Posted on 03/16/2023 11:01:40 AM PDT by jacknhoo
In recent days it has been reported in the Chosun Ilbo (one of South Korea’s most widely read daily newspapers) that if North Korea launches an ICBM into the “Pacific region,” the United States will “immediately” intercept it. This report was quickly responded to by Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, who warned of a “swift and overwhelming” military response to any action taken by the United States. It is unclear if the reporting in the Chosun Ilbo was a misquote or even a mistranslation. Such a comment has never been made in the past by a senior American official.
The reporting in the Chosun Ilbo was based on an unconfirmed comment allegedly made by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander to the Korean Consul-General in Honolulu and is based on unnamed military sources. The U.S. Department of Defense has not commented on this reporting.
Of course, the recent rhetoric leads one to ask, why would the North Koreans launch an ICBM into the “Pacific region?” The North Koreans have launched several ICBM platforms on an extremely high trajectory (almost straight up) since 2017. If these angles were to be laid out to the actual trajectory of a missile launched at the United States, the Hwasong-14 likely has the range to hit the west coast of the U.S., while the Hwasong-15 has the range to hit all of the continental U.S. Though the Hwasong-17 has reportedly been tested recently, its reliability remains in question.
So why break from this testing modus operandi that has been in effect since at least 2017? Because the debate within the United States and its allies in East Asia continues about whether or not a North Korean ICBM “can really hit” the United States simply based on the extreme trajectory the missiles have been tested on, and perhaps as importantly, “can it really” re-enter the earth’s atmosphere successfully with a live nuclear payload.
There is only one way to definitively prove this. To launch an ICBM carrying a nuclear payload into an empty spot somewhere in the Pacific Ocean. To date, the North Korean leadership has not felt the need to definitively prove this capability to the world. The ongoing debate, however, may have compelled Kim Jong-un to feel he now must show the world that he can launch a nuclear weapon at the United States if the need arises. In addition, if North Korea were to conduct such a test, it would be a “double-whammy,” detonating yet another nuclear weapon while also testing an ICBM at its “full-range” capability.
If the North Koreans were to conduct such a test and fire an ICBM with a nuclear payload into some empty spot in the Pacific Ocean, what would the risk be to American sovereign territory? Well, the answer is, no risk unless the ICBM was to be on a trajectory that would take it over Guam. Thus, though there have been no comments on the statement allegedly made by the Indo-Pacific Commander, if he did in fact make the remarks he may have been referring to a circumstance where the North Korean missile was actually overflying Guam in the Marianas Islands.
While North Korea’s missile launches can be considered provocative they have not been a threat to any nations in the Asia-Pacifric thus far. One wonders if the United States would even want to shoot at a missile that did not pose a threat, and that calls the reported remarks (if they were made) into question.
If the United States did in fact make the decision to shoot down an ICBM that was overflying U.S. sovereign territory, until very recent times, this was something that was seen as an unlikely reaction – because ballistic missile defense capabilities may not have been able to successfully achieve the mission.
There is a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) unit stationed on Guam and the system is well known for being able to bring down MRBM or IRBM systems – but has not been definitively or successfully tested on intercepting ICBM systems and thus would likely be ineffective against these systems if one or more of them was overflying America’s territory in the Marianas Islands.
Fortunately for the United States, on its Aegis-equipped ships, it has the SM-3 Block II-A system. This system successfully brought down (intercepted) an ICBM target on November 16, 2020, and thus could be deployed to wherever it needed to go if the United States made the decision to intercept a North Korean ICBM.
While it appears unlikely the United States would shoot down a North Korean ICBM headed toward an empty spot in the ocean – unless it looked to be on a trajectory that took it over American territory (and even then it is unclear what Washington’s reaction would be because there have been no official statements addressing this recently) – it is clear that the Americans (certainly in theory) have the capability to shoot down the ICBM if called into action while the North Koreans (certainly in theory) have the capability to put a nuclear warhead on a missile and launch it into an empty area in the Pacific Ocean.
Since the North Koreans have never fired an ICBM with a nuclear payload into the ocean, and the Americans have never intercepted a North Korean ballistic missile, we are looking at unprecedented events if either one of these things were to occur.
What are the events that are likely to occur if North Korea does in fact launch an ICBM with a nuclear payload? We can expect sanctions with real teeth will occur. There will also likely be other initiatives put in place to put pressure on and contain North Korea’s WMD programs.
If the United States were to decide to intercept a North Korean missile (and if the attempt was to be successful), tensions would of course increase, but Pyongyang would be forced to think twice before launching further “full-range” tests. If the attempts to bring down the North Korean missile were to prove unsuccessful, a call for further funding and development of BMD is likely to go out.
This would be legitimate because the threat from North Korea continues to grow in numbers and modernity.
The Sea.........................
“N. Korea has yet to prove a guidance system or a re-entry system.”
But they do have it. It was handed to China by Clinton in 1997 through Loral and Hughes corporations. It was called the Missile Re-entry Vehicle system, or MRV. China passed it off to North Korea.
The firms allegedly shared their findings with China on the cause of a rocket’s explosion while launching a U.S.-origin satellite in February 1996. The companies reportedly provided expertise that China could use to improve the accuracy and reliability of its future ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. At least three classified studies reportedly found that U.S. national security was harmed. Congress and the Executive Branch also investigated Hughes’ review of China’s launch failure of January 1995. After failed satellite launches in 1992, 1995, and 1996, China has reported 28 consecutive, successful commercial and government/military space launches.
In 2000, the State Department and Lockheed Martin agreed to a settlement with a fine of $13 million. In 2002, Loral announced a civil settlement with a fine of $20 million. In early 2003, Hughes and Boeing agreed to a civil penalty of $32 million. In 1998, Congress passed the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 105-261 ) that transferred licensing authority over satellites back to the State Department (effective March 15, 1999). On December 30, 1998, the Cox Committee unanimously approved a classified report said to conclude that China’s technology acquisitions over the past 20 years, not only that associated report on May 7, and the Cox Committee issued a declassified report on May 25, 1999 with satellite launches, harmed U.S. national security.
So North Korea has had the MRV since 1997 when Clinton ordered everyone out of major meeting in China thus allowing the companies to pass the information. Clinton approved all the technology transfers.
wy69
Yes, I spent 45 years in the biz, and my assertion remains: N. Korea has yet to prove a guidance system or a re-entry system.
Hey! Where’s the next 3 seconds of that video?
You can disagree/dream all you want, but we have no missile defense system in place that can intercept these ICBMs in a real world scenario. What you point out is a simple one of test and it is not even implemented anywhere.
Exerpt from your article:
“”We have demonstrated that an Aegis BMD-equipped vessel equipped with the SM-3 Block IIA missile can defeat an ICBM-class target, which is a step in the process of determining its feasibility as part of an architecture for layered defense of the homeland,” he said.””
A step in the process, a single ICBM mockup with zero cloaking strategy.
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Experts: North Korea’s New ICBM Poses Challenges to US Missile Defense
March 16, 2022
“The current system right now would be quite constrained,” said Ian Williams, deputy director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Right now, the U.S. homeland missile defense system is tailored for fairly simple threats — one missile, one warhead, relatively simple countermeasures.”
And
The current U.S. missile defense capabilities are unable to defend against even one North Korean ICBM carrying a single nuclear warhead, according to a January report by the American Physical Society.
“Intercepting even a single nuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missile or its warhead(s) in flight under the conditions expected during a nuclear attack is extremely challenging,” the report said. “The ability of any missile defense system to do this reliably has not been demonstrated.”
(Note, our ICBMs have 13 warheads.)
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After four decades and $200 billion, the US missile defense system is no match for a Russian nuclear attack
Jim Puzzanghera Globe Staff, Updated March 12, 2022
Excerpt:
The US only has a limited ability to destroy an incoming nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile, a study released last month by the American Physical Society concluded. It said that “the current capabilities are low and will likely continue to be low for the next 15 years” to protect the US against a strike from North Korea, which has an estimated 20 nuclear warheads and relatively unsophisticated missiles. The Pentagon disputes the findings and says the most recent tests show the system can handle a North Korean attack.
But the ability to defend against an attack by Russia, which is estimated to have nearly 6,000 nuclear warheads and highly sophisticated missile technology, is practically nonexistent. The US system is no match against a large number of incoming missiles — precisely the kind of attack that Russia would launch, experts said.
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/03/12/nation/after-four-decades-200-billion-us-missile-defense-system-is-no-match-russian-nuclear-attack/
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No, We Cannot Shoot Down North Korea’s Missiles
It’s time national leaders speak realistically about missile defense.
Joe Cirincione
September 2017
Excerpt:
“If North Korea cooperated and shot their new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-14, at the United States with adequate warning so that we could prepare, and if the warhead looked pretty much like we expect it to look, and if they only shot one, and if they did not try to spoof the defense with decoys that looked like the warhead, or block the defense with low-power jammers, or hide the warhead in a cloud of chaff, or blind the defense by attacking the vulnerable radars, then, maybe this is true. The United States might have a 50-50 chance of hitting such a missile. If we had time to fire four or five interceptors, then the odds could go up.”
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/09/no-we-cannot-shoot-down-north-koreas-missiles/141070/
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Missing link to the first part of the above post:
Experts: North Korea’s New ICBM Poses Challenges to US Missile Defense
https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-north-korea-s-new-icbm-poses-challenges-to-us-missile-defense-/6487640.html
I remember that. Given to them by the 1990s version of Julius Rosenberg.
“What are the events that are likely to occur if North Korea does in fact launch an ICBM with a nuclear payload?”
1. North Korea gets turned into a lake of glass.
2. That is all.
???? Oh, Really? Which ICBM is that?
Peacekeeper had the capability of 10, but it is no longer deployed.
Minuteman III has the capability of 3, but Bambi ordered them reduced to 1.
N. Korea has demonstrated ZERO guidance or targeted Re-entry capability to date.
Good article, but the stupid headline excites the emotions of the band of noisy monkeys.
So are we talking about if our SDI is good enough to shoot down an ICBM from NK or if our SDI is good enough to destroy all 6,000 Russian nukes? It's hard to keep up with your shifting point you're trying to make.
And about the Boston Globe article you linked to as though it's a separate study, check out this excerpt: "...a study released last month by the American Physical Society concluded...". That's referencing the same study I already told you was limited in scope (to only ground based interceptors).
Last but not least is the Defense One article. Just like I don't judge this laptop based on laptop capabilities from 5 years ago, I hope you're not judging todays SDI from what was public knowledge 5 years ago after 8 years of Obama suppressing SDI R&D.
By the way, a truly exhaustive conversion about planning and implementing missile defense intercepting missiles from Russia isn't complete without discussion about agreements with Russia's neighbors so we can set up missile interceptor launches in virtually every direction from Russia. Our odds of successful interception is way higher if done during ascent. That means the closer we're able to launch from the enemy's launch site, the better our odds. Of course, that gets into situations like the current Russia/Ukraine war (Ukraine and Poland being ideal locations in case Russia launched at us from their west, but Russia obviously ain't happy about stuff like that). I think with Russia we're still mainly dependent on MAD, but we can't count on MAD with other potential enemies like NK and Iran. Fortunately those enemies don't have 6,000 nukes we'd have to intercept like Russia does.
“You’re moving the goal posts to make your argument sound right. “
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No, you’re just lying to make it look bad.
The same article talking about Russia talks about North Korea, but you’re to thick to read it.
Russia’s tiny tactical nukes have been rotting in incompetent storage, and Russia doesn’t have much equipment remaining with which to fire those inaccurate, little artillery rounds. Russia’s longer range missiles are old tech inflated by much exaggeration. Our military forces can see everything they have and everything they’re doing. Russia has no effective defenses and can’t finish preparations to launch in less than 5 minutes.
“So are we talking about if our SDI is good enough to shoot down an ICBM from NK or if our SDI is good enough to destroy all 6,000 Russian nukes? It’s hard to keep up with your shifting point you’re trying to make.”
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You poor thing, I notice and anyone paying attention would too, that you post NOTHING proving we have capability to defend against North Korea, Russia, Iran or any other enemy launching multiple ICBMs with multiple warheads at the USA.
Your hyperbole is nauseating and empty.
“Don’t be misled by cowardly hippies and tyrannical globetrotters.”
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I’ll be waiting for your proof that we have the capability to defend against a ICBM attack of multiple missiles launch at the USA. From anywhere...even from a submarine, which is another highly probable scenario.
I don't think they care what the target is, as long as they hit something.
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