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I maybe had too much eggnog at the office Christmas party (hic!) but I don't think that the "reasonable doubt" standard is an argument from ignorance.

Putting it into a nutshell, depending on the type of case, there are different ways that the burden of proof is allocated. In a civil case, the plaintiff has the burden of proof, and for most civil cases, the standard is "preponderance of the evidence." If the plaintiff proves that his version of the facts is more likely than the defendant's version, he prevails.

When you think of it, think of Justice holding her scales. They don't have to tip very much for the plaintiff to win, but if they are in equipoise, the plaintiff hasn't met the burden of proof and doesn't win.

In fact, the judge may not even force the defendant to put on evidence if the plaintiff's evidence isn't sufficient, but may dismiss the case on a motion to strike the evidence as being insufficient to make the case as a matter of law.

But if the plaintiff gets past the motion to strike, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove his or her case.

In a criminal case, it works the same way, but the amount of weight that needs to be placed on the scales is far heavier. The plaintiff in a criminal case is the government, because a crime is an offense against the government. And the amount of weight that needs to be placed on the scales of justice in order to get past a motion to strike is far, far heavier than the 1% that is needed in a civil case. How much? There is not a percentage, but the evidence needs to be really, really strong. Strong enough that all by itself, without more, it's enough to meet the "reasonable doubt" standard in the mind of the judge.

It's called "reasonable doubt" because the standard doesn't require you to consider anything that's outside the scope of reason, such as aliens coming down and committing the crime.
Otherwise, the case doesn't go forward, but goes out on a motion to strike.

But if the case gets past the motion to strike, then defendant doesn't have to put on any evidence, but can let the jury decide based on the same evidence that the trial judge ruled was sufficient to get past the motion to strike.

This doesn't require the jury to be ignorant, but to have higher standards in a criminal case. If there are equally plausible explanations which are consistent with the facts and the evidence that mean that the defendant's innocence is a real possibility, then that should be sufficient to create reasonable doubt.

But a defendant in a criminal trial isn't found "innocent," he's found "not guilty." If it really were the same as "argument from ignorance," the failure to prove guilt would mean a finding of innocence. I think maybe in Scotland there is a finding of innocence but not in the USA or England.

But a defendant in a criminal trial isn't found "innocent," he's found "not guilty." If it really were the same as "argument from ignorance," the failure to prove guilt would mean a finding of innocence. I think maybe in Scotland there is a finding of innocence but not in the USA or England.

Ah, old Irving probably could have worded that section a little more clearly. It's really the presumption of innocence that's an argument from ignorance. We presume that the accused is innocent until proven guilty. But that presumption is itself an argument from ignorance - we don't, in fact, know that he is innocent, but we presume him to be innocent until proven otherwise. And insofar as that presumption may carry through to an acquittal, that acquittal may itself be an argument from ignorance - if the defendant does not present an affirmative defense to establish his own innocence, but is acquitted by virtue of the fact that the prosecution has failed to bear the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we still don't know that the defendant is, in fact, innocent - we simply default to an acquittal in the absence of evidence to the contrary, whether that acquittal is actually true to the facts or not. And in that case, the "not guilty" verdict is roughly equivalent to the verdict that the Scots have, but we don't - a verdict of "not proven".

But regardless of whether the verdict is a logical fallacy or not, we agree as a society to sacrifice a certain amount of logical cogency in the name of justice - as the authors paraphrase, we agree that it is better that 100 guilty men should go free than that one innocent man should be hanged. And in pursuit of that end, we agree to treat our ignorance as though it were, in fact, an affirmative conclusion, even though it isn't.