James Madison (VA) supported some formula, but as it was, all states would soon end up with three electors, the maximum. He favored a rule in which the number would vary according to state populations.
Elbridge Gerry (MA) motioned a starting point, an initial number of electors per state for the first election and suggested, NH 1, MA 3, RI 1, CN 2, NY 2, NJ 2, PA 3, DE 1, MD 2, VA 3, N C 2, SC 2, GA 1.
Judge Oliver Ellsworth (CN) moved to modify the electoral number for NH and GA.
Jacob Broome (DE) & Luther Martin (MD) wished to postpone Mr. Gerry’s allotment of electors and send it to a committee.
A vote to send the issue to committee failed 7-3.
William Houston (GA) seconded the motion to add an elector to NH and GA. The motion carried 6-4.
Hugh Williamson (NC) thought the number of electors after the first election should be the number of reps in the House of Representatives.
The motion as to numbers of electors per state in the first election carried 6-4.
A portion of the 9th Resolution, “to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty,” was next.
Charles Pinckney (SC) did not support impeachment of the Executive.
William Davy and James Wilson (PA) considered impeachment essential. Absent impeachment there was no telling what some men would do to remain in office. (Impeachment is next to no threat to any criminality or violation of our Constitution. What a shame. The fear in 1787 was making impeachment and removal too easy, for say, policy differences with Congress.)
Governeur Morris (PA) (Well, at least his aristocratic tendencies are consistent.) again thought only the Executive’s ministers impeachable; that reelection or no should be sufficient evidence of guilt. Who is to impeach? (We hadn’t gotten that far yet.) What would be the result of impeachment, suspension of his functions? Mr. Morris thought the threat of impeachment would render the Executive dependent on those with the power.
Dr. Benjamin Franklin (PA) wished to retain the clause. Without it, violence, and assassination were the only recourses for particularly objectionable executives. Impeachment would also serve to acquit an innocent man. (Franklin was among the best at understanding human nature. Here, he foresaw scoundrel Presidents and encouraged impeachment as an alternative to violent overthrow. At the end of the Convention he also predicted our eventual slide into despotism.)
Governeur Morris (PA) modified his position to wish a delineation of the offenses that could bring on impeachment.
James Madison (VA) answered Mr. Morris using terms: incapacity, negligence, perfidy, perversion of his administration, peculation, oppression, betrayal. Executives and legislatures differ in their capacity of corruption, one man v. many. While it was difficult to bribe a majority of a legislature, (Oh well, nobody bats 1.000) it was easier to corrupt a single man and therefore impeachment was necessary. (Had Madison’s envelope of impeachable offenses been incorporated, I have to wonder how it would have hindered Presidential overreach of powers.)
Charles Pinckney (SC) did not see the need for impeachment. Such a “rod” held over the head of the Executive would surely impair his independence. (I think we see here another indication of state legislative muscle over their governors. There was an undercurrent, a presumption in these debates, of a powerful Congress that must be reined in to some extent, less it railroad the Executive as state assemblies did to governors.)
Elbridge Gerry (MA) urged acceptance of the clause. A good Magistrate could not fear it, a crooked one should. (In a rebuke to Mr. Morris) Executives can do wrong.
Rufus King (MA) reminded the Convention of axiom of independence between the branches. Judges were impeachable because they served during good behavior. Executives had to face elections regularly. What was the forum to be for impeachment? Would the Executive also hold office subject to good behavior? If so, the legislature should not be the grand jury to bring charges. (Ever so slowly, the theories of the great political philosophers were considered, molded, polished, and put into practice.) Mr. King along with other delegates considered legislative impeachment a violation of Montesquieu’s maxim.
Governor Edmund Randolph, himself a governor, knew the opportunities for executive mischief, especially during war. Provision for impeachment was imperative. He brought up a method using judges as per Alexander Hamilton (NY)’s sketch of government.
Dr. Benjamin Franklin (PA) gave an historic example why violence may at times be the alternative to impeachment.
Rufus King (MA) drew an exception to Mr. Franklin’s lesson. The Statholder held office for life.
James Wilson (PA) drew an interesting parallel between Senators and Executive. Both were to hold office for six years; should Senators not be subject to impeachment?
Charles Pinckney (SC) implied the powers of the Executive would be so narrow as to “render impeachments unnecessary.”
Governeur Morris (PA)’ opinion had changed. (As did most all of the delegates during the span of the Convention) He saw the need for impeachment when, as would be the case, the Executive could be bribed, be bought by foreign interests (Bent Willie and China and Loral Space Systems?) Mr. Morris drew the difference between a Monarch who had power and wealth and could reasonably resist betrayal of the interests of his country with an elected Executive for years. For treachery, buying his electors, and incapacity, the Executive should be impeachable. “This Magistrate is not the King but the prime-Minister. The people are the King.” (That could become a FR tagline) Still, the Executive should not be dependent on the legislature.
On the question, “Shall the Executive be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty,” passed 8-2.
“To receive fixed compensation,” passed without opposition.
“To be paid out of the National Treasury,” passed with only NJ in the negative. (?) The Convention agreed unanimously to “that the Electors of the Executive shall not be members of the Natl. Legislature, nor officers of the U. States, nor shall the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme magistracy."
James McClurg (VA) queried as to the powers of the Executive. The committee of detail would have an easier time of it if they had direction as to the extent/limits of Executive power.
James Wilson (PA) concurred.
Adjourned.
Notice the reason for it, to provide a nonviolent means to remove scoundrel Presidents.
As colonists a dozen years prior, we couldn't depose the King who made war on us. Our Framers corrected that; as a free and self governing people we could remove our President.
Does that paper power exist today, or is the impeachment clause just another one excised by time, non use? Or, is it not used because the office of the President has become more Kingly in nature rather than popular?