Posted on 08/15/2024 9:31:05 AM PDT by PJ-Comix
Oh woe is us! Hackers have found vulnerabilities in voting machines and, gee whiz, there is just no way to fix them before the November election. At least that is what the Politico cybersecurity reporter Maggie Miller would like you to believe.
However, there is a certain word very conveniently missing from her story on Monday and that missing word is "paper," as in "paper ballots," which you will find nowhere in "The nation’s best hackers found vulnerabilities in voting machines — but no time to fix them."
(Excerpt) Read more at newsbusters.org ...
Paper ballots mean NOTHING => IF the tabulating machines are reading and/or recording them incorrectly.
If the machines are compromised, they can’t be used. Politico is suggesting we continue to use them?
However, it is a bit of a step up for them. They went from "Our voting systems are absolutely perfect" to "Voting machines can be easily hacked but it is too late to do anything about it."
THEN BACK UP A FEW STEPS FURTHER & COUNT THEM BY HAND.
Paper ballots are excellent for validating the machines, but, they aren’t going to hand count ballots to validate the machines unless something forces them to.
Remember that.
There is no reason you have to scan your paper ballot and it stays inside the machine. You should be able to take it home with you and later you can verify online if the vote matches the vote cas
Or you could scan it and get a printed receipt showing your votes cast. There are a number of ways to computerize this that would maintain security. However the worst possible way is the way Dominion did it. If they claim a vote could not be read, they generate a new one but had a library of blobs to hide the fact that this was a computer generated reprint. In such a case the reprint should be attached to the original so they could be compared . It is a total opposite of what you should do. If there is a computer generated it should be overly and extremely obvious that this was a computer generated reprint. Not hidden.
Dominion systems are designed to cheat. I’m a computer software engineer with over 25 years experience. I could be called into court as an expert witness. I can point out all the ways that Dominion systems are designed to do the exact opposite of what you should do to secure a system.
“COUNT THEM BY HAND”
Involves about ten times the manhours of machine counting.
The Republican Party can buy a machine.
The Democratic Party can buy a machine.
Here’s a batch, Mr. Elephant. Your turn, Mr. Donkey.
Your count, Mr. Elephant!
Your count, Mr. Donkey!
Next batch!
Original uncountable Pam C 32
Duplicate Pam C 32
When I go to vote here in Florida, I believe each sheet is photo-electronically copied as I feed it in.
Yup. I vote here in Florida. You HAND MARK your ballots which is electronically copied. If their needs to be a recount, those HAND MARKED ballots are available.
The biggest fraud problem is with mail ballots.
Something like 1.7 million were mailed out in Nevada, but only about 1 million mailed back.
At least 700,000 could have been misappropriated and misused.
Mail ballots should only be sent out response to a current election year cycle request by the likely voter.
I agree, handcounted, watched, and verified => and not discarded or shredded for an extended period of time to allow for recounts and court cases.
My response was to the false leap that finding that the counting machines were hackable meant nothing.
If the paper ballots are simply put through the machine, and the machine counting can be hacked, we do not have a provably accurate vote count.
“TEST DECKS
There are a variety of checks we need to do verify that each machine is functioning correctly, but this
document will mostly focus on how we know that the tabulators are correctly counting the votes that are
marked on the ballots they scan.
Each tabulator scans a test deck—a series of test ballots marked with a known pattern”
“In a county this size, the expected outcome calculation involves a great deal of arithmetic. There are 432
different types of ballots that voters will be able to receive in the upcoming general election. We are
testing them on 210 tabulators for election day, 65 for advance voting, 4 for absentee ballots, and one for
provisionals. There are three separate test decks for absentee and provisional ballots; two for advance
voting; and each election day polling place has a smaller test deck for its own ballots.”
“Every Monday until the completion of L&A, we will be posting a summary of how many tabulators have
been completed, the expected outcome we calculated based on the test decks used, and a report showing
that the votes tabulated by the election software are the same as the expected outcome. Please do not
be confused. These are not real votes. They are test ballots used only for L&A. As part of the process, we
will post a zero report demonstrating that all test votes have been cleared from the system prior to the
real election.”
“We invite the public to observe the process. Details are posted on our website. If you have any questions,
you can contact us at voterreg@dekalbcountyga.gov or (404) 298-4020”
https://www.dekalbcountyga.gov/sites/default/files/users/user3667/L%20and%20A%20Overview%20(2).pdf
Do you want people who probably can’t make the correct change for a lemonade stand hand-counting ballots?
The Department strongly discourages relying solely on automated L&A testing or using only preprinted ballots provided by vendors. Manual entry of votes, using pre-audited ballots prepared by election officials, is the most effective way to identify potential errors and anomalies.
When preparing test decks, counties should ensure the following:
1) Test decks should include ballots printed via all printing options — including by the ballot printing or mail house vendor, from a BOD printer, and ballots
generated from a ballot-marking device (BMD). The goal is to ensure that test deck ballots are printed under the exact same conditions as live ballots that will be provided to and voted by the voters.
2) The same paper stock should be used for testing that will be used for the election.
3) Test decks should include all ballot sets and styles to be used in the election (including, for example, Election Day ballots, absentee ballots, mail-in ballots,
emergency ballots, provisional ballots, ballot on demand, ballot-marking devices, accessible ballots, non-partisan ballots, bilingual ballots, and federal ballots)
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