BREAKING: President Trump Fires Biden-Appointed Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook Amid Mortgage Fraud Allegations

Whatever. You’ve got a documented history of called for racial segregation and for reducing rights of black Americans.

Your use of the word “colored” when referring to black Americans speaks for itself. It was not meant as a term of endearment. That you got busted for it I expect is what sticks in your craw.

Nothing is stuck in my craw! Are you a White person?

LOL! Why do you keep asking MY race?

To see if you’re a colored person. Are you?

LOL!

Umm you should never assume as you make an ass mostly out of you (and me). FYI I have a mixed son and a granddaughter who is a quarter black. I was once married to an American black southerner. So your virtue signaling is wrong once again.

What precisely am I assuming?

Try firing a union-protected government employee with your mind. Absent due process, it gets reversed with back pay and interest.

We're talking about losing one's job; people get fired from jobs all the time and never go to trial to prove "cause" before accepting they were fired. What makes this situation different?

She is a Federal Reserve Governor covered by statutory protection. Government employees enjoy a property interest in the job.

Cause is not defined in the statute, leaving it to the courts to define.

At issue is whether the President may remove a sitting member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System without affording the procedural protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the statutory limitations of the Federal Reserve Act.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Supreme Court has held that public officials with a statutory entitlement to their position possess a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. (Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).

Governor Cook’s 14-year term, coupled with the “for cause” removal provision, creates a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. This triggers the protections of procedural due process.

The statutory protections afforded to Governors of the Federal Reserve must be at least as strong as those provided to lower-level federal employees. It would defy logic and legislative intent to treat a confirmed Governor as having fewer procedural safeguards than a union-protected GS-4 clerk.

Due process cannot consist merely of a no-notice communication—whether by letter or tweet—without an opportunity to respond. A more appropriate mechanism for addressing alleged misconduct would be placement on paid administrative leave pending a full and fair investigation.

To permit summary termination without process would render Governors effectively at-will employees, a result plainly inconsistent with the statutory design and the importance of institutional independence.

The absence of precedent for summary removal underscores the expectation of procedural safeguards.

Cause is not defined in the statute, leaving it to the courts to define.

The courts? or does the President get deference to the Executive branch to decide?

I know that the overturning of Chevron deference applied to agency rulemaking by bureaucrats, the the President is not a bureaucrat, he IS the Executive branch and everyone else has powers delegated by him. As such, his interpretation should carry weight until such time as the court thinks it's not the right interpretation.

To go there, they would look at where else in the US Code "for cause" terminations were found, and there are common definitions for that, as you pointed out. Here are two recent cases where the Supreme Court ruled both cases in President Trump's favor:

Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) - 5 USC 1202(d): MSPB members "may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office".
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) - 29 USC 153(a): NLRB Board members may be removed by the President "for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause".

This would suggest that the firing of Lisa Cook for the cause of malfeasance is supported by the Supreme Court's decisions in the firing of both Gwynne Wilcox (NLRB) and Cathy Harris (MSPB), without having to wait for a criminal conviction.

I know that people say it's unprecedented to fire a governor of the FED and it hasn't been done in its 112 year history, but in that time has it ever been discovered that a Fed Governor had two mortgages declaring each property to be their primary residence in order to get favorable interest rates (prima facie evidence of mortgage fraud)?

-PJ

Of course there is wrongful process in our system. This is why we’re draining the swamp.

Wait till you see what the drained swamp looks like. Your world will never be the same.

Wait till you see what the drained swamp looks like. Your world will never be the same.

I'll be long dead before that happens.

It's as likely as seeing a year-over-year reduction in the federal debt. Last happened under Eisenhower.

This would suggest that the firing of Lisa Cook for the cause of malfeasance is supported by the Supreme Court's decisions in the firing of both Gwynne Wilcox (NLRB) and Cathy Harris (MSPB), without having to wait for a criminal conviction.

Cook is neither NRLB nor MSPB, nor General Schedule, nor Senior Executive Service. While I believe it can be done without a conviction for misbehavior in office, it cannot be done without due process. A no-notice mean tweet, with no opportunity to respond, does not suffice.

Wilcox and Harris are not direct precedents as Cook is of a quasi-independent agency protected by a statute specific to that agency, as explicitly distinguished by the Supreme Court.

The courts? or does the President get deference to the Executive branch to decide?

See Cook v. Trump, DDC 1-25-cv-02903 Doc 1 (28 Aug 2025) COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, pp 4-10. Footnotes omitted, all emphasis as in original.

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STATUTORY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
7. Since its establishment in 1913, Congress intended for the Federal Reserve System to function independent of political interference. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Wilcox v. Trump, “[t]he Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.” 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (May 22, 2025) (citing Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 222 n.8 (2020)). The intent that the Federal Reserve retain independence has been reinforced by statutory amendments to the FRA in 1935, 1977, and 2010.
8. The Board of Governors is the seven-member governing body of the Federal Reserve System—made up of the chairperson plus six governors—responsible for setting monetary policy, supervising and regulating banks, and maintaining financial stability. The governors, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, serve staggered 14-year terms. The long and staggered term procedure reinforces the independence of the Board.
9. An independent Federal Reserve is essential for a stable economy, as the short-term political interests of a president often clash with sound monetary policy. Presidents, facing pressure to boost the economy, may favor lower interest rates and a more expansive policy to achieve a temporary economic lift. However, this approach often fuels long-term inflation. A politically insulated Board of Governors can make appropriate, albeit unpopular, decisions—such as raising interest rates to combat inflation—that are crucial for the nation’s long-term financial health.
10. The Federal Reserve’s effectiveness in managing inflation and economic stability depends on its credibility. If markets and the public believe that the central bank is making
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decisions based on political pressure rather than sound economic data, that confidence erodes. A lack of credibility can make a central bank’s job much harder; for example, if markets anticipate higher inflation in the long run due to a political decision to temporarily boost the economy, it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. An independent central bank, by contrast, acts predictably and transparently, which stabilizes markets and the wider economy. In the few days following President Trump’s unprecedented action, media, economists, and academics from across the political spectrum have sounded the alarm that his actions threaten the historic independence of the Federal Reserve.
11. An independent Federal Reserve also prevents presidential administrations from using monetary policy for self-serving political ends in other ways, such as ensuring the government cannot simply print more money to finance debt. This practice, when unchecked, can lead to economic collapse and hyperinflation.
12. The independence of the Federal Reserve is supported by several statutory provisions that shield the Board of Governors from political interference. Such statutory provisions include the Board’s funding outside the annual appropriations process; the Board’s authority to set all terms and conditions of Board employment; the Board’s exemption from Government Accountability Office audits of its monetary policy decisions; the Board’s authority to litigate independently; the Board’s ability to present legislative recommendations and testimony to Congress without executive branch approval; the exemption of the Board’s monetary
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policy decisions from the Congressional Review Act; and the Board’s authorization to participate directly in certain international fora without executive branch intermediation.
13. One of the statutory devices used to maintain this crucial independence of the Federal Reserve is a “for cause” removal protection for Board Governors. The FRA expressly provides that
Upon the expiration of the term of any appointive member of the Federal Reserve Board in office on August 23, 1935, the President shall fix the term of the successor to such member at not to exceed fourteen years, as designated by the President at the time of nomination, but in such manner as to provide for the expiration of the term of not more than one member in any two-year period, and thereafter each member shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President.
12 U.S.C. § 242 (emphasis added).
14. The “for cause” removal protection guaranteed by the FRA, which has been the bulwark of the Federal Reserve’s independence for the past century, prevents the President from firing a Federal Reserve Board governor except “for cause,” meaning instances of inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or comparable misconduct.
15. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of such statutory protections for government officials serving on multi-member agencies. In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court found that Congress has the authority to restrict presidential removals “depend[ing] upon the character of the office.” 295 U.S at 631. Specifically, “for-cause” removal restrictions were deemed constitutional with respect to officers at the FTC; in reaching
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this conclusion, the Court specifically relied on the FTC’s structure as (a) “a body of experts,” (b) with long, staggered terms, (c) that was designed to be “nonpartisan” and act “with entire impartiality.” Id. at 624–25.
16. The Supreme Court recently made clear that the analysis in Humphrey’s Executor applies with particular force to the Federal Reserve. In a case about the President’s removal of a member of the National Labor Relations Board and a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Court permitted the removals to take effect, but specifically distinguished the removal protections for Federal Reserve Governors. The Court addressed the quasi-private nature of the Federal Reserve and the historical importance of its for-cause removal protections as unique even among independent agencies:
[R]espondents Gwynne Wilcox and Cathy Harris contend that arguments in this case necessarily implicate the constitutionality of for-cause removal protections for members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors or other members of the Federal Open Market Committee. [] We disagree. The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.
Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (May 22, 2025) (internal citations omitted; emphases added).
17. The Government similarly has stated in court that “the Federal Reserve represent a unique institution with a unique history and background,” and thus is distinguishable from “other federal entities.” Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037, Reply Br. for Appellants at 15 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 11, 2025) (internal citations omitted).
18. This is not the first time the Supreme Court has distinguished the Federal Reserve from other government agencies. The recent analysis in Trump v. Wilcox builds on what the Court previously signaled about the unique nature of the Federal Reserve and how it is differently situated from other agencies in Seila Law. 591 U.S. at 222 n.8.
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19. As the Court’s decision in Trump v. Wilcox makes clear, the Federal Reserve uniquely relies on its independence to function in the historical tradition of an independent central bank. The “for cause” statutory removal provision provided by the FRA is essential to protecting this independence.
20. The “for cause” standard is not defined in the FRA, but statutes establishing the standard for other independent agencies expressly limit cause to the standard that is articulated in Humphrey’s Executor: There must be a specific finding of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 295 U.S. at 623. Courts and litigants have assumed the standard in cases where such language is not expressed in the statute. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010) (decided “with [the] understanding” that SEC Commissioners could only be removed under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” even in the absence of explicit statutory for cause removal protection, after both parties agreed to such an understanding).
21. The Supreme Court has not defined “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” (emphasis added), but historical use of these terms indicates that (a) “‘neglect of duty’ meant failing to perform one’s duties in a way that caused specific harm to the entity . . . to which the duties were owed”; (b) “malfeasance” connoted the commission of an unlawful act in the performance of one’s official duties; and (c) the “inefficiency” standard targets concerns about “waste, especially . . . result[ing] from self-interested dealing,” and was designed to “ensur[e] that . . . officers did their jobs competently and honestly.” Lev Menand and Jane Manners, The Three Permissions, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29, 48–49 (2021) (tracing the historical meaning of the term through English common law and early American law).
22. Congressional intent that the “for cause” standard in the FRA requires a finding of
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“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” is illustrated by the fact that Congress amended the FRA three months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Humphrey’s Executor to provide Board members with 14-year terms “unless sooner removed for cause by the President.” 49 Stat. 684, 704 (emphasis added). Prior to that, the statute was silent on removal. The Humphrey’s Executor decision was raised in the hearings on the passage of these amendments to the FRA. See Gary Richardson & David Wilcox, How Congress Designed the Federal Reserve to be Independent of Presidential Control, 39 J. of Econ. Persp. 221, 229 (2025).
23. Whether or not the FRA’s “for cause” removal provision is interpreted using the usual standard of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” it clearly does not support removal for policy disagreements. See Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 619 (finding the President’s decision to remove an FTC member because their minds did not “go along together on either the policies or the administering” of the agency failed to satisfy grounds for removal); Wiener, 357 U.S. at 350 (President did not have cause to remove commissioner because he believed it was in the “national interest” to appoint “personnel of [his own selection); Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 229 (noting that Humphrey’s Executor “implicitly rejected an interpretation that would leave the President free to remove an officer based on disagreements about agency policy”).
24. Allowing the President to remove members of the Board over policy disagreements would also render illusory the Board’s independence, as emphasized throughout the statutory provisions protecting such independence in the FRA.
25. As the Court’s articulation of the standard in Humphrey’s Executor makes clear, removal “for cause” requires some connection to official conduct, prohibiting removal based on an unsubstantiated allegation of private misconduct (which in this case allegedly occurred prior to her Senate confirmation). And even to the extent that private misconduct could bear on a particular
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officer’s official conduct in certain cases, “cause” requires a factual basis supporting such asserted misconduct.

Do you think the Supreme Court is moving away from Humphrey's Executor and back towards a unitary Executive?

The Constitution grants the power of the Executive in a President AND ONLY a President. What do you think about Congress creating these "independent" agencies inside the executive branch that is effectively beyond the reach of the President? Don't you think that was an encroachment on the separation of powers? The powers inside the executive branch descend downward from the President, not crosswise from the Congress.

-PJ

You forget—they never thought Hillary would lose.

Now the deep state, the corrupt politicians, big tech/fake news, the puppetmasters—THEY’RE PANICKING LIKE WE’VE NEVER SEEN BEFORE.