Might be interesting to compare notes...Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787, Taken by the Late Hon Robert Yates, Chief Justice of the State of New York, and One of the Delegates from That State to the Said Convention.
SATURDAY, JUNE 9TH, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment.
Motion by Mr. Gerry to reconsider the appointment of the national executive.
That the national executive be appointed by the State executives.
He supposed that in the national legislature there will be a great number of bad men of various descriptions-these will make a wrong appointment. Besides, an executive thus appointed, will have his partiality in favor of those who appointed him-that this will not be the case by the effect of his motion, and the executive will by this means be independent of the national legislature, but the appointment by the State executives ought to be made by votes in proportion to their weight in the scale of the representation.
Mr. Randolph opposes the motion. The power vested by it is dangerous- confidence will be wanting-the large States will be masters of the election-an executive ought to have great experience, integrity, and activity. The executives of the States cannot know the persons properly qualified as possessing these. An executive thus appointed will court the officers of his appointment, and will relax him in the duties of commander of the militia-Your single executive is already invested with negativing laws of the State. Will he duly exercise the power? Is there no danger in the combinations of States to appoint such an executive as may be too favorable to local State governments? Add to this the expense and difficulty of bringing the executives to one place to exercise their powers. Can you suppose they will ever cordially raise the great oak, when they must sit as shrubs under its shade?
Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware divided.
On motion of Mr. Patterson, the consideration of the 2d resolve was taken up, which is as follows: Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be apportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of inhabitants, as the one or other rule may seem best in different cases.
Judge BREARLY. -The present question is an important one. On the principle that each State in the Union was sovereign, congress, in the articles of confederation, determined that each State in the public councils had one vote. If the States still remain sovereign, the form of the present resolve is founded on principles of injustice. He then stated the comparative weight of each State-the number of votes 90. Georgia would be 1, Virginia 16, and so of the rest. This vote must defeat itself, or end in despotism. If we must have a national government, what is the remedy? Lay the map of the confederation on the table, and extinguish the present boundary lines of the respective State jurisdictions, and make a new division so that each State is equal-then a government on the present system will be just.
Mr. Patterson opposed the resolve. Let us consider with what powers are we sent here? (moved to have the credentials of Massachusetts read, which was done.) By this and the other credentials we see, that the basis of our present authority is founded on a revision of the articles of the present confederation, and to alter or amend them in such parts where they may appear defective. Can we on this ground form a national government? I fancy not. - Our commissions give a complexion to the business; and can we suppose that when we exceed the bounds of our duty, the people will approve our proceedings?
We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent, sovereign States, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our States who have sent us here for other purposes?
What, pray, is intended by a proportional representation? Is property to be considered as part of it? Is a man, for example, possessing a property of 4000 to have 40 votes to one possessing only 100? This has been asserted on a former occasion. If State distinctions are still to be held up, shall I submit the welfare of the State of New Jersey, with 5 votes in the national council, opposed to Virginia who has 16 votes? Suppose, as it was in agitation before the war, that America had been represented in the British parliament, and had sent 200 members; what would this number avail against 600? We would have been as much enslaved in that case as when unrepresented; and what is worse, without the prospect of redress. But it is said that this national government is to act on individuals and not on States; and cannot a federal government be so framed as to operate in the same way? It surely may. I therefore declare, that I will never consent to the present system, and I shall make all the interest against it in the State which I represent that I can. Myself or my State will never submit to tyranny or despotism.
Upon the whole, every sovereign State, according to a confederation, must have an equal vote, or there is an end to liberty. As long, therefore, as State distinctions are held up, this rule must invariably apply; and if a consolidated national government must take place, then State distinctions must cease, or the States must be equalized.
Mr. Wilson was in favor of the resolve. He observed that a majority, nay, even a minority of the States, have a right to confederate with each other, and the rest may do as they please. He considered numbers as the best criterion to determine representation. Every citizen of one State possesses the same rights with the citizen of another. Let us see how this rule will apply to the present question. Pennsylvania, from its numbers, has a right to 12 votes, when on the same principle New Jersey is entitled to 5 votes. Shall New Jersey have the same right or influence in the councils of the nation with Pennsylvania? I say no. It is unjust-I never will confederate on this plan. The gentleman from New Jersey is candid in declaring his opinion-I commend him for it-I am equally so. I say again, I never will confederate on his principles. If no State will part with any of its sovereignty, it is in vain to talk of a national government. The State who has five times the number of inhabitants ought, nay must have the same proportion of weight in the representation. If there was a probability of equalizing the States, he would be for it. But we have no such power. If, however, we depart from the principles of representation in proportion to numbers, we will lose the object of our meeting.
The question postponed for farther consideration.
Adjourned to to-morrow morning.
I review the available notes of all delegates. When they have something to add to Madison, I include it. Yates had nothing to add; his notes mirrored Madison’s today. To post his notes or others for the mere sake of doing so is just so much spam.