Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2025

Russian forces continue to advance in central and western Pokrovsk, although the exact contour of the front line in and around the town remains unclear. Geolocated footage published on October 23 and 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and western Pokrovsk and seized positions along the Pokrovsk railway line.[1] ISW has observed footage of small Russian infantry groups operating in central and western Pokrovsk over the last week (since roughly October 17) and therefore assesses that Russian forces likely maintain isolated but enduring positions south of the railway line in western Pokrovsk.[2] ISW defines the Assessed Russian Advance layer as verifiable areas in which Russian forces have operated in or conducted attacks against, even if they do not maintain control. Russian forces almost certainly do not maintain control over any positions in Pokrovsk, which is defined as “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.”[3] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged that the situation within Pokrovsk is unclear and that it is impossible to determine where Russian forces may hold enduring positions in the town.[4] Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Pokrovsk, although Russian forces appear to be undertaking significant efforts to consolidate advances and seize Pokrovsk in the coming months. Additional geolocated footage published on October 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southeastern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[5] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

The Kremlin continues its multifaceted cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing US decision makers in Russia's favor in response to recent US sanctions. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 24 that Russian President Vladimir Putin “promised a stunning response not only to the Tomahawk missile deliveries…but to [any] attempt to carry out strikes deep into Russian territory.”[13] The Kremlin has recently been engaged in a cognitive warfare effort framing the potential US provisioning of long-range Tomahawk missiles or any long-range missile strike against Russia as a red line, including by issuing overt threats regarding Russia's ability and desire to respond militarily to Tomahawk missile provisions.[14] The Kremlin's threat of a military response to Tomahawk missile provisions is the most recent line in its long-standing rhetorical effort to convince the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable due to Russia's supposed military prowess and advantages over Ukraine and the wider West. Russia's ongoing cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian victory as inevitable ignores the reality that Russian forces continue to make only minimal, grinding advances at disproportionately high casualty rates and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives in Ukraine by force in the short- or medium-term.[15] Russia often leverages threats, including nuclear saber-rattling, in order to obfuscate Russia's own military weaknesses and false claims that the West and Ukraine are escalating the war in order to justify Russian escalations. ISW has observed the well-demonstrated pattern that Russia escalates its war in Ukraine as soon as it develops new weapons systems and tactics that Russia assesses will help its war effort. ISW assesses that Russia will continue to escalate the war at any moment of its choosing in the future, regardless of whether the West provides Ukraine with military assistance. The Kremlin notably has not offered any assurances that Russia will refrain from escalating its war in Ukraine even if the United States were to refrain from provisioning Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

Peskov also blamed Ukraine on October 24 for the “protracted pause” in negotiations and claimed that Europe is encouraging Ukraine's unwillingness — a long-running Kremlin narrative designed to dually distract from Russia's continued intransigence and discredit the current Ukrainian government and Europe.[16] Russia has repeatedly attempted to deflect blame for its lack of substantive progress toward peace in Ukraine, despite the fact that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its war aims in exchange for peace.[17] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently acknowledged that the West views Russia's negotiating position as “maximalist” and stated that “Russia has not altered its positions” and that Russia expects that the “root causes” of the war to be addressed.[18] Lavrov has continued to define the root causes of Russia's war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers – similar reasons to those Russian President Vladimir Putin gave on February 24, 2022 when he launched the full-scale invasion.[19] Russian officials have repeatedly stated that Ukraine's neutrality, alteration of NATO's integral open-door policy, and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government are the only conditions by which Ukraine and the West can address the supposed “root causes” of the war.[20] Zelensky, in stark contrast to Russia, has continually demonstrated Ukraine's willingness to engage substantively in the peace initiative, including most recently by articulating his alignment with US President Donald Trump on implementing an immediate ceasefire.[21]

The Kremlin is attempting to weaponize reinvigorated US interest in bilateral cooperation with Russia and involvement in initiatives to return Ukrainian children to pressure the US administration.[22] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on October 24 that Ukraine and its allies are promoting an “anti-Russian smear campaign on the children's issue” and that the US Senate is considering several “anti-Russian bills,” including a bill recognizing Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism for the “abduction of Ukrainian children.”[23] Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova recently implicated herself in the forced deportation and re-education of a Ukrainian teenager and admitted that she “stole” and re-educated the teenager into a pro-Russian ideology.[24] The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab estimates that Russia has likely deported upwards of 35,000 Ukrainian children, and ISW continues to observe reports that Russia maintains many “re-education” and militarization camps in occupied Ukraine and Russia.[25] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated Russia's desire to extend the New START Treaty despite recent US sanctions and claimed that “the first step toward cooperation could be the re-establishment” of dialogue on the treaty, which is set to expire in February 2026.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains committed to attempts to engage the United States on issues unrelated to Russia's war in Ukraine in an effort to stall or bypass the negotiation progress and extract additional economic and political concessions.[27]

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev announced on October 24 that he is traveling to the United States to meet with Trump Administration officials.[28] CNN, citing sources with knowledge of the visit, reported that Dmitriev will visit with Trump Administration officials to continue discussions about the bilateral relationship.[29] Axios and Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Dmitriev will meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff on October 25.[30]

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the fourth time since June 2025, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability against the backdrop of new US sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending. The Kremlin continues to push the Russian Central Bank to pursue economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability. The Russian Central Bank announced on October 24 that it lowered its key interest rate from 17 to 16.5 percent.[31] The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that it recorded significant cooling in sectors oriented toward external demand, likely referring to international trade. The Russian Central Bank assessed that current inflationary pressures will temporarily increase in late 2025 and early 2026 due to a number of external economic factors, in line with ISW’s ongoing assessments.[32] The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that there are persistent tensions in Russia's labor market, but noted that wage inflation is growing more slowly than in 2024. The Central Bank has largely leveraged monetary policy to cope with the economic consequences of Russia's wartime economy and expanded the Russian money supply through military payouts, social projects, and investment in the DIB.

Ongoing intensified Western sanctions against Russia and Russia's ongoing labor issues brought on by Russia's war in Ukraine have significantly contributed to Russia's economic instability. Russia's strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits alongside efforts to rapidly expand its DIB since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase government spending to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB’s labor force.[33] Russia has leveraged large federal and regional one-time bonuses (some of which are over ten times Russia's annual average salary) to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other civilian jobs, and competition between Russia's DIB and civilian enterprises is causing wage inflation for civilian positions and inflating prices in service industries writ large.[34] The Kremlin, however, recently began setting conditions to involuntarily mobilize reservists to fight in the war in Ukraine, which, if activated, would allow the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to reduce payments to soldiers and could potentially lower inflation by reducing one source of large government spending, which also exacerbates structural wage inflation.[35] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russia has begun compulsory mobilization of reservists at this time; however, the Kremlin is setting conditions for the possibility of such.

Russian forces recently launched a series of long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, underscoring Ukraine's urgent requirements for long-range air defense systems. The Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported on October 24 that Russian Su-34 fighters launched three long-range guided glide bombs against Odesa Oblast.[36] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that the strikes were the first Russian glide bomb strikes against Odesa Oblast.[37] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted strikes with modified long-range glide bombs against Poltava Oblast on October 20, against Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast on October 18, and against Mykolaiv City, Mykolaiv Oblast on October 16.[38] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on October 24 that Russian forces employed UMPB-5R precision guided glide bombs with an extended range of 100 to 180 kilometers and a payload of 100 kilograms — significantly smaller than the 500-to-3,000-kilogram payload of typical Russian glide bombs that Russian forces use against frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and settlements.[39] Beskrestnov noted that the UMPB-5R glide bombs are a cheaper analogue to jet-propelled Shahed-type drones and missiles and are similar to previous Russian developments, such as the Banderol cruise missile and the D30 guided glide bomb. Beskrestnov previously reported that Russia relies on Chinese-produced jet engines to increase the glide bomb's range and that Russian aircraft launch the bombs from an altitude of at least 10 kilometers.[40]

Russian forces likely seek to restore their long-range strike capabilities, allowing Russian aircraft to operate farther from the front line and beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems. ISW observed that Russian forces reduced glide bomb strikes in late 2024 in response to higher rates of Ukrainian air defenses shooting down Russian aircraft.[41] The recent longer-range glide bomb strikes indicate that Russian forces are launching these new glide bombs without the same risk of Ukrainian air defenses, exploiting Ukraine's scarcity of air defense systems that have a long range and are capable of downing aircraft covering the front line. ISW continues to assess that a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an umbrella that uses more Patriot systems, would degrade Russia's ability to conduct airstrikes, underscoring the critical necessity of timely Western provisions of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine, as the system is the longest-range air defense option in Ukraine's current arsenal.[42] ISW observed that Russian forces are attempting to use medium-range Lancet loitering munitions to counter Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea at ranges over 50 kilometers, which may be part of Russian efforts to reestablish low- and high-altitude superiority to enable long-range glide bomb strikes against southern Ukraine from airspace over the Black Sea.[43]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly increasing its purchases of domestically produced cruise and ballistic missiles despite Western sanctions that aim to contain Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) production. Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported on October 24 that it received access to leaked Russian military procurement documents about Russian missile procurements from 2024 to 2027, indicating that Russia is scaling up its purchases of missiles.[44] Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered about 303 Iskander-K cruise missiles from Russian manufacturer Novator Design Bureau in 2024-2025 at a cost of between 135 to 142 million rubles ($1.6 to 1.7 million) per missile. Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered 95 modernized 9M729 Iskander-K missiles with a range of over 2,000 kilometers for 146 million rubles ($1.8 million) per missile. Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered 240 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles for delivery in 2022 to 2024 and ordered another 450 for delivery in 2025 to 2026 for a cost of about 168 million rubles ($2.1 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 56 nuclear-capable Kinzhals for delivery in 2024-2026. Militarnyi noted that the cost of Kinzhal missiles may increase from 168 million rubles to between 175 and 190 million rubles ($2.2 to 2.3 million) per missile during the production period. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 525 Kh-101 cruise missiles in 2024 for a cost of 164 million rubles (about $2 million) per missile and ordered 700 Kh-101s for 2025 for a cost of 171 to 194 million rubles ($2.1 to 2.4 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered four different Iskander-M ballistic missile variants totaling 589 missiles in 2024 and 643 in 2025 for a cost of 189 to 238 million rubles ($2.3 to 2.9 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 18 “9M723-2” missiles, which Militarnyi assessed could refer to the “Iskander-1000,” a new reported Iskander variant with an intended range of about 1,000 kilometers. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 44 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles in 2024 and 144 missiles in 2025 for a cost of 366 million rubles ($4.6 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly contracted indefinite numbers of Zirkon anti-ship missiles, which Russian forces use to strike ground targets in Ukraine, with planned deliveries of 80 missiles per year for a cost of 420 to 450 million rubles ($5.2 to 5.6 million) per missile. The extent to which these reported leaked documents reflect the Russian DIB’s ability to deliver missiles to the Russian MoD on the contracted timelines and the planned deliveries of some of these missiles are unclear. The leaked documents, if authentic, indicate that the Russian MoD believes that Russian missile manufacturers are capable of increasing production of the cruise and ballistic missiles that Russian forces regularly launch at Ukraine despite Western sanctions that aim to curtail the Russian DIB’s production capacity. Russian forces likely seek to rebuild their stockpiles of cruise and ballistic missiles and will very likely use increased production lines to launch larger and more devastating strike packages against Ukraine, underscoring Ukraine's critical need for air defenses.

Russian manned aircraft violated NATO airspace for a second time on October 23. The Lithuanian Armed Forces reported that a Russian Su-30 fighter jet and a Russian Il-78 Aerial Tanker illegally entered Lithuanian airspace on October 23, and NATO scrambled two Spanish Eurofighters from a Lithuanian base in response to the aerial incursion.[45] The Eurofighters are part of NATO's ongoing Baltic Air Policing Mission. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda condemned Russia's incursion into Lithuanian airspace as a ”gross violation of international law.”[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rejected accusations that Russian aircraft violated Lithuanian airspace, claiming that the Su-30 and Il-78 aircraft were conducting “scheduled training flights over Kaliningrad Oblast.”[47] ISW previously reported that three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonian airspace on September 19.[48]

German media outlet Kieler Nachrichten reported on October 23 that the Russian amphibious Ropucha-class landing ship Aleksandr Shabalin anchored near the entrance to Lübeck Bay off the German coast and blocked a shipping lane.[49] The outlet reported that the Russian ship is obstructing commercial vessels traveling a key shipping route linking the Baltic Sea to the North Sea. The Lübeck Bay is notably roughly 55 km from Kiel, the capital of the northern German state Schleswig-Holstein, where German authorities identified several unknown drones flying overnight on September 25 to 26.[50] German Federal Police stated that the Russian ship is currently operating in international waters and is neither violating international law nor international navigation regulations.[51] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations and non-conventional activity are likely part of ”Phase Zero” — Russia's broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[52]

more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/

Side note, one of china’s claimed to fame is their EV car production.
First in China a car built is considered a car sold.
Second Russia has shown Chinese cars to be not up to standard.
Third, EV cars were and are a joke, and the joke has not aged well. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13, 2025

The Kremlin removed some restrictions on using Russian reservists in combat, allowing the Kremlin to employ reservists in its war in Ukraine. The Russian government approved on October 13 a draft law that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed stipulating that servicemembers of the Russian mobilization reserve can perform defensive tasks during armed conflicts, counter-terrorist operations, or deployments outside Russian territory.[1] The law proposes that the Russian president can call up reservists for special training lasting up to two months. An explanatory note to the law states that the changes will allow Russia to deploy reservists during peacetime, expanding the current legislation that only allows Russia to deploy reservists during mobilization or wartime. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated on October 13 that the law will allow the Kremlin to deploy reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine's Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[2] ISW will review the significance of this draft law in an upcoming warning update publication.

European officials continue to note how Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. Polish National Security Bureau Chief Sławomir Cenckiewicz told the Financial Times in an article published on October 12 that Russia is using cryptocurrency to pay actors conducting sabotage in Europe in order to prevent European intelligence services from tracking the payments.[3] Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin increasingly relies on “ad hoc” local agents for sabotage missions and that Poland discovered in 2023 a network of agents whom the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) recruited and whom Russia financed “to a high extent” with cryptocurrency. Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin increasingly relies on “ad hoc” local agents for specific missions to minimize risk to the Kremlin. Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin has also leveraged cryptocurrency to circumvent Western sanctions. Cenkiewicz also stated that Poland is now in a “state of war” in the cyber domain, and FT noted that Poland has accused Russia of orchestrating a recent hacking attempt to cut off the water supplies to Gdansk.[4]

German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) President Martin Jäger stated on October 13 that the frequency of Russian attacks on Europe is a “new level of confrontation.”[5] Jäger stated that Russia is trying to probe Europe's borders, undermine NATO, destabilize European democracies, divide societies, and intimidate the population. Jäger stated that Europe must prepare for further Russian escalation and cannot assume that Russia will not launch a conventional attack against NATO until 2029. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky compared on October 12 Russia's recent attacks against Europe to the ways in which Russian President Vladimir Putin used Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 to gauge the West's reaction.[6] Zelensky warned that Putin is preparing the Russian population for aggression against the Baltic States and Poland. ISW continues to assess that any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for rapid redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many European officials currently expect.[7]

The Kremlin appears to be changing tactics within its reflexive control campaign to deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, likely due to recent reporting that the United States has been sharing intelligence to help Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure. US President Donald Trump stated on October 12 that he would inform Russian President Vladimir Putin that the United States would provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles if Russia refused to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[8] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on October 13 that Russia is unable to distinguish between Tomahawk missiles armed with nuclear or conventional payloads while the missiles are in flight and claimed that the United States would control Ukrainian Tomahawk launches.[9] Medvedev implied that Russia would have to respond to such a scenario and threateningly claimed that US deliveries of Tomahawks to Ukraine would “not be good for anyone.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a request for clarification about Medvedev’s statement, claiming that US specialists would have to participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk missile strikes and that any expert is aware of the consequences of such a decision.[10]

The Kremlin has been engaged in a campaign to deter US sales of Tomahawks to Ukraine in recent days, issuing boilerplate claims about US participation in the strikes, the threat such missile deliveries would pose to US-Russian relations, and the missiles’ inability to shift the situation on the battlefield.[11] The Kremlin's October 13 claims about the difficulties in discriminating between nuclear and conventional payloads mark an inflection in this informational campaign. The Kremlin is likely shifting its narratives following the October 12 Financial Times (FT) report about how the United States has been providing Ukraine with intelligence to facilitate Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector, including oil refineries.[12] Kremlin officials largely did not respond to the FT article, likely because the reporting undermined the narrative that the Kremlin had been repeatedly spreading about how US participation in potential Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes would allegedly risk escalation and a Russian response.

The Kremlin is reportedly preparing to manipulate voters by dismissing unpopular government officials ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 13 that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and a political strategist working with the Kremlin's political bloc stated that the Kremlin is considering replacing select federal subject governors ahead of the 2026 Duma elections.[13] The political strategist source noted that dismissing governors is “more effective” closer to elections, so that “people experience a temporary positive emotion” before voting. The sources stated such a Kremlin decision would aim to allay Russian citizens’ discontent with and distract from recent unpopular decisions, such as raising the value-added tax (VAT) and tightening tax regimes on small businesses. The political strategist stated that the Kremlin may also dismiss the governors to distract Russians who are “tired of the war [in Ukraine] and tired of waiting for negotiations.” Sources stated that local authorities usually cause more discontent than federal ones and that citizens place the blame on the governors for issues that most often irritate them, like issues with transport, utilities, and roads. The source noted that the Kremlin must prepare for dismissals before the 2026 elections now so that the new governors have time to understand how electoral resources work in their regions, which the source emphasized is important to ensure the Kremlin's desired election results.

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of October 12 to 13. Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspline on October 13 that Ukrainian forces struck at least five tanks at the Feodosia Offshore Oil Terminal, a 220kV electrical substation in Feodosia, and a 330kV substation in occupied Simferopol.[14] The sources stated that the strikes started a fire at the oil terminal. Geolocated footage and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data confirm that Ukrainian forces struck the three targets in occupied Crimea.[15] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian strikes damaged 11 fuel tanks at the oil terminal, including eight tanks holding diesel fuel with capacities of 5,000 to 10,000 metric tons, two tanks holding gasoline, and one empty tank.[16] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in occupied Feodosia overnight and caused fires.[17]

Select Russian industries are showing signs of steep decline that risk lasting damage with potentially deep socio-economic repercussions. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 12 that sanctions, rising costs, and low prices have plunged Russia's coal industry into its worst crisis in over 30 years.[18] FT reported that data from Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) shows that Russia's coal sector had $2.8 billion in losses in the first seven months of 2025 — doubling the total of all of 2024 and a stark decline from 2023 when Russia's coal industry generated nearly $4.6 billion in profits. FT reported that the Russian coal industry directly employs more than 140,000 people and remains critical in some oblasts, both as a source of employment and funding for local budgets. FT noted that prices of thermal coal hit multiyear lows globally in 2025 — down 78 percent from 2022 highs — but that the problem has been more severe for Russia as it deals with Western sanctions and logistics bottlenecks. FT reported that the coal sector in occupied Donbas is experiencing significant issues, with Russian investors starting to return mines that the Russian state had given them after they struggled to make the mines profitable. The Russian government has designed its wartime economy to prioritize investment in Russia's domestic industrial base (DIB), which in turn is having negative effects — many of which are potentially long-term — on many civilian sectors and the Russian economy as a whole.[19]

“we (in the Kremlin) plan to encourage people to buy less food for the New Year”

…Not just for the New Year’s Eve party - for the whole year.

Venezuelan style belt tightening. Welcome back to the Soviet Union comrades. Get in line. Show me your papers.

“Russian industries are showing signs of steep decline that risk lasting damage with potentially deep socio-economic repercussions.”

Putin should have taken the deal - that was the smart play. He can’t stop himself, so he must be stopped, at the cost of bankrupting Russia, wiping out a generation’s worth of savings and investment, and likely destroying a lot of the capability to restart making the same incomes afterward.

Putin is The Doom of Russia.

The crisis arrives. New restrictions are in place, to prevent people from leaving, because the Kremlin knows they will want to, but Putin wants/needs them to go down in flames with him.

Putin is The Doom of Russians themselves. It is him or you comrades.

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