Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2025

Russian intelligence services appear to be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe. The Economist and Bloomberg, citing an upcoming report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), recently reported that instances of suspected Russian sabotage attacks and hybrid warfare incidents in Europe sharply escalated to 30 attacks in 2024; IISS also counted 11 suspected Russian-backed hybrid attacks in Europe between January and May 2025.[14] The Economist reported that IISS analysts assessed that the decreasing trend in the number of suspected sabotage attacks in 2025 could be due to the increased NATO presence in the Black Sea, Russia's attempts to posture itself as a good-faith negotiator during peace negotiation with the United States about the war in Ukraine, or concerns that the scale of Russian hybrid attacks in Europe may provoke NATO escalation.[15] US and European officials told Bloomberg that the decreasing trend could be due to Russian President Vladimir Putin's desire to avoid antagonizing US President Donald Trump at the start of Trump's second term and early peace efforts in Ukraine, the reallocation of Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) resources to Ukraine, high-profile trials of saboteurs that are deterring future attacks, or the Moscow's attempts to tighten its control over and restrain the local proxies that Russia is using to conduct the attacks.[16] The official sources cautioned that the decreasing trend does not indicate that Russia has stopped its hybrid attacks or will not escalate them in the future, noting that Russian sabotage plots are more frequent in eastern European states than those in western Europe. IISS similarly warned that Russian intelligence services may be refining their tactics and reassessing the criminal networks in Europe with whom they partner, and that Russia may renew its hybrid campaign against Europe in the near future.[17]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2025

Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia. The Kremlin did not immediately employ a coordinated response on August 2 and 3 following Trump's initial announcement, but more Kremlin officials began to coalesce around similar rhetorical lines on August 4.[1] Kremlin officials utilized three main framings to respond to Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines — posing Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines as “emotional,” discounting the threat that this decision poses to Russia, and posturing Russia as a more responsible international actor than the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 4 that discussions of nuclear escalation are premature and a “very emotional” perception of the situation.[2] Peskov claimed that Russia is “very careful” about any statements related to nuclear issues and that Russia takes a “responsible position” in regard to nuclear rhetoric.[3] Russian Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairperson Grigory Karasin responded to Trump by claiming that it is always better to be less emotional and more rational in foreign policy.[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev also characterized Trump as “emotional” in response to Trump's August 1 statement.[5] Russian State Duma Deputy Viktor Volodatsky claimed that Trump is attempting to intimidate Russia, but that the redeployment of US nuclear submarines near Russia is not a real threat to Russia, and Russian Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov similarly claimed that Trump is mistaken if he assesses that this redeployment will scare Russia.[6] Dzhabarov claimed that Russia is not threatening anyone.

These official Russian responses ignore the Kremlin's history of frequently leveraging nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia. Trump explicitly acknowledged on August 1 that he redeployed the submarines in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev’s July 31 nuclear threats.[7] Medvedev alluded on July 31 to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the “Dead Hand” or the “Perimeter.”[8] The Kremlin regularly uses Medvedev to introduce nuclear threats into the Russian and international information spaces, but more senior Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, also often make similar vague allusions to Russia's nuclear weapons capabilities.[9] Putin has routinely invoked Russia's Oreshnik ballistic missile system to allude to the possibility that Russia could conduct a nuclear strike against the West, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed during a media engagement with Putin on August 1 that Trump cannot dictate rules to a nuclear power like Russia.[10]

The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev’s role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information efforts targeting the West. Peskov claimed on August 4 that Russian officials, including Medvedev, have different assessments on current events but that Russian President Vladimir Putin alone determines Russia's foreign policy.[11] Peskov claimed that Putin's position is the “main thing” of import. Peskov’s attempt to separate Medvedev’s views from Putin's ignores the way that Putin and other high-level officials in Putin's inner circle have themselves frequently used similar nuclear saber-rattling to threaten the West.[12] Medvedev himself does not drive Russian foreign policy decisions, but ISW continues to assess that his statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy.[13] Putin would be able to censor Medvedev’s statements if he chose to do so, especially considering the Kremlin's demonstrated ability to coordinate official statements and overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev’s aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, however, as they push the West to see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and create space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats. Peskov’s August 4 claims are trying to conceal the way that the Kremlin is likely approving and encouraging Medvedev’s use of his platforms to make statements against the West.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025

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