Replies

The court, in an unanimous decision, disagreed with Oakland County prosecutors' contention that first-degree child abuse should be considered a "general intent" crime. That would require proof only of Tarajee Maynor's intent to leave her two children in the car, and not specific proof that she intended to harm them.

I thought that if a death was to be prosecuted as Murder I under the Felony Murder Rule, that

the death had to have been the proximate result of an enumerated felony (burglary, rape, armed robbery, arson, kidnapping, or other specified felony -- child endangerment?); and
the only intent needed to be shown was the intent to commit the underlying felony, NOT to harm the proximate victim.

Having a hard time understanding the Michigan Supremes' decision.

THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE (EXCERPT)

Act 328 of 1931

***** 750.316.amended THIS AMENDED SECTION IS EFFECTIVE JUNE 11, 2004 *****

750.316.amended First degree murder; penalty; definitions. Sec. 316.

(1) A person who commits any of the following is guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life:
(a) Murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, or third degree, child abuse in the first degree, a major controlled substance offense, robbery, carjacking, breaking and entering of a dwelling, home invasion in the first or second degree, larceny of any kind, extortion, kidnapping, or vulnerable adult abuse in the first and second degree under section 145n.
(c) A murder of a peace officer or a corrections officer committed while the peace officer or corrections officer is lawfully engaged in the performance of any of his or her duties as a peace officer or corrections officer, knowing that the peace officer or corrections officer is a peace officer or corrections officer engaged in the performance of his or her duty as a peace officer or corrections officer.
(2) As used in this section:

(a) “Arson” means a felony violation of chapter X.
(b) “Corrections officer” means any of the following:
(i) A prison or jail guard or other prison or jail personnel.
(ii) Any of the personnel of a boot camp, special alternative incarceration unit, or other minimum security correctional facility.
(iii) A parole or probation officer.
(c) “Major controlled substance offense” means any of the following:
(i) A violation of section 7401(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7401.
(ii) A violation of section 7403(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7403.
(iii) A conspiracy to commit an offense listed in subparagraph (i) or (ii).
(d) “Peace officer” means any of the following:
(i) A police or conservation officer of this state or a political subdivision of this state.
(ii) A police or conservation officer of the United States.
(iii) A police or conservation officer of another state or a political subdivision of another state.

History: 1931, Act 328, Eff. Sept. 18, 1931 ;--CL 1948, 750.316 ;--Am. 1969, Act 331, Eff. Mar. 20, 1970 ;--Am. 1980, Act 28, Imd. Eff. Mar. 7, 1980 ;--Am. 1994, Act 267, Eff. Oct. 1, 1994 ;--Am. 1996, Act 20, Eff. Apr. 1, 1996 ;--Am. 1996, Act 21, Eff. Apr. 1, 1996 ;--Am. 1999, Act 189, Eff. Apr. 1, 2000 ;--Am. 2004, Act 58, Eff. June 11, 2004