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They didn’t stop, they worked fine. The last date above is July of 43, and there’s more at the link going through 44 and 45.

If you’d actually admit what is in bold from the excerpt, you’d see that the German forces were “almost powerless to intercept” them. This is because of their performance.

And the more depleted the Luftwaffe became, the more effective the small, tactical bombers and especially the fighter-bombers became.

Post-war the RAF determined that the Mosquito was 4.95 times cheaper than the Lancaster at bombing in terms of useful damage done.

They would get the jobs that amounted to the “surgical strikes” of the day, since they had fantastic accuracy relative to heavy bombers, as they could come in tree top level if necessary in high-performance low-level attacks.

The conventional thinking of the Allied command from the outset, however, guided by the “experts” of the day was that the “fortress” heavy bomber was going to be “it”, so those efforts continued to be made no matter what the result was. There was this constant line of bs about destroying the “morale” of the citizenry, yet with totalitarian governments in Tokyo and Berlin, it was utterly obvious that those governments would never surrender due to any amount of whining and groaning of the populace they lorded over. And the populace simply had no way to voice any significant public discontent with their war effort, let alone effect a surrender, without deadly retribution on them from their own government.

Well given that the experts who personally guided Roosevelt and Churchill wanted wholesale destruction, it’s no surprise that from the top down that was the conventional wisdom of the day. Bomb the civilians into obvlivion - that’ll teach that Hitler a lesson.

Of course, top-down idiocy plagued the German and Japanese High Commands as well - yes, according to the overall plans of those bankers that were devised many years before the actual start of the war. The trail of evidence for that is in the financing and direction of key war industries more than a decade before the outset of hostilities.

They were a great plane, but there weren't enough of them to be effective. The depletion of the Luftwaffe in Europe apart from Italy came about because of the presence and use of four-engined bombers. That's the fact. The Luftwaffe's main concern was the attacks of these bombers. That's the fact.

And the more depleted the Luftwaffe became, the more effective the small, tactical bombers and especially the fighter-bombers became.

The smaller planes became more numerous, but their effects were still tactical.

And the populace simply had no way to voice any significant public discontent with their war effort, let alone effect a surrender, without deadly retribution on them from their own government.

Leadership has consequences.

according to the overall plans of those bankers that were devised many years before the actual start of the war. The trail of evidence for that is in the financing and direction of key war industries more than a decade before the outset of hostilities.

Because there had to be some amorphous goal, it couldn't be that people desired war, no it was bankers that drove them to it. Leadership entranced by bankers, not a lust for power, not for hegemony. It has to be something else and unseen. Not exactly what it appears to be.