BBC's insult to hero pilots: Veterans rage over Dresden coverage that attacks Britain...

dailymail.co.uk ^ | 14 February 2015 | Larisa Brown and Inderdeep Bains

[Berlin_Freeper]

The BBC’s coverage of the bombing of Dresden in which Britain was described as ‘worse than the Nazis’ was condemned as disgraceful by RAF veterans and MPs last night.

Despite dedicating more than 32 minutes of airtime to the 70th anniversary of the fire-bombing that killed tens of thousands at the end of the Second World War, there was barely a mention of British airmen who lost their lives.

The BBC’s four major news shows and Radio 4 interviewed multiple German survivors of the bombings.

They also showed a British prisoner of war who berated those who ordered the raids, adding it was ‘demonic’ and ‘evil’.

[PieterCasparzen]

We knew where the airfields were.

The airfields were target #1.

[xone]

There were alot of airfields. Doesn't mean there would be aircraft on them when you got there. Germans figured out the scramble too. The bombers attracted German fighters. Germany lost 21000 fighters during the war, over 6000 of them to bomber crews. From the beginning of the war until 1944 the only offensive weapon killing Germans consistently in Europe (Italy aside)were aircraft. Aircraft apart from bombers that could consistently scourge the Germans didn't show until Mar 44.

There was no 'real-time' intel, comms sucked compared to today. No real-time imagery. In short, none of the systems that make targeting effective today were available.

[PieterCasparzen]

“D-Day 1944
Air Power Over the Normandy Beaches and Beyond”

Richard P. Hallion
Air Force Historian

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-H-DDay/

This recounts what was available D-Day and immediately thereafter.

Amazingly good.

Luftwaffe basically did not show up, according that account.

If all Allied bombing had been directed at Luftwaffe airfields and used to lure up fighters and dogfight them, sheer attrition would have ended the Luftwaffe as an effective force even earlier than it was.

As it was they ran out of pilots before equipment.

Highly trained pilots are the most precious resource that can’t be replaced fast enough if an air force is being trampled.

[xone]

Highly trained pilots are the most precious resource that can’t be replaced fast enough if an air force is being trampled.

No kidding, pilots killed by bomber crews. Not replaced because of Hitler's stupidity. Notice the date, 5 years of attrition.

[xone]

If all Allied bombing had been directed at Luftwaffe airfields and used to lure up fighters and dogfight them, sheer attrition would have ended the Luftwaffe as an effective force even earlier than it was.

The fighters at the time couldn't hang with the bombers, so the battle of attrition would only be over easily fixed airfields. No strategic targets would be struck as the bombers get shredded over the home fields of the fighters. The Allied bomber assets would have been spent for no gain. That's where the attrition would have occurred. Bombing without meaningful targets.

[PieterCasparzen]

No kidding, pilots killed by bomber crews. Not replaced because of Hitler's stupidity. Notice the date, 5 years of attrition.

If enemy airfields were the bombers' destinations - even if they missed - the same attrition would have happened.

[PieterCasparzen]

Actually the building of the heavy bombers was a waste.

As the above link shows (Air Force historian) the fighter-bomber was the ultimate effective tool.

The evidence was clearly in front of Allied Command, since they knew how well the Mosquito did.

Without dedicating resources to building heavy bombers, massive hordes of fighter-bombers and light, fast bombers could have been built and deployed.

[xone]

If enemy airfields were the bombers' destinations - even if they missed - the same attrition would have happened.

Yes, but it would be a wasted sortie, over the fighter base, absolutely no advantages for the bombers

[xone]

Actually the building of the heavy bombers was a waste.

Revisionist BS. Fighter-bombers hadn't the range or payload to effect the strategic targets. The same failing of the Luftwaffe had by not developing and producing a four engined bomber prior to hostilities. They couldn't affect Russian industry once Barbarossa started. The same industry that ran them out of the Soviet Union.

Without dedicating resources to building heavy bombers, massive hordes of fighter-bombers and light, fast bombers could have been built and deployed.

And you would need the horde, unless you passed on strategic targets. Bomb-laden fighter bombers would have been easy pickins for the Luftwaffe unless they dropped their bombs, in which case you'd be killing civilians all over Europe, not just in Germany.

[xone]

Actually the building of the heavy bombers was a waste.

Yeah, that was proven in the Pacific.

[cycjec]

the Jews who took off the stars after the bombing lived,
e.g. Victor Klemperer. The orders had just been issued
for he and others to be murdered (sent to whichever camp
they would be sent to)

Another data point

[cycjec]

add photos of Minsk and Manila, to really bolster your point

[PieterCasparzen]

Excerpt from wikipedia:

(more at this link)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Mosquito#Survivors

"When the Mosquito began production in 1941, it was one of the fastest operational aircraft in the world.[6] Entering widespread service in 1942, the Mosquito was a high-speed, high-altitude photo-reconnaissance aircraft, continuing in this role throughout the war. From mid-1942 to mid-1943 Mosquito bombers flew high-speed, medium or low-altitude missions against factories, railways and other pinpoint targets in Germany and German-occupied Europe. From late 1943, Mosquito bombers were formed into the Light Night Strike Force and used as pathfinders for RAF Bomber Command's heavy-bomber raids. They were also used as "nuisance" bombers, often dropping Blockbuster bombs - 4,000 lb (1,812 kg) "cookies" - in high-altitude, high-speed raids that German night fighters were almost powerless to intercept.

As a night fighter, from mid-1942, the Mosquito intercepted Luftwaffe raids on the United Kingdom, notably defeating Operation Steinbock in 1944. Starting in July 1942, Mosquito night-fighter units raided Luftwaffe airfields.[emphasis mine]"

Another article shows Mosquitos operating with virtual impunity against German airfields during '42 and '43.

Exerpt from wikipedia:

More at the link:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Cologne_in_World_War_II

"30/31 May 1942 RAF 868 aircraft bombed Cologne during the first 1000 bomber raid (1,047 aircraft),[10] laden with over 3 million kg of ordnance.
31 May 1942 RAF Photo reconnaissance by 5 de Havilland Mosquitoes of No. 105 Squadron RAF.[10]
31 May/1 June 1942 RAF Two aircraft. Conditions were cloudy over Cologne so no bombing was undertaken. Both aircraft returned to base.[10]
1 June 1942 RAF 2 Mosquitoes in a nuisance[nb 1] and diversionary raid.[10][nb 2]
26 July 1942 RAF 3 Mosquitoes in a nuisance raid.[10]
10 August 1942 RAF Single Mosquito on a nuisance raid, bombs and returns to base.[10]
25 August 1942 RAF 4 Mosquitoes to Germany on nuisance raids, one of them to Cologne, three complete their mission and bomb. One lost.[10]
2 September 1942 RAF 1 Mosquito on a nuisance raid, bombs and returns to base.[10]
2 September 1942 RAF 2 Mosquitoes on a nuisance raid, bomb through cloud and return to base.[10]
7 September 1942 RAF 1 Mosquito on a nuisance raid, bomb through cloud and return to base, no record of the bombing on the ground.[10]
15/16 October 1942 RAF 289 aircraft.[10]
22/23 January 1943 RAF This was the first raid on Cologne using "Oboe" navigation, two Mosquitoes damaged 55 houses, killing 5 people and 22 injured. This showed that using electronic aids a few bombers were able to inflict as much damage as 100-bomber raids in poor weather in the previous years.[10]
2/3 February 1943 RAF 161 aircraft.[10]
14/15 February 1943 RAF 243 aircraft.[10]
25/26 February 1943 RAF 6 Mosquitoes to the Ruhr in a diversionary raid (the main attack was against Nuremberg), 13 people were killed in Cologne[10]
26/27 February 1943 RAF 427 aircraft.[10]
May 1943 RAF [10]
11/12 June 1943 RAF 1 Mosquito as part of a diversionary raid (the main attack was against Düsseldorf)[10]
13/14 June 1943 RAF 2 Mosquitoes bombed Cologne one of several nuisance raid.[10]
16/17 June 1943 RAF 212 aircraft.[10]
17/18 June 1943 RAF 2 Mosquitoes bombed Cologne, one of several nuisance raids.[10]
19/20 June 1943 RAF 6 Mosquitoes to Cologne, Duisburg and Düsseldorf (the main attack was against Le Creusot).[10]
22/23 June 1943 RAF 4 Mosquitoes as a diversionary raid, (the main attack was against Mülheim).[10]
23/24 June 1943 RAF 3 Mosquitoes on a nuisance raid.[10]
28/29 June 1943 RAF 608 aircraft.[10]
2/3 July 1943 RAF 3 Mosquitoes on a nuisance raid.[13]"

Of course, there's no way they would want to focus on wiping out the Luftwaffe and all its airfields, equipment and installations, not to mention the loss of pilots that would be inflicted by focusing completely on the Luftwaffe first and foremost.

So the Mosquito was mostly reduced to the role of "nuisance raider", photo recon, etc.

[xone]

Of course, there's no way they would want to focus on wiping out the Luftwaffe and all its airfields, equipment and installations, not to mention the loss of pilots that would be inflicted by focusing completely on the Luftwaffe first and foremost.

No, it's because it couldn't do the job. They raided airfields in 1942. If it worked, why stop? It didn't work. Or do you think the bankers called the squadron?

[PieterCasparzen]

They didn’t stop, they worked fine. The last date above is July of 43, and there’s more at the link going through 44 and 45.

If you’d actually admit what is in bold from the excerpt, you’d see that the German forces were “almost powerless to intercept” them. This is because of their performance.

And the more depleted the Luftwaffe became, the more effective the small, tactical bombers and especially the fighter-bombers became.

Post-war the RAF determined that the Mosquito was 4.95 times cheaper than the Lancaster at bombing in terms of useful damage done.

They would get the jobs that amounted to the “surgical strikes” of the day, since they had fantastic accuracy relative to heavy bombers, as they could come in tree top level if necessary in high-performance low-level attacks.

The conventional thinking of the Allied command from the outset, however, guided by the “experts” of the day was that the “fortress” heavy bomber was going to be “it”, so those efforts continued to be made no matter what the result was. There was this constant line of bs about destroying the “morale” of the citizenry, yet with totalitarian governments in Tokyo and Berlin, it was utterly obvious that those governments would never surrender due to any amount of whining and groaning of the populace they lorded over. And the populace simply had no way to voice any significant public discontent with their war effort, let alone effect a surrender, without deadly retribution on them from their own government.

Well given that the experts who personally guided Roosevelt and Churchill wanted wholesale destruction, it’s no surprise that from the top down that was the conventional wisdom of the day. Bomb the civilians into obvlivion - that’ll teach that Hitler a lesson.

Of course, top-down idiocy plagued the German and Japanese High Commands as well - yes, according to the overall plans of those bankers that were devised many years before the actual start of the war. The trail of evidence for that is in the financing and direction of key war industries more than a decade before the outset of hostilities.

[xone]

They were a great plane, but there weren't enough of them to be effective. The depletion of the Luftwaffe in Europe apart from Italy came about because of the presence and use of four-engined bombers. That's the fact. The Luftwaffe's main concern was the attacks of these bombers. That's the fact.

And the more depleted the Luftwaffe became, the more effective the small, tactical bombers and especially the fighter-bombers became.

The smaller planes became more numerous, but their effects were still tactical.

And the populace simply had no way to voice any significant public discontent with their war effort, let alone effect a surrender, without deadly retribution on them from their own government.

Leadership has consequences.

according to the overall plans of those bankers that were devised many years before the actual start of the war. The trail of evidence for that is in the financing and direction of key war industries more than a decade before the outset of hostilities.

Because there had to be some amorphous goal, it couldn't be that people desired war, no it was bankers that drove them to it. Leadership entranced by bankers, not a lust for power, not for hegemony. It has to be something else and unseen. Not exactly what it appears to be.

[xone]

yet with totalitarian governments in Tokyo and Berlin, it was utterly obvious that those governments would never surrender due to any amount of whining and groaning of the populace they lorded over

And it took atomic weapons delivered by 4 engined bombers to convince the Japanese to capitulate, saving millions of Japanese lives.