Correct. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, Byrne will have to show that his business or property has been damaged as a result of the racketeering activity, that he was the intended victim of the racketeering activity, and that the racketeering activity was the proximate cause of the injury. Stated another way, to survive a motion to dismiss, Byrne must allege in detail that defendants carried out or conspired to carry out a pattern of racketeering activity through the "Clinton enterprise" with the specific intent of causing harm to Byrne's business or property, and the harm was an intended and foreseeable consequence of the racketeering activity.
But the following implies an individual taxpayer could bring charges:
To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must plead, at a minimum, “(1) the defendant's violation of 18 USC § 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff's business or property, and (3) causation of the injury by the defendant's violation. This third requirement is satisfied if the defendant's injurious conduct is both the factual and the proximate cause of the injury alleged.” Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2003)
Which prevails?
Neither. It is obvious to anyone paying the scantest attention in recent years, “the rules are for little people.”
No. That argument is disposed of in Basich cited above. The reakateering activities only have to be the "proximate cause" of injuries to Byrne. He does not have to demonstrate that the conspirators intended to target him specfically - though I think his allegations cover him there anyway. They certainly did intend to target him and did so, if the facts stated are true.
The concept of "standing" is not unique to RICO. To have standing to sue in federal court, the plaintiff must have suffered harm that is separate and distinct from the harm suffered by the public at large. For this reason, mere taxpayer status rarely provides standing to sue in federal court because the plaintiff has not suffered harm that is separate and distinct from the harm suffered by taxpayers as a whole.
In order to have standing within the context of a civil RICO claim, the plaintiff must have been the intended victim of the racketeering activity. Suppose, for example, that I own a pub next to a social club where gangsters are known to hang out and engage in racketeering activity, but they have never specifically directed their racketeering activity towards me. The gangsters sometimes eat and drink in my pub, but because they are known to engage in murder, extortion, arson, bribery, robbery, illegal gambling, and narcotics trafficking, and other racketeering activity, my other customers feel uncomfortable and so they stop coming in and I lose money. Even though the racketeering activity has clearly harmed my business, I do not have standing to commence a civil RICO suit because I am not the intended victim of the racketeering activity.
In addition to standing, the plaintiff must show that the racketeering activity is the proximate cause of the injury to its business or property. Proximate cause requires that the injury to the plaintiffs business was not only the result of racketeering activity, but that the injury was the intended or foreseeable result of such activity. Although proximate cause and standing are often tied together, they are distinct elements of the RICO claim in that standing refers to the intended victim and proximate cause refers to the intended or foreseeable result.