Posted on 09/22/2022 6:28:09 AM PDT by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Small arms, ATGMs, MANPADS, loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles, trailers and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it is not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
RuZZian Tank losses RunningTotal: 1176
September 2022 - 182
August 2022 – 74
July 2022 – 108
June 2022 – 67
May 2022 – 148
April 2022 – 243
Feb 24 - March 2022 – 350
RuZZian Artillery losses Running Total: 302
September 2022 - 60
August 2022 – 21
July 2022 – 21
June 2022 – 18
May 2022 – 20
April 2022 – 52
Feb 24 - March 2022 – 110
1176 tanks!
Demilitarization and denazification of RuZZia continues.
Michael Kofman
https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1572573086490464256
A few incomplete thoughts on the question of mobilization. It won’t solve many of the RU military’s challenges in this war, but it could alter the dynamic. Fair to say that these are uncharted waters, and so we should take care with deterministic or definitive claims. 1/
I wouldn’t suggest that this can turn around Russia’s fortunes in the war. However, I would take care being overly dismissive, especially looking out towards the medium term of this winter and 2023. Force availability and manpower matters, hence the implications can vary. 2/
The Russian military has had structural manpower deficits throughout the war leading to problems with recruitment, retention, and rotation. Units can’t be rotated, leading to exhaustion. Number of refuseniks grew. Hiring short term volunteers exacerbated retention issues. 3/
Piecemeal solutions have led the Russian military to steadily cannibalize the force, using up officers, equipment, and enlisted professionals for reserve and volunteer units. Hence force quality degraded over time, as did morale, retention & exhaustion problems grew worse. 4/
Mobilizing LDNR personnel, and using them to absorb losses led to a variegated force that lacked cohesion, interoperability, and suffered from weak morale. This approach seems to have largely exhausted itself in July, few men left to forcibly mobilize in LDNR. 5/
The first and more important implication is not mobilization but enactment of stop-loss policies. Service contracts extended indefinitely, right to refuse deployment suspended, new criminal measures enacted to enforce what is a de facto introduction of wartime measures. 6/
Caveat, this is an initial interpretation of the order. But it implies that you can no longer tear up your contract in the Russian military or leave service. Volunteers who signed up for short tours (4-6 months) are now extended for the duration of the mobilization period. 7/
All mobilized personnel will be treated as contract servicemen, subject to these conditions. The situation with conscripts appears unchanged, but if Russia annexes these 4 UA regions, then it can technically deploy conscripts in those territories as well... 8/
The optimal time for Russia to conduct mobilization was in April, before significant parts of the force and mobilization base were ineffectually consumed. So, what can this ‘partial’ mobilization achieve for Russia at this stage? The disappointing answer is it depends. 9/
The first limit on mobilization is likely to be throughput - the system has to call-up, house, train, feed, equip, etc. Hence Shoigu’s 300k number is likely to be notional, while actual mobilization proceed as a much more limited and phased process. 10/
That said, I’m skeptical that mobilization infrastructure has sat entirely dormant. Russian voenkomats have been calling people up to update their info since April. Assembling reserve and volunteer battalions likely exercised some of this system already. 11/
Since units typically train their personnel, its unclear what the capacity is in the system to absorb mobilized officers/soldiers, train them, and equip them. These are all uncertainties. Russian training of 3rd corps at Mulino might be an example of the approach (or not). 12/
Hence mobilization is unlikely to generate new units for several months, and even then the output will be a lot less than what Moscow might expect. Mobilization is a coercive process in practice & economically disruptive. It also depends on how Russians choose to react. 13/
However, RU mil could use mobilized personnel first to raise manning levels in currently deployed BTGs, many of which seem at 40-50%. Morale of mobilized personnel might be low, but individual replacements can start filling these units out faster than establishing new units. 14/
Another approach might also be to deploy lower quality infantry regiments, akin to those currently seen among mobilized LDNR units, in order to hold large stretches of the line, i.e. the opposite of the 3rd corps effort to stand up a new volunteer formation with better kit. 15/
The second main limitation stems from constraints on force employment. No matter how many personnel are mobilized, RU mil can only sustain and command a finite number of troops on the battlefield. Scaling has been one of the Russian military’s chief problems in this war. 1
Russian capacity to implement partial mobilization is uncertain, as is the time it would take to produce results & how Russians will react to it. However, I’m also not sanguine on the proposition that it will make no difference. There’s room for caution here. 17/
Morale will continue to be an issue. Stop-loss policies may yield fewer refuseniks, but more deserters. Most UA advantages will remain. What partial mobilization may do in the coming months, depending on what actually comes of it, is help RU mil stabilize their lines. 18/
This is in part why these coming months remain an important window of opportunity for UA to retake territory. Over the winter the contest will likely be one more defined by attrition and reconstitution. The extent to which mobilization can help RU reconstitute is unclear. 19/
Mobilization comes with significant political risks and downsides for Moscow, but it could extend Russia’s ability to sustain this war more so than alter the outcome. As always, these are just initial impressions and a very imperfect reading at best. 20/
Perhaps a useful addition - mobilization & stop-loss might help Moscow stem the deteriorating quantity of the force, but not the deteriorating quality of the force & its morale. Having used up its best equipment, officers, & personnel, I don’t see how this can be recovered.
Mark Hertling
https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1572571676524838915
Putin’s announced mobilization of 300,000 “reservists” was jaw-dropping to me this morning, but not for the reason some might suspect.
Why? Because know how Russian soldiers are trained, in basic training & in their units.
A brief 🧵 on some fun facts. 1/
While I commanded US Army Europe before retiring, before that I commanded all basic & advanced soldier training for the Army (2009-11).
During that period,≈150,000 new soldiers/year at (then) 5 basic training sites & 21 advanced training locations, received training.2/
Most new US soldiers get 10 weeks of basic training (some get more at one-station unit training (OSUT) sites, like infantry, artillery, MPs). Those that don’t go to OSUT travel off to different length courses for advanced training in a “specialty” (logistics, intel, etc). 3/
It’s a long period of time, trained by very professional drill sergeants. There is an extremely high resource overhead to all this. Soldiers report to their units ready to be integrated in the specific mission. Remember, the US population is 344 million & we train≈150k. 4/
Russia, on the other hand, has a population of 144 million citizens, spread over 11 time zones. Theirs is a conscript force w/ 1 basic training site, (Labinsk in S. Russia). Some RU get advanced specialty training, but most RU soldiers get most training in their 1st unit. 5/
Russian soldiers got just a few days of basic training before being sent to Belarus starting last November (pre-invasion). https://themoscowtimes.com/2022/07/20/russia-sends-army-recruits-to-fight-in-ukraine-after-just-days-of-training-a78314 6/
During 2 visits to RU, I saw basic & unit training. It was awful. Familiarization versus qualification on rifles, rudimentary first aid, very few simulations to conserve resources, and...most importantly...horrible leadership by “drill sergeants.” 7/
Officers admitted to me that theirs was a “one year” force, with some - the poorest - volunteering or being elected for leadership roles. 8/
Remember, RU soldiers get almost ALL training in units vs at basic. How units are resourced play a big part. One tank unit i visited near Moscow proudly told me they get 1 tank round/crew each year (US units spend hours in simulators & crews fire dozens of real rounds/year). 9/
BTW, Ukraine’s army has taken the US model to heart after receiving training from US personnel in both individual and unit training techniques since 2014. The establishment of JMTG-U by US Army, Europe was instrumental in that. Heres a link to that. 10/
But I digress... The issue is the Russian army is poorly led & poorly trained. That starts in basic training, and doesn’t get better during the RU soldier’s time in uniform. Mobilizing 300k “reservists” (after failing with depleted conventional forces, rag-tag militias...11/
...recruiting prisoners & using paramilitaries like the Wagner group) will be extremely difficult. And placing “newbies” on a front line that has been mauled, has low morale & who don’t want to be portends more RU disaster. Jaw-dropping. A new sign of RU weakness 12/12
T62 or bust.
“A new batch of cold-war era T62-M tanks (MY1983) for newly mobilized Russian soldiers is on its way to Ukraine. Photo taken on Sep. 11 in Millerovo, Rostov region”
https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1572547554675687428
Ain’t she a beautiful sight.
“Reportedly M270 MLRS in Ukrainian service.”
https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1572576128069672968
“In #Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian BMP-3 IFV using drone-dropped munitions.”
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1572642431853821953
Go Westward young man.
“What is happening on the border of Russia and Georgia.”
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1572720796103245824
“Two drones (presumably Chinese commercial SkyEye) were lost in Dzhankoi, Crimea. One of the drones was shot down, the second fell down in a field. Similar Chinese COTS drones were previously used in a kamikaze role by Ukrainian forces.”
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1572924277552300032
“According to a Novaya Gazeta source in Putin’s administration, the classified seventh paragraph of the mobilisation decree allows the Defence Ministry to mobilise not 300 thousand but 1 million people into the army.”
https://twitter.com/TadeuszGiczan/status/1572909476994220033
“In Buratiya, male uni students are being taken straight out of classes. Some schools have closed and turned into enlistment offices. Men are being rounded up and conscripted from small villages. This will all look *very* different in Russia’s ethnic republics than in Moscow.”
https://twitter.com/ichbinilya/status/1572921782805340163
Does this obviate some of the Russian criticism of the West for supplying arms to the Ukrainians? I mean, given that the Russians are the biggest arms suppliers, through outright gifts of equipment.
“First clips coming out of Russia this morning of draftees saying bye to their families. This from a small town in Yakutsk.”
https://twitter.com/PjotrSauer/status/1572863899934019585
“More signs that the mobilization in Russia is far from partial. This 32-year old IT worked has been drafted despite not having done any military training or study”
https://twitter.com/dasha_reports/status/1572929082014277633
“Buryats flee from mobilization through Kyakhta to Mongolia.”
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1572836000522702848
Good RuZZians
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1572644667203674120
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1572638973297819650
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1572841145830367234
Russia started with an estimated 1200 tanks for the invasion and 1176 have been confirmed destroyed
Is the battle field now almost devoid of Russian tanks? Or have they added a lot more?
Nice job Ukraine!
Note: one of two posts from War in Ukraine.
Ukraine: military situation update with maps, Sept 20, 2022 Update
(’Orc’ is associated with the various hoards of 13th century Mongol invaders, as well as LOTR evil villains)
War in Ukraine
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCP2QApi8G2TKc8NZmeDWSUg/videos
Artillery (key to success in this war), Fuller explanation of Orc military structure, Other Bonus articles - see previous postings in “Attack on Europe” (FR title search).
(Numbered printed material below - Some of the items below may be out of date, and not updated yet)
••denotes transcribed dialogue.
———————————————————————————————————————
Military Situation:
What happened this morning when a Russian president announced mobilization, and I will explain why its not partial mobilization, even though it says so an informal degree so let’s just and sir and before I jump in just want to say
I apologize for not delivering video yesterday I was very sick so I couldn’t couldn’t work so finally I got I feel better so I can I can resume work
What happened actually this morning on September 21, 2022. Russian president gave a speech where he basically outlined these things that there is mobilization in Russia and then Russia is gonna annex, kept newly captured territories because there is not even question that they already annexed territories that were captured in 2014 which is Crimea and part of Luhansk region, part of Donets region.
Now there is annexation also of Kherson region, the Zaporizhzhia region is on the question and the reason its under question is because the capital of the region which is the Zaporizhzhia city is not controlled by Russian troops.
It doesn’t even pass KGB-like legal rationalization. But Kherson region passes that master because Kherson which is the original capital is controlled by Russian troops, so those referendums are going to happen between September 23rd until September 27th.
We almost guarantee that the results are going to be super positive and Russian sources already announced that they do did the opinion polling and between 80% in Kherson region to 90% in Luhansk in the Donets region are already in favor of joining Russia.
This is annexation is being masked by this referendum so being legalized in the view of KGB that like formal legal excuse to do that, its obviously not gonna be recognized by international, well I would say nothing not the whole international community because there is a lot of countries that indifferent or may support Russia in exchange for energy, but let’s say by the West, but at the same time the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania was not recognized by the West in 1940 didn’t prevent a Soviet Union from controlling those countries till 1991.
So that’s not a problem for for Russia, and so what is interesting is how does this mobilization decree may affect population in these regions is that there’s not even question that in those old captured territories which is this part of Luhansk’ region this part of Donets region, they will be mobilized without the question that; there was already mobilization there is no problem about that, however people in Kherson region formally says that they will not be mobilized, unless they volunteer to do so; its a free will.
Knowing how the Soviet system works, because Russia is still Soviet system, Ukrainian Soviet system means that they will be forcibly mobilized, and almost guaranteed that that’s probably going to happen in the Zaporizhzhia region here as well. Those people who live in Kherson if you listen you might be mobilized, in the Zaporizhzhia into the Russian army, so its probably in your best interest not to participate.
Russian Society:
How annexation effects Russian society. In the decree, there was the number of mobilized people was kept secret, then the Russian minister of defense came out and said it is going to be 300,000 soldiers for now.
The first line who is going to be mobilized as those who served in the army, those who served under the signed a contract in the past, and served in Russian army, those are going to be like first layers that will be called, but the way its actually going to work and why its not a partial mobilization. This is really its opening up a door to mobilization as needed; its kind of like an accordion mobilization.
It will be happening layer by layer. The first layer Russian military will try to get those people who are most capable right away; they don’t need much training because they’ve served in the Russian army under the contract.
I think that Russia still has this compulsory conscription services, everybody has to serve with exception those who go into higher education, but in any case, most of the population went through the conscription service.
The first layer will be those who actually served, signed the contract with the Russian army in the past served, but decided not to extend the contract. The second layer is going to be conscripts and then in a non-conscripts. This is how its going to work and where it stops will be determined by the situation on the battlefield.
The decree is just a tip of the iceberg: Russian parliament passed the law at the same time. This is where two parallel processes discuss, addressing all of these details about the full mobilization of the Russian society.
Some of the key features that relates to the economy, the most important one is Russian military can force civilian companies, enterprises to do military orders, to produce whatever is needed for the military, and not only that but also, the owner may be jailed for years, if they refuse to to produce required goods.
That’s where there is a huge leverage now and why I say that this is full-scale mobilization, because this really means that the entire Russian economy is in the hands of the Russian twelve Russian leadership.
If you serve, you’ve been mobilized and you serve in Russian army, and if you surrender you will get up to 10 years of prison, if there is no signs of treason, but this will go hand in hand and probably there will be a sign of treason or knowing how the Russian legal system works - and by the way Ukraine is the same - the better way to say how the Soviet legal system works, you’re gonna get 15 years.
There is some part that says if you surrender of your free will this only applies, but again knowing how Soviet system works, its going to be everybody is going to be free will; you immediately will get slapped with 10 to 15 years and in most cases maybe 15 years, because there is no objective way to establish was it free will. The system will always go in the direction of most repressive choice. Those are the key features. (Edit: Except in present day USA, where, if you are caught smuggling 38 kilos of a dangerous drug, you will get maybe up to 3 years. But in most countries it will be 3-6 years for just 2 kilos, 10-15 years for 10 kilos, and decades for more than 10 kilos.)
How does this change the whole situation, this whole war?
As I said about a week ago, Ukraine almost won the war or at least on the path to winning, this change 180 degrees, its on the path of losing war.
Why? I said in March that if Ukraine is going to be as inefficient as it is, it has no chance of winning this war, and this is going to be very challenging for Ukrainian society as a whole to really change. Ukrainian leadership at all levels is absolutely incompetent and not capable of winning this kind of war of attrition, even though it is possible to win such a war.
For that you need to be extremely efficient and efficient mean like using resources efficiently, not wasteful, and by resources I mean everything: human resources, production resources, energy resources, literally everything. Now, it becomes all in total war for Ukraine, even more so than for Russia, because its a smaller country there is no other option. That’s is going to be challenged for Ukrainian society to basically change and its going to be a sink or swim moment; whether it will be able to do so is remains to be seen.
I want to mention that Russian leadership decided to close the door of negotiations by saying that referendum in Kherson region will close the door; this is going to be forever Russian territory which is obviously not acceptable for Ukraine.
Kherson and the Zaporizhzhia region the majority is ethnically Ukrainian region, especially Kherson region, and generally the Zaporizhzhia region is also, actually Zaporizhzhia itself is more Russian ethnically, because there was a lot of Russian population that was also forcibly moved by the Soviet government during the industrialization of this whole area. Its not a natural process; it was all engineered or forced by the Soviet government, in any case, this is a little bit of background on the on the ethnic situation in these regions.
North Luhansk’
There’s no further movement of Ukrainian troops from this small bridgehead on in east Kupiansk. It remains small and stable to our knowledge.
Lyman:
Ukrainian troops did attack on the 19th, but that attack apparently failed; they did not manage to liberate Lyman. Everything returns to status quo before the attack at this point; no changes. Ukrainian command is trying to bridge the Russian defenses and apparently very clearly that Ukrainian troops probably will move towards Savatove and in Starobil’s’k with the idea of liberating the North Luhansk’ region.
North Donbas:
The situations here is interesting: Ukrainian troops apparently are on the verge of breaking Russian frontline northward around Spyrna and with one sort of axis going to this version of Kamenka which is also means Luhansk oil refinery.
Ukrainian troops managed to breach Russian defensive lines southward and even the reach village of Berestova. There were reports that it was liberated, no confirmation. But this section of the front line, Russian side is really threatened, and as a result of that, Russian command is pulling Wagner mercenaries from their attacks in Bakhmut and south of Bakhmut to plug the hole around Berestova.
This gives you idea why everything is so difficult for Russian command; they were forced to do this mobilization and everything because, otherwise, they cannot win this war. Russian troops continued their attacks in Soledad without much success; the same is true in Bakhmut.
There’s the real risk that Ukrainian troops will penetrate; they can move more towards Papasana and creates a threat of encirclement, and with it the collapse Russian frontline in the south.
Central Donbas:
Nothing new there and just the same kind of attacks there
Kherson bridgehead:
Nothing changed really.
Don’t forget......... Help is needed
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/4095195/posts
RuZZia biggest supplier of arms to Ukraine. USA second.
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