Book review: Pacific Trilogy by Ian Toll

Call it author's ego, but there are very few other historians that I read and say, "Wow, I wish I could write as good as him." Among those who come to mind, David Hackett Fischer, Paul Johnson, Ron Chernow, Barbara Tuchman, and David McCullough.

Ian W. Toll's magnificent Pacific war trilogy was one of those books (three, actually) that when you were finished you were sad because there were no more literary worlds to conquer.

His previous claim to fame was a book about the War of 1812 called "Six Frigates," which I plan to grab next. Otherwise, I had not heard of him. He is apparently NOT a prof---a free lancer as are Chernow, Johnson and most of the rest. That's probably what makes them so good. They didn't get stultified by the academy.

Volume I, "Pacific Crucible," covers the Pacific War from its origins to the Battle of Midway; volume II, "The Conquering Tide," goes from June 1942-the end of 1944; and "Twilight of the Gods" covers the bloody final months including Iwo Jima and Okinawa, plus the dropping of the a-bombs.

NOTE: He does NOT cover the war in China, the Burma/SE Asia front, or war in the Indian Ocean. His focus is on America and American forces. He deals with the fall of Singapore in a cursory manner (if "cursory" can be used when discussing volues each of almost 600 pages plus endnotes.

In "Pacific Crucible," Toll presents one of the very best analyses of the lead up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that I've seen. Without taking Japan's side, he provides deep insight into how they interpreted the Washington Treaty, the immigration restrictions, and even the Treaty of Portsmouth (which they viewed as demeaning). As most people know, Isoroku Yamamoto was part of the "peace faction" who knew that war with America would be a defeat and that under no scenario could Japan hope to win. In most scenarios, even he doubted Japan could hope for a negotiated end once the US recovered.

Toll heaps blame on Adm. Nagumo for failing to hit the fuel tanks on Oahu. In one of his rare omissions of a critical source, he fails do discuss Maj. Clausen's book "Pearl Harbor: Final Verdict" that laid out the ghastly and multiple layers of incompetence by Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel in coordinating; in changing alert codes without telling Washington; in failing to have long-range recon aircraft out; and so on. Toll gets some of this on his own, but misses some of the really big ones. (Short changed the order of the alert codes from 1 being high to 1 being low WITHOUT TELLING WASHINGTON). This was July 1941. SO when Marshall asks if PH was on "Level 1 alert" meaning "highest" to him, Short said yes, with level 1 meaning lowest.

Toll follows the Japanese rampage through Singapore, the Philippines (blaming MacArthur for being unprepared, despite many days' warning; for overconfidence, but absolves him of anything but heroism in defense of Bataan.

Toll's character studies of Nimitz, whom he admires greatly, King, whom he tolerates but praises for constantly protecting the Navy's interests against MacArthur, MacArthur (a publicity hound who always put out press releases saying "I" did x, y, or z, not "the American Army" or "we," Spruance, a talented but cautious commander, Halsey, who he faults on three separate occasions for endangering the fleet (two typhoons and the Battle of Leyte, are superb. He correctly shows that King, with his henchmen the Redmons, stabbed Joe Rochefort and Edwin Layton in the back because their analysis of intel proved better than the Redmons' own back in DC.

In "Pacific Crucible," Toll doesn't spare criticism of the U.S. Navy's nearly obsolete equipment at the beginning of the war: the horrible Mark 13 torpedoes (which the Navy Ordinance Bureau refused to fix), the slow Wildcat fighters (whose deficiencies were overcome largely by tactics such as the "Thatch weave,"; and the sickeningly slow Avenger torpedo planes. He praises the Dauntlesses, which proved to be not only acceptable dive bombers for the first year of war, but also doubled as excellent long-range scouts.

At Midway, Toll confirms the generally accepted story that the U.S. was both lucky and good, in that Leyton and Rochefort figured out when and where the Japanese would be LITERALLY TO THE HOUR AND WITHIN A FEW MILES OF THE JAPANESE LOCATION. That was skill: it was pure luck that because of the uncoordinated attacks from three different torpedo squadrons from different directions at different times, the Japanese fighter cover was non-existent when the US Dauntlesses found the carriers by tracking a destroyer that had lingered behind to search for the "Nautilis" sub.

Most people know how that turned out. Over a 48 hour period, the US so badly damaged the four star Japanese carriers that they could not be salvaged & were sunk by Japanese subs. What is a myth is that 300 pilots went down with them. In fact, 2/3 of the Japanese pilots were recovered/rescued.

Of course, the Midway invasion was Yamamoto's idea, but was given the go ahead due to the Doolittle Raid, an anazing combined Army/Navy operation that did little actual physical damage but phenomenal psychic damage. Overnight, the Japanese high command approved Yamamoto's Midway plan and were put on their heels.

Volume II begins, following Midway, with the strategy to protect the supply line to Australia, then start moving up the island chain to Japan. Marines landed at Guadalcanal and everything was going swimmingly until at night a force of Japanese cruisers sailed into Savo Island Sound and destroyed several American cruisers. The carriers had been pulled out because of concerns about Japanese land based bomber raids and submarines. Toll does not criticize Spruance for this repositioning, given that the Enterprise was our lone fully functional carrier for much of this time and had to be protected. But the Marines on Guadalcanal caught hell until finally the air strip was finished & air cover could land there.

At the naval battle of Guadalcanal, the Americans got payback for Savo Island Sound and sealed the victory for the Marines on the island. After that, Japanese attempts to resupply the island were sporadic. Still, Japanese troops strength on the island reached 30,000 at one point. Attempts to provision the troops with fuel drums full of rice or other supplies were occasionally successful, but the Japanese forces dropped to just 15,000 before an evacuation was ordered. Australia was saved, and the lifeline for the island invasions was established.

What was becoming clear was that the early Japanese advantage in night fighting had given way to the American superiority in radar; that American tactics had offset the technological advantages of the Zeros and that the Japanese couldn't compete with the army of skilled pilots the US was turning out. The air war advantage shifted to the USA.

Toll exposes as malarky the notion that MacArthur was the architect of the "island hopping" strategy. It was an idea developed by Halsey's staff & MacArthur came along belatedly. The joint S. Pacific counteroffensive by Halsey (who had replaced Spruance in a regular rotation) and MacArthur advanced up through Bougainville and then bypassed the heavily fortified Rabaul moving on to New Britain and the Admiralty Islands.

Usually balanced and not given to long digressions, Toll provides a full chapter to sub warfare and especially the voyage of the Wahoo, which penetrated the inland sea and was sunk, but only after a terrific kill record. Largely overlooked, the subs began to eviscerate Japan's merchant shipping, depriving them of steel, then of oil.

Meanwhile, Toll examines American naval production and the "conquering tide" of ships, planes, and materiel that buried the Japanese. The US would launch almost 100 carriers of various types by the end of the war; Japan, one new battle carrier (which was sunk by a sub). New Hellcats replaced the Wildcats and proved vastly superior to the Zero (and everything else) AND, as a side effect, turned out to be good dive bombers as well. New torpedoes replaced the crap Mark 13s.

Just when things were really looking up for the US, an island called Tarawa stood in the way. Since Guadalcanal, the Japanese learned that banzai bayonet charges were foolish and suicidal. At Tarawa, the first of the "dig in" strategy that the Japanese would use for the rest of the war was encountered. Certainly the Japanese learned that they could not survive above ground against American naval gunfire & air support. Instead, they burrowed into caves and, fighting suicidally, had to be burned out. They were. It was costly and slow, but ultimately the verdict was not in doubt. The raid on Truk atoll caught some of the remaining Japanese fleet at harbor and destroyed more of their ships by air---"a smashing carrier raid" as Toll calls it.

With the subsequent success of the carrier raids, Toll looks back at the assault on Tarawa and suggests even that could have been "island hopped." Perhaps. But bloody as it was, Tarawa provided real life (and death) training for Marines (and later, the Army) that would be needed at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and it could be argued that without the experience gained at these islands, Iwo and Okinawa would have been even more costly.

Next, at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, what was left of Japanese naval air power was slaughtered (The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot). Not one, but two Americans became an "ace in a day," and one flier shot down an astonishing NINE planes. At this time, newly manufactured Zeros were being hauled away from the Mitsubishi plant by . . . oxen. The planes were too flimsy to transport on trucks. But feed was in short supply. As Toll puts it in one of his great lines, "essential wartime delivereies of replacement aircraft this hung on the fate of a diminishing herd of underfed beasts."

Adm Marc Mitscher pursued Ozawa's retreating carriers and got the Hiyo, whereupon his returning planes arrived at night, searching for their carriers to land on. The fleet "turned on the lights" and led most of the American planes home.

At times there are fascinating parallels to modern events. At one point, a Japanese girl recalls she became "disillusioned with the disgraceful qualities in our people. They had ecome a herd whose humanity had beeh shorn from them by war" . . . or in our case, by deranged hate of a duly elected president.

Volume III, "Twilight of the Gods," begins with the debate over bypassing the Philippines in favor of Formosa, or invading the Philippines. According to myth, MacArthur almost singlehandedly convinced FDR to invade the Philippines. In reality, though, one by one all the major commanders except King concluded Formosa was NOT the better choice at that time, and the the Philippines gave us many of the same things, while at the same time rescing a US territorial protectorate and freeing POWs. Above all, MacArthur's Philippine offensive could be launched with existing forces and did not have to await transfer of European forces. First up was Peleliu, another tough fight with dug-in Japanese. After that, Ulithi Atoll, which provided a magnificent US harbor for Halsey and Spruance's task forces. In six weeks, Halsey's carrier force went on a rampage that wiped out 1,200 Japanese aircraft in the region.

At the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, Halsey made a serious error. He allowed his carriers to be lured north by Adm. Ozawa's remaining carriers . . . which had no planes on them. Meanwhile a force under Adm. Nishimural tried to sneak in to the south of Leyte gulf and attack the helpless transports---only Adm Kinkaid's forces lay in wait with layers of PT boats, destroyers, submarines, then the heavy guns of the US cruiser and battleship lines. It would be the last gun-to-gun naval battle in history. We won. Nishimura turned back with heavy losses. But unknown to Halsey, there was a third force under Kurita slipping in behind him to attack Leyte from the north west. On that side, only the "Taffy 3" baby flattops and a handful of destroyers supported the invasion. They were sitting ducks for cruisers. Gamely, however, the destroyers lay smoke and attacked while the flattops ran. The combination of air harassment, destroyer torpedoes and the disorganization that struck Kurita's force in the smoke left him confused and concerned that he was walking into a trap. Quite the contrary, had he pushed on, he might have achieved a major victory. Both Halsey and Kinkaid at that point were too far away to help. But Kurita chose to run, offsetting Halsey's error in chasing Ozawa. The errors canceled out, but Halsey finished the Japanese carrier fleet in the "Bull Run", the Battle of Cape Engano. Halsey never admitted he screwed up. But the other admirals were furious at him and Nimitz briefly considered recalling him. But Halsey, like Patton, was simply too popular with his men. "He fights" was his byword, and that saved his command.

Returning to the submarine war, the Archerfish, happened to be in the right place at the right time and caught a completely unknown vessel---merely the LARGEST AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN HISTORY up to the carriers of the 1950s, the Shinano, trying to get south. Archerfish sank what it did not know was a carrier, but the skipper drew pictures and later it was a confirmed kill.

For the rest of the volume, Toll recounts the fantastically difficult assault on Iwo Jima (again, where naval and air power were nearly inconsequential). Out of 22,000 Japanese on the island, only 400 surrendered. Nearly 5,000 Marines were killed to take a hunk of volcanic rock that would later prove critical in the B-29 raids on Japan.

After Iwo, Okinawa was the last major jumping off point before Japan itself. Again, the Japanese pulled back, ceded the beaches, and fought a suicidal series of fallback battles. Again, almost all had to be killed. Only a handful surrendered.

It was in these final stages that all Japanese---ground, sea, air---were expected to become kamikazes and attack even with no hope of surviving, let alone winning. And, at the same time, a typhoon swept in and Halsey managed it badly. Destroyers leaned past 45 degrees. Some 790 Americans died in this typhoon, and again, Nimitz considered removing Halsey.

Toll shifts gears to the B-29 history, production, staging and eventual use. Hap Arnold managed to get the B-29s in their entirety sent to the Pacific, and rained holy hell on the Japanese after Iwo and Okinawa were taken. High altitude bombing gave way to low-level night attacks with firebombs that leveled 20% of Tokyo. One pilot recalled thanking God at every takeoff for the Marines who died that they had a base to return to.

Secretly, of course, the a-bomb had been prepared. The Japanese knew they couldn't win; but they thought extensive casualties might cause the US to negotiate short of an invasion of Japan itself. Operation Olympic was being planned when special airplanes began training at Tinian and Saipan. At Potsdam, the Allies gave Japan one last chance to surrender, and the hard liners in the Army especially refused. Little did they know that the USSR had spent months moving millions of troops from Germany to Asia and would unleash a shattering attack that crushed Japanese resistance in northern China.

On Aug. 6, Enola Gay basically eliminated the city of Hiroshima, but even then, the Japanese hesitated to surrender. They began to quibble about conditions in the Potsdam statement. Truman wisely did not wait and the bombing of Nagasaki followed on Aug. 9. The emperor had enough, personally weighed in, and announced the plan to surrender over Japanese radio broadcast. Surrender on the Missouri followed two weeks later.

Some of Toll's best writing is in the final chapter describing the occupation. It is heartwarming and consoling that the Japanese people could become friends with Americans, and the GIs do the same with their former enemies.

In broad strokes, Toll adeptly discusses the tradeoffs for each campaign; the Army and Navy position; the politics of various campaigns; and of course, the personalities. Armed with crappy equipment at the outset, America not only made more but much better equipment by 1944. Even if the Japanese could have matched us in quantity, they still would have lost. Only the suicidal kamikaze mentality stretched the war out as long as it went. Had Japanese surrendered like more typical European soldiers at Tarawa, Pelileu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Manila, the war likely would have ended in mid 1944 and no one would have ever seen an a-bomb dropped in combat.

Toll is not PC in his analysis of either the a-bomb, Japanese atrocities, or, for that matter, American atrocities when they occurred. Neither MacArthur nor Halsey were all-star heroes, but they were there at critical moments when, likely, no one else could have done the job. Nimitz was a gem---probably the best commander on either front save Ike and Patton (all for different reasons). King, despite being an a-hole, did not micromanage the war from Washington and got the Navy the equipment and men it needed.

Thanks.
“The horrible Mark 13 torpedoes”
The thing that bothers me. I can’t understand how it survived review.

anyway... my father likely wouldn’t have survived an invasion of Japan so i’m appreciative of the A-bomb LOL!

“deranged hate of a duly elected president”.

Why did this have to be there? Given what Biden has done so far, so fast, to harm American interests, it applies to him but I doubt the reviewer has that in mind.

Testing on the Mark 14 torpedoes was minimal, because the Navy was so poorly funded between the wars. To save money, the Navy used the same torpedoes over and over for testing, such that they wore down (because torpedoes aren’t exactly re-used in battle) and developed their own characteristics, and never tested one with a live warhead before release to the fleet. (In contrast, not only had the Japanese rigorously tested and proven their Type 95 torpedoes, but every Japanese sub commander got to fire a live one as part of training.)

Also, the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport, RI was the living embodiment of a entitled, secretive, bureaucratic workforce that literally didn’t care about their work output or the needs of the Navy, even after the war began. That’s why the new projects, like the electric Mark 18 and acoustic Mark 27 torpedoes, were entrusted to the new, untested factories at Forest Park, Illinois and Keyport, Washington for development and production.

Remarkably, once debugged, the Mark 14 was good enough to continue in service well into the 1960s.

Additionally, the Mark 14 was plagued with an innovative magnetic exploder, that again had not been adequately tested before deployment. It was designed around the notion of a ship’s magnetic field being hemispherical, and strongest directly under the ship...apparently this was true in the waters off of Newport, but in equatorial regions the field formed a wide, thin disc shape, and the exploders were triggered well before reaching the ship, let alone traveling under it.

The inventor was the same Admiral commanding the US sub fleet out of Australia (Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie)...not only did he refuse to listen to any criticism of his design, but he waged a virtual vendetta on sub skippers that dared to criticize it. He was finally overridden by his superiors, who ordered it withdrawn from the field.

Christie was also notorious for brown-nosing for General MacArthur, such that he was ordering his subs’ deployments to suit MacArthur more than the Navy, and putting them at needless risk...which resulted in the death of Admiral Nimitz’ son aboard the USS Robalo in 1944, and the end of Christie’s command.

"the slow Wildcat fighters (whose deficiencies were overcome largely by tactics such as the "Thatch weave,"

The men who flew and fought the Wildcat were both talented and courageous, and had to be both in taking on the Zeros. When the Hellcats showed up in the fleet, they were visually similar to the Wildcats and totally caught the Japanese pilots off guard. Most sources list the Hellcat as having the highest kill to loss ratio of any fighter in WWII.

Adm Nimitz’s son (Chester Jr, better known as “Chet), was commander of USS Haddo in 1944, and sank over 14,000 tons of enemy shipping during war patrols under his leadership. Both the sub and the younger Nimitz survived the war. He committed suicide (along with his wife) in 2002, after their health deteriorated rapidly in their final years. Chet Nimitz (who reached Rear Admiral on the retired list), was 86 at the time he ended his life by taking an overdose of sleeping pills.

On that side, only the "Taffy 3" baby flattops and a handful of destroyers supported the invasion. They were sitting ducks for
cruisers. Gamely, however,the destroyers lay smoke and attacked while the flattops ran. The combination of air harassment, destroyer
torpedoes and the disorganization that struck Kurita's force in the smoke left him confused and concerned that he was walking into a
trap.

Quite the understatement...The Destroyers Johhston, Hoel and DE Samuel B. Roberts were lost running straight at the Battle ship heavy Japanese Center Force inflicting heavy
damage on several of the bigger Jap ships so that the carriers could get away...one of the bravest
sacrifices in WWII naval history, IMHO. James D. Hornfischer covers it beautifully in 'The Last Stand of The Tin Can Sailors'.

Thank you for the review of Toll's work...I have read the 'Conquering Tide'...I will pick up the other two.

I like to start with the first...you compelled me to order Six Frigates just now. It will be here tomorrow. You also likely got me in trouble with the spousal unit...she hates it when I order more books. ;)

The Navy Ordinance Bureau insisted the torpedoes were fine, and that it was “pilot error,” i.e., the sub captains screwed up. This finally changed after an independent review (I think by a Brit or Aussie), then the sheer number of complaints by the sub captains, who had completely turned off the auto detonators and set them for other types of detonation, reached King to the point he couldn’t ignore them.

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