solving the
Enigma - History
of the
Cryptanalytic
Bombe
Jennifer
Wilcox
2001
Brochure - PDF
or Text version
Enigma
The
Cryptographic
Mathematics of
Enigma
Dr. A. Ray
Miller
2001
Brochure - Text
version
Midway
The Battle of
Midway: AF is
Short of Water
Patrick
Weadon
2000
Monograph -
Text version
Pearl Harbor
Pearl Harbor
Revisited US
Navy
Communication
Intelligence
1924-1941
Frederick
Parker
1994
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524,
or e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov
Pearl Harbor
The Quiet
Heroes of the
Southwest
Pacific Theater
Sharon A.
Maneki
1996
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524,
or e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov
SIGSALY
SIGSALY Story
Patrick
Weadon
2000
Monograph -
Text version
SIGSALY
The Start of the
Digital
Revolution:
SIGSALY Secure
Digital Voice
Communications
in WWII
J. V.
Boone
and R. R.
Peterson
2000
Brochure - Text
version
Women
Sharing the
Burden: Women
in Cryptology
during WWII
Jennifer
Wilcox
1998
Brochure - Text
version


Cold War (1948-1991)

Subject
Title
Author
Date
Format
Cold War
A Dangerous
Business: The U.S.
Navy and National
Reconnaissance
During the Cold
War
John R.
Schindler
2004
Brochure - PDF or
Text version
Cold War
CT3 Edward
Purcell
Patrick
Weadon
2003
Monograph - PDF
or Text version
Cold War
Dedication and
Sacrifice: National
Aerial
Reconnaissance in
the Cold War
Center for
Cryptologic
History
Brochure - Text
version
Cold War
SSgt Donald
Hill/A2C Earl
Radlein Jr
Patrick
Weadon
2002
Monograph - PDF
or Text version
Cuban
Missile
Crisis
NSA and the
Cuban Missile
Crisis
Thomas R.
Johnson and
David A.
Hatch
1998
Brochure - Text
version
VENONA
The VENONA Story
Robert Louis
Benson
Brochure - PDF or
Text version
VENONA
VENONA Soviet
Espionage and the
American
Response
1939-1957
Robert Louis
Benson and
Michael
Warner
1996
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524, or
e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov


Korean War Era (1950-1953)

Subject
Title
Author
Date
Format
Korean War
PFC Jay Stoner
Patrick
Weadon
2001
Monograph - PDF
or Text version
Korean War
The Korean War:
The SIGINT
Background
David A.
Hatch and
Robert Louis
Benson
2000
Brochure - Text
version
Pusan
Perimeter
SIGINT and
COMSEC Help
Save the Day at
Pusan
Patrick
Weadon
Monograph -
Text version
Pusan
Perimeter
So Power Can be
Brought into Play:
SIGINT and the
Pusan Perimeter
Jill Frahm
2000
Brochure - Text
version


Vietnam War (1954-1975)

Subject
Title
Author
Date
Format
Vietnam
Essential Matters
History of the
Cryptographic
Branch of the
People's Army of
Vietnam
1945-1975
Translated
and edited
by David W.
Gaddy
1994
Booklet - For copies
of this manuscript,
call 301-688-6524,
or e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov


Miscellaneous

Subject
Title
Author
Date
Format
Anniversary
50th Anniversary
Brochure
NSA
Publication
2002
Brochure - PDF or
Text version
Books
Rare Books in the
National
Cryptologic
Museum
Center for
Cryptologic
History
Brochure - Text
version
Cryptology
American
Cryptology: Two
Centuries of
Tradition
Center for
Cryptologic
History
Monograph - Text
version
Cryptology
The Voynich
Manuscript - an
Elegant Enigma
M. E.
D'Imperio
1978
Booklet - For
copies of this
manuscript, call
301-688-6524, or
e-mail
nsapao@nsa.gov
Information
Security
Securing Record
Communications:
The TSEC/KW-26
Melville
Klein
2003
Brochure - PDF or
Text version
Mathematics
Women in
Mathematics
Society
Michelle D.
Wagner
2003
Monograph - Text
version
Museum
Showcase of the
National Security
Agency The
National
Cryptologic
Museum: A
10-Year
Anniversary
Retrospective
Jack Ingram
2003
Brochure - Text
version
NSA
The Origins of NSA
Center for
Cryptologic
History
Brochure - Text
version
Operation
Enduring
Freedom
SSG Gene Vance
Patrick
Weadon
2003
Monograph - PDF
or Text version
Tordella
In Memoriam Dr.
Louis Tordella
Brochure - PDF or
Text version

>>Information Assurance >>Signals Intelligence Accessibility
Privacy & Security

[nw_arizona_granny]

G o o g l e's cache of http://listarchives.his.com/intelforum/intelforum.0103/msg00534.html as retrieved on Jul 9, 2004 06:57:45 GMT. G o o g l e's cache is the snapshot that we took of the page as we crawled the web. The page may have changed since that time. Click here for the current page without highlighting. This cached page may reference images which are no longer available. Click here for the cached text only. To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:YuC4rNaFFokJ:listarchives.his.com/intelforum/intelforum.0103/msg00534.html++site:listarchives.his.com+If+It's+Not+Soviet+it+Must+Not+be+Dangerous&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&client=googlet Google is not affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content. These search terms have been highlighted: if it's not soviet must not dangerous [Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 To: intelforum@xxxxxxx Subject: CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 From: Michael Dravis Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 20:51:38 -0500 Reply-to: intelforum@xxxxxxx Sender: owner-intelforum@xxxxxxxxxxxxx From: Michael Dravis To: intelforum@xxxxxxx Subject: CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 The following message is cross-posted from H-Diplo. Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2001 02:47:39 -0500 From: "H-DIPLO [Grossman]" Subject: JRL: CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 To: H-DIPLO@xxxxxxxxxxxxx From: David Johnson Johnson's Russia List 14 March 2001 DJ: For more information go to www.cia.gov or www.foia.ucia.gov/historicalreport.htm 1. Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Opening the Conference on CIA?xED;s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991. 2. Remarks of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin: The Changing Nature of CIA Analysis in the Post-Soviet World. ******* #1 Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Opening The Conference on CIA?xED;s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 Princeton University As Prepared for Delivery 8 March 2001 Princeton University?xED;s Center of International Studies and CIA?xED;s Center for the Study of Intelligence have done a great job in organizing this Conference on the Agency?xED;s Cold War Analysis of the Soviet Union. It is just the newest example of Princeton?xED;s famous motto: "Princeton in the Nation?xED;s Service and in the Service of All Nations." I have no doubt that these discussions will make an important contribution to the understanding of intelligence analysis and of the role it played in shaping policy during the defining conflict of the latter half of the 20th century. Back in 1997, CIA held its 50th anniversary gala. Dick Helms, a legend in the world of espionage well before he ever became Director of Central Intelligence, delivered the keynote address. I had expected Dick to focus on the operational side, but he surprised me by reminding everyone that analysis ?xF3; putting all the information together, evaluating it, and warning US policymakers of key elements in the international environment ?xF3; was in fact the CIA?xED;s original and central mission. Of course, each Director of Central Intelligence has his own perspective on analysis. William Colby, a Princeton alumn, believed that, while a DCI must juggle many different things at once, his responsibility for substantive intelligence is his most important charge. A DCI should do his homework, discuss with his analysts the basis of their assessments, then be prepared to brief ?xF3; and defend ?xF3; the Agency or Intelligence Community views with precision and conviction before the President ?xF3; or perhaps even more daunting ?xF3; the likes of a Henry Kissinger. According to Colby, Kissinger had a voracious appetite for intelligence, but he didn?xED;t necessarily believe it. "Bill," Kissinger would tell him, "give me things that make me think!" Allen Dulles, the only other Princeton graduate to become Director, had his own way of processing analysis. It could be tough to brief him. There were always distractions and phone calls, invariably ops-related. According to one war story, an analyst was ushered into the inner sanctum. Dulles was watching a baseball game from a reclining chair (for his gout, he said) placed directly in front of his TV. The analyst stood facing him >from behind the set. As the analyst pressed ahead with his briefing, Dulles would remark "good fielder, can?xED;t hit" or something like that, leaving the hapless briefer totally at a loss. Which is not to say that Dulles was not listening ?xF3; it was just hard to tell sometimes. For example, when Khrushchev kicked out the anti-Party group in 1957, he evidently took in what everyone said, then dictated his own briefing for the President. By all accounts it was brilliant. He did not miss a single nuance. This conference coincides with the release of over 850 CIA analytic documents on the Soviet Union, totaling over 19,000 pages of text ?xF3; all part of a larger effort begun by DCI Bob Gates to illuminate the intelligence component of the Cold War?xED;s history. This latest tranche of >documents, combined with the approximately 2,700 CIA analytic products and National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR that were previously declassified, constitutes the largest trove of intelligence analysis on any single country ever released by any nation. That achievement is significant, but it is not sufficient. I am determined to make more of the analytic record available. And so, the office that does most of our declassification work will be releasing to scholars within the next couple of years a substantial additional amount of CIA analysis on the Cold War and more National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR. Declassification is not easy. There are no shortcuts. It takes experienced, knowledgeable people sitting down with each document and painstakingly going over it page by page, line by line. There is no alternative. A mistake can put a life in danger or jeopardize a bilateral relationship integral to our country?xED;s security. Despite the difficulties involved in the declassification process, no other nation?xED;s foreign intelligence agency has voluntarily released as much information about its past as has the Central Intelligence Agency and we will continue to build upon that achievement in the years ahead. CIA will be as forward-leaning as possible consistent with our security responsibilities. We will be forthcoming for two major reasons: One: because US intelligence is a servant of America?xED;s democratic system. We are accountable for our actions and the quality of our work to elected leaders and ultimately to the American public. The American people are best served by having available the information necessary to understand how their government functions. And Two ?xF3; because the men and women of US Intelligence are proud of the contributions they made to defending the security of the Free World during the Cold War. We believe that a careful study of our role in that great global struggle will show that, time and again, US Intelligence provided American leaders with critical information and insights that saved American lives and advanced our most vital interests. Keeping the Cold War from becoming a hot one was the overriding goal of US Intelligence and American national security policy for over four decades. An intelligence effort of such magnitude and fraught with such great risk and uncertainty was bound to have its flaws and failures, both operational and analytical. I believe, however, that the overall record is one of impressive accomplishment. I know that each of you here tonight has arrived at this conference with deep expertise, unique experiences and strong opinions that should make for interesting discussions. This is, of course, not the first time that we have sought the views of outside specialists. For example, from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, CIA?xED;s Office of National Estimates benefited from the counsel of its "Princeton consultants" ?xF3; a group of >scholars who met at Princeton and exchanged ideas with CIA?xED;s top analysts. Others in universities and think tanks, individuals with family or other ties to Russia and Eastern Europe, diplomats, business people, and others >from many walks of life who were interested in and knowledgeable about Soviet affairs helped our analysts greatly. Our products were enriched by their inputs, but any errors that may be found in our products are entirely our own. We in US Intelligence never claimed to have had a monopoly on wisdom regarding the Soviet Union. It always pays to have a little humility on that score, particularly here on George Kennan?xED;s stomping ground. In recent years, as you know, Ambassador Kennan has warned American policymakers against (quote) "creating a Russia of our own imagination to take the place of the one that did, alas, once exist, but fortunately is no more." It was no less a challenge for America?xED;s scholarly, diplomatic, military ?xF3; and intelligence communities ?xF3; throughout the Cold War to understand the Soviet reality ?xF3; so that our national leaders could base their decisions not just on fears, but on facts. Analyzing the Soviet Union was anything but an exact science for all of our communities, and dealing effectively with Moscow was every Cold War President?xED;s ultimate leadership test. Among the first to admit the difficulties for Cold War analysts and policymakers alike was George Kennan?xED;s good friend, fellow Soviet expert and "Wise Man" , Chip Bohlen. Bohlen said (quote): "There are two statements which indicate beyond doubt that the person making them is either a liar or a fool. The first is: Whiskey has no effect on my judgment. The other is: I know how to deal with the Russians. Bohlen?xED;s statement holds just as true today. Assessing CIA?xED;s Analytic Contributions To the men and women of the CIA?xED;s Analytic Directorate ?xF3; the Directorate of Intelligence ?xF3; their Cold War mission was very clear: to use all sources at their disposal to gauge the capabilities and intentions of the massive, closed, totalitarian system that was the Soviet Union, and by so doing, to provide the President and other US policymakers with the information and insights they needed to act and plan with confidence. Allow me to give you only a few examples of the ways CIA analysis informed US decision making toward Moscow. I will draw from a sampling of the Agency products that were released for this conference, but in so doing I do not in any way wish to ignore the substantial analytic contributions of CIA?xED;s companion agencies in the Department of State, the Department of >Defense, the armed services, and other parts of the federal government. Of course, intelligence analysts were not the only ones working on the Soviet puzzle. It should be interesting at this conference to explore how our assessments measured up to contemporaneous judgments from other quarters. And, as the former policymakers in the audience will attest, many other factors besides intelligence reports and judgments shaped their thinking and actions. Those caveats aside, what does the record show? >From the mid-1960s on to the Soviet collapse, we knew roughly how many combat aircraft or warheads the Soviets had, and where. But why did they need that many or that kind? What did they plan to do with them? To this day, Intelligence is always much better at counting heads than divining what is going on inside them. That is, we are very good at gauging the size and location of militaries and weaponry. But for obvious reasons, we can never be as good at figuring out what leaders will do with them. In regard to the "unmeasurables", CIA analysts were keenly aware of the importance of what they would conclude and of the political pressures attendant to the issues on which their judgments were sought. And for a quarter of a century, our national leaders made strategic decisions with confidence in our analysts?xED; knowledge of the Soviets?xED; military strength. The record shows that confidence was justified. In the early ?xF3; and mid ?xF3;1980s, for example, a radar under construction in Krasnoyarsk generated considerable debate in Washington. The Intelligence Community's analysts were at center stage, providing policymakers with their assessment of the radar?xED;s true purpose. As it turns out, the Community assessment was on the mark. The analysts maintained ?xF3; correctly ?xF3; that the station was to be used primarily for tracking ballistic missiles, not space tracking as the Soviets had claimed. This analysis served as the basis for the Reagan Administration?xED;s policy, which was to declare the radar a clear violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and to call for its dismantling. Intelligence analysts perform a critical service when they help policymakers think through complex issues, identify possible strategies and project likely outcomes. A case in point is the role CIA played in assessing the potential implications for the United States vis-a-vis Moscow of President Reagan?xED;s Strategic Defense Initiative. Our Office of >Soviet Analysis, or SOVA, forecast in late 1987 that Moscow could not effectively counter SDI without severely straining the Soviet economy, discounting Moscow?xED;s assertions that it could do so quickly and cheaply. SOVA maintained that anything more than a modest acceleration of existing offensive and defensive strategic deployments would divert advanced technologies desperately needed to modernize the civilian economy. Indeed, SOVA predicted that Moscow would defer key decisions on deployments and "continue to pursue arms control measures to gain American concessions on SDI." And so it did. Leadership analysis remains perhaps the most difficult of analytic specialties. Mikhail Gorbachev?xED;s rise to power in the Soviet Union ?xF3; assessing his evolving thinking and policies, their implications and the chances for their success ?xF3; posed huge analytical dilemmas. One of the first papers done in the Gorbachev era was devoted to the promises, potentials and pitfalls of his economic agenda. Published in the fall of 1985, it expressed doubt that the economic reforms that Gorbachev had announced would actually be carried out, or that resources could be found to meet his modernization goals. Two years later our analysts were even more doubtful that he would succeed. They predicted that the radical reforms that Gorbachev might be tempted to implement risked "confusion, economic disruption, and worker discontent" that could embolden potential rivals to his power. It is tough to divine leadership intentions in a secretive, centrally controlled society ?xF3; particularly if that leadership, as was true under Gorbachev, ceases to be static. Assessing thinking beyond the leadership ?xF3; identifying other societal forces at work and weighing their impacts, is even tougher. Take nationalist and ethnic pressures, for example. For decades, Moscow?xED;s policies toward minorities had combined gradual modernization with rigid suppression of any hints of separatism. CIA?xED;s analysis reported that this long-standing combination of concessions and coercion had kept a lid on a "potentially explosive source of political instability." Our analysts picked up, however, on signs of change in Soviet policy and rising ethnic tensions under Gorbachev and drew the attention of US decision makers to their far-reaching implications. A Business Built on Uncertainty, Analysis Based on Judgment Obviously our record was not perfect. Intelligence analysis ?xF3; even the most rigorous ?xF3; can never be error-free. Our analysts may have the best information available, but they seldom have the luxury of complete information before making a judgment. The glints and glimmerings of insight that they get from examining shards of information help them peer into the unknown. But getting some forecasts wrong is an unavoidable part of the intelligence business ?xF3; a business built on uncertainty. Although we could fairly accurately count how many they already had, projecting the future development of Soviet military forces, for instance, proved to be one of the most difficult problems for the Intelligence Community during the Cold War. Every National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) written on the subject from 1974 to 1986, to which CIA analysts contributed, overestimated the rate at which Moscow would modernize its strategic forces. But there is an important difference between getting it wrong despite thoughtful analysis, and deliberately exaggerating the threat. I think that an honest review of the documents shows that our analysts made a good-faith effort. I would also note that, in many cases, the very same analytic teams that overestimated future Soviet procurement also published volumes of analysis about existing Soviet nuclear missiles and warheads and other weapons programs that Moscow very much wanted to keep secret. It was their painstaking analysis that gave successive American Presidents and Senators the confidence to pursue, sign and ratify arms control agreements ?xF3; agreements that helped contain and mitigate the very real dangers of the Cold War. The fact that some of our analysis became controversial ?xF3; and remains the subject of heated disagreement today ?xF3; does not necessarily mean that the judgments were wrong. The Agency?xED;s work in assessing the state of the Soviet economy, for example, has come under criticism since the Soviet collapse. This topic will be debated at the conference, and that is all to the good. I will only note that it is all but forgotten ?xF3; and the declassified studies are there to remind us ?xF3; that CIA analysts reported a deceleration in Soviet economic growth as early as 1963. President Lyndon Johnson thought this analysis so important that he dispatched a delegation to brief the findings in West European capitals. American academics and the national press, however, were skeptical of CIA?xED;s analysis. Indeed, many economists of that era believed that the Soviet Union?xED;s command economy possessed inherent advantages over the market-based systems of the West. But whatever the prevailing currents of popular thinking may be, it is the responsibility of our analysts to call it like they see it, whether the evidence supports the conventional view or not. We can even point to an instance where CIA analysts helped to shape not only US policy, but even may have helped to shape Soviet policy as well. We now know that the Kremlin monitored economic studies done in the West on the Soviet Union, especially CIA reports published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. President Jimmy Carter drew particular attention to such a CIA study when he declared to a surprised world that the Soviet petroleum industry was beset by serious problems. The Agency had projected that Soviet oil production was likely to plateau by the early 1980s and then decline to the point where the USSR would become a net importer of oil. As it turned out, CIA was right on the fundamental problems that eventually brought about a fall in production. But our analysts underestimated the Soviets?xED; ability to avert the worst by shifting investment in favor of the energy sector and changing the USSR?xED;s extraction and exploration policies ?xF3; changes that perhaps resulted from Moscow?xED;s reading of the Agency?xED;s published assessment. And those changes have real implications for Russian energy production today. US Intelligence capabilities clearly were not omniscient during the Cold War, and we are not all-seeing now. Our Soviet analysts were not prescient then and our Russia analysts are not all-knowing today. Our analysts continue to work in a climate that President Kennedy described in his day when he said that intelligence successes are often unnoticed while our failures are paraded in public. And that is fine. Our analysts are not in this business for headlines or kudos. They are in it to make a critical difference ?xF3; to advance our nation?xED;s interests and values. And that is what they do every single day. I make it a point to remind them that the fear of sometimes getting it wrong should never, ever get in the way of them doing their job. And when my analysts do call it wrong, they take responsibility and they learn from their mistakes. That means taking apart the evidence or the assumptions that got them off track. It can be a painful process, but it makes for better analysis. What, then, if not infallibility ?xF3; should our national leaders, and ultimately the American public, expect of our analysts? First and foremost, they should expect our analysts to deliver intelligence that is objective, pulls no punches, and is free from political taint. Next, that our analysts think creatively, constantly challenging the conventional wisdom, and tapping expertise wherever it lies ?xF3; inside the Intelligence Community or in the private sector and academia. That our analysts always act with the highest standards of professionalism. That they take risks ?xF3; analytic risks ?xF3; and make the tough calls when it would be easier to waffle. That they respond to the President?xED;s and other decision makers?xED; needs on demand ?xF3; juggling analytic priorities and capabilities to meet the most urgent missions. And lastly, that our analysis not only tell policymakers about what is uppermost on their minds ?xF3; but also alert them to things that have not yet reached their in-boxes. Making a Critical Difference, Then and Now In closing, I will only say that more that a decade after the Soviet Union?xED;s demise, we live in a world still in transition from something that was well understood ?xF3; the bipolarity of the Cold War ?xF3; to something that has yet to crystallize. In such a world, our country needs a strong analytic intelligence capability more than ever to help the President separate fact from fiction, avoid danger, seize opportunities and steer a safe course to the future. On behalf of CIA?xED;s analytic community, I want to thank you for your participation and interest in this conference and in our work ?xF3; past, present and future. As always, we welcome and value your insights, and we hope that you will find the discussions stimulating. ****** #2 Remarks of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin at the Conference on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 Princeton University "The Changing Nature of CIA Analysis in the Post-Soviet World" As Prepared for Delivery 9 March 2001 When the conference organizers asked me to give its first keynote address, I reminded them that my principal work on this part of the world came after the Soviet Union had broken up. In fact, it was just three months after that breakup that I was put in charge of the Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis ?xF3; the name we gave to the organization that picked up the responsibility for analysis of the former Soviet Union, once it had ceased to exist. Because I had the opportunity to lead our work on this part of the world at that pivotal moment, I thought that is what I ought to talk about rather than looking back at our effort on the Soviet Union. You are going to be doing that non?xF3;stop for a day and a half, so perhaps you will welcome a brief excursion into the decade that just passed into history. This topic is germane to the conference for a number of reasons. First, what I encountered back in March of 1992 was in every way the inheritance of our long focus on the Soviet target. And the experiences we had in those early post?xF3;Soviet years were emblematic of the Agency's efforts, successful I believe, to adjust to a new world that no longer had a universally accepted organizing principle for American intelligence. So let me take you back to the spring of 1992 and tell you something about the journey we have been on since then. Let me begin with an anecdote that I believe says a lot. On my first day on the job in 1992, I made the rounds, shaking hands with my new colleagues. I remember stopping by one officer's cubicle, and there, sitting on top of her computer, instead of the usual souvenirs, was a big can of peas with Cyrillic lettering. When I asked why, she replied: "I'm the canned goods analyst." We also had a timber analyst back in those days. To me, that anecdote says volumes about Soviet analysis during the Cold War. For reasons that this audience will readily grasp, it was actually important that we understand things like the food processing industry ?xF3; symbolized by that can of peas ?xF3; in order to gauge the underlying strength of Soviet society. As you know, we tried every conceivable way to gain insights into that fundamentally closed system ?xF3; a system whose functioning was opaque in the most basic respects, not only to the rest of the world, but to its own people ?xF3; even to its leadership, as Vlad Treml will attest tomorrow. Sherman Kent, the founding father of national intelligence estimates, once said: "Estimating is what you do when you do not know." We did a lot of estimating during the Cold War, and we are doing a lot of estimating now. But what we didn't know then about the Soviet Union is different in so many ways from what we don't know now about Russia. Most of what we needed to know then was at least discoverable. Much of what we'd like to know now may not even be knowable. Today, our Office of Russian and European Analysis does not employ a canned goods analyst, or even a timber specialist. The Russia that our analysts are trying to understand is no longer cloaked from view by a totalitarian regime. But in many ways I think it is even harder to grasp ?xF3;by us and by the Russians themselves. It was not always this way. Dick Lehman, the creator of what we now call the President's Daily Brief, once remarked that the basic analytic training he got back in 1949 came down to a single piece of advice from his boss: "Whatever you do, just remember one thing?xF3;the Soviet Union is up to no good!" Simple, but that said it. To be sure, there were other targets, but as someone who worked on many of them, I can tell you that our interest was mostly derivative. For something to gain priority attention or command resources, there had to be a connection to the Soviet threat. Many CIA analysts cut their baby teeth in SOVA ?xF3; the legendary Office of >Soviet Analysis ?xF3; or in one of the celebrated offices that preceded SOVA's creation in 1981. And young analysts soon learned that the ultimate objective of their collective efforts ?xF3; whether their expertise lay in peas or trees or tanks ?xF3; came down to helping us gauge the Soviets' military strength and intentions. Everybody understood the paradigm. Everybody knew what the top analytic priorities were: the frontal threat to NATO, Moscow's first strike capabilities, the Soviet command and control system, arms control monitoring, the capacity of the Soviet economy to sustain military power. As many of you will recall vividly, the butter-guns question of how many dishwashers equals a tank was a serious analytic calculation ?xF3; also I might add, a difficult proposition from a collection standpoint, considering that Soviet dishwashers actually looked like tanks! With the demise of the Soviet Union, the nature of our analytic questions changed. Before, threats emanated from Soviet strengths. Now, dangers stemmed largely from Russia's weaknesses or simply from the uncertainties associated with its transformation. Now, we were not much concerned about a deliberate, surprise attack by Moscow or the sheer numbers of military forces and equipment. Instead, we worried about instability in 15 sovereign states instead of one, about the cohesiveness of Russia itself, about whether it was reconciled to the independence of the other fourteen states, about the safety and security of weapons, about proliferation fueled by Russia's economic straits, and about how to maintain momentum in arms control when your original partner no longer existed. And this was a time of wrenching change for our analysts. Economists who had worked their entire professional lives on a command economy were suddenly confronted with free prices and privatization. And it was not enough just to apply the tried-and-true lessons of macro-economic and micro-economic theory, for this was an economic transition unlike any that preceded it. We quickly discovered that no one had the market cornered on analyzing such a thing, and we had to actually devise from scratch methodologies to do things like gauge the size